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P. D. MURRAY: THE COOCEPT OF SALVATION IN THE THEDLOGY OF KARL RAHNER 
This work explores the adequacy of Karl Rahner 1 s theological 
methodology through an analysis of the concept of salvation in his 
theology. Karl Rahner represents one of the most significant of 
twentieth century Roman Catholic theologians. His life work was to 
give expression to the inherited tradition in the vastly changed milieu 
of the modern world. He did not seek only to reformulate particular 
doctrines but to re-express the very foundations of theology. Building 
/ 
upon the work of Joseph Marechal, he sought to root theology in a 
transcendental analysis of the knowing and willing human sUbject. 
Rahner's methodology remains foundational for many contemporary 
theologians. However, questions remain as to the adequacy of this 
methodology: ]):)es Rahner, in the final analysis, simply seek to 
correlate the inherited tradition and theological methodology to 
contemporary self-understanding, or does he genuinely seek to re-
articulate the Christian tradition and theological methodology in the 
light of contemporary self-understanding? wa explore this question 
in dialogue with concerns drawn from fundamental soteriology. 
Throughout Christian history soteriological concerns have provoked 
theological debate. Soteriology brings to a £ocus fundamental questions 
in Christian theology and practice: the dignity and significance of 
Jesus of Nazareth; the relationship between a transcendent God and an 
immanent saving activity; the nature of the Christian vocation; the 
relationship between the historical order and eternal beatitude; 
whether theology fits with human concerns and if so, how? wa examine 
these questions through a study of Karl Rahner 1 s theology and in so 
doing inquire as to the adequacy of his theological method and his 
attempted re-articulation of the Christian tradition. 
1 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
THE COOCEPT OF SALVATION IN THE THIDI.DGY OF KARL RAHNER 
RAHNER' S APOLOGIA FOR A PRIORI MEI'APHYSICS 
AND THE NEED FOR A RE.VISIONisr S)'l'ER!OJ.DGY 
ONE VOLUME 
PAUL DAMIAN MURRAY 
M. LITT. 
UNIVERSITY OF IXJRHAM 
DEPARIMENI' OF THIDI.DGY 
1990 
2 
TABLE OF OONI'ENI'S: 
1. OiAPTER ONE: INI'OOJ::X.CI'ION 
1.1 Atonement as a central question in Christian theology 
1.2 The soteriological issue as a moment within the 
response to modernity 
1.2.1 The axial rotation of modernity 
1.2.2 Epistemological concerns 
1.2.3 The autonomy of the moral subject 
1.2.4 Scientific and political conscientization 
1.3 Dual task for theology 
1.4 Rattner set in context - his significance for the neo-
orthodox pursuit 
1.5 Overview of the present work 
ENINJI'ES: CHAPTER ONE 
2. CHAPTER 'lW): OOME CRITERIA OF ADEX:lUACY FOR SOTERIOIOOY 
2.1 The need for an approach to theology which works from 
particular concerns to general theories 
2.1.1 The crisis of meaning in religious language 
2.1.2 Why this crisis? 
2.2 The inadequacy of a soteriology focussed upon 
individual salvation 
2.3 The need for a soteriology of healing liberation and 
radical transformation 
2.3.1 Idealistic perspectives on humanity 
2.3.2 The depth of the soteriological question 
2.3.3 The Reformation dispute over justification and 
3 
Page 8 
8 
11 
11 
13 
14 
14 
17 
19 
26 
29 
Page 39 
39 
39 
40 
so 
56 
56 
57 
the dual principle that God must be present 
both in forgiveness and healing Page 64 
2.3.4 The Catholic tendency to make salvation 
conditional upon the fulfilment of a near 
impossible ideal. 
2.3.5 The cause of Catholicism's retreat from a high 
theology of grace into legalism 
3. CHAP1'ER THREE: THE OPENNESS OF THE HUMAN PERSON TO THE 
67 
69 
73 
INFINITE HORIZON OF IDLY MYSTERY Page 96 
3.1 Introduction 96 
3.2 The Kantian critique of human reason 97 
3.3 Rahner in dialogue with Kant 100 
3. 3 .1 The place of anthropology in Rahner 's theology 100 
3.3.2 The necessity of the metaphysical question 101 
3.3.3 Rahner's metaphysical analysis of the 
transcendental structure of the knowing and 
willing human subject • • • 104 
3.3.4 God as the illimited horizon of all human 
knowing and willing 107 
3.4 God is mystery 110 
3. 5 'lbe place of freedom in Rahner 's anthropology 113 
3.6 The human person's free choice of self into eternity 
as the locus of soteriology 
3.7 The human person's soteriological concern as 
embracing concern for the human community 
3 .a The inadequacy of Rahner 's starting point 
4 
••• 119 
126 
130 
ENINOrES: CHAPI'ER THREE 
4. CHAPTER FOUR: SIN AND GUILT AS RADICAL DEI'ERMINAm'S OF 
HUMAN LIFE 
E:NIN:YrES: CHAPTER FOUR 
5. CHAPTER FIVE: THE SELF-o:::MruNICATION OF GOD AS THE 
ABSOUJI'E CIDSENESS OF FORGIVIN3 IDVE 
5.1 God - the radical closeness of the absolute horizon 
of human life 
5.2 Salvation as sharing in the trinitarian life of God 
5.3 The universality of God's offer of salvation 
5.4 Rahner's disagreement with the scholastic teaching on 
nature and grace 
5.5 Rahner's approach to the relationship between nature 
and grace 
5.6 The historical thematic mediation of the supernatural 
existential 
5.7 How can the transcendent God be present in the 
historical order? 
5.8 Can the universality and the gratuity of grace be 
reconciled? 
5.9 Rahner's understanding of the nature-grace 
relationship as condemning the human person to 
existential Pelagianism 
ENDDl'ES: CHAPTER FIVE 
5 
Page 141 
••• 154 
••• 166 
Page 171 
171 
177 
182 
••• 185 
••• 187 
••• 190 
••• 194 
••• 204 
••• 207 
••• 214 
6. CHAPTER SIX: CHRIST THE CX>NSt.M1ATION OF SALVATION' HISIDRY Page 234 
6.1 Introduction 234 
6.2 Transcendental Christology 235 
6.2.1 Background 235 
6.2.2 The God-man as the radical fulfilment of 
hurnani ty • s transcendental openness to God 
6.2.3 The God-man as the radical fulfilment of God's 
transcendental self-conununication to the human 
person 
6.2.4 The conditions that the absolute saviour must 
••• 238 
••• 241 
fulfil ••• 243 
6.3 Jesus, the absolute saviour, the God-man, the 
irrevcx:::able self-conununication of God and the 
eschatological consi.U'IIliiCltion of salvation history 
6.4 Christ as ground and goal of God's transcendental 
self-conununication 
6.5 Rahner's ontological soteriology 
6.6 Rahner's last stand - God Who cannot change in 
Godself can change in God's other 
6. 7 The inadequacy of Rahner • s ontological soteriology 
due to his transcendental perspective 
6.8 Conclusion 
FNINJI'ES: CHA?1'ER SIX 
BIBLIOORAPHY 
6 
••• 246 
••• 252 
••• 257 
••• 267 
••• 271 
••• 273 
••• 280 
••• 294 
Dm.ARATION 
None of the material contained in this thesis has been 
submitted for a previous degree in this, or any other, 
university. This thesis is the product of the 
author's sole research under the supervision of 
Professor Daniel W. Hardy. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without his 
prior written consent and information derived from it 
should be acknowledged. 
7 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRO.DIJCI'ION 
1.1 Atonement as a central question in Christian theology. 
The Christian gospel is a gospel of salvation (1). It finds its 
originating impulse and raison d'etre in the conviction that in the 
life, death and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, God was present 
reconciling the world to Godself in a final and irrevocable manner. 
The Christian vocation is to proclaim in word and deed the reality of 
this new creation and to cooperate with God's redeeming activity. The 
soteriological significance of the Christ event has consistently 
determined Christian self-understanding. Indeed, soteriological notifs 
can be seen to have guided the formulation of the Church's Christology 
in the first few centuries (2). Whilst it is clear that Christian 
self-understanding is intrinsically linked to the belief that salvation 
is present in Jesus Christ, it is less certain as to What this 
salvation consists in (3). 
Soteriological concerns have provoked some of the most crucial 
debates in Christian history. Against the dualism of gnostic systems, 
Christianity maintained that God's redeeming activity in Christ 
encompassed the entire created order (4). Against Pelagius the Church 
maintained that the entire created order was 'fallen' and in need of 
redemption (5). Luther believed himself to be maintaining the identity 
of Christianity in claiming that justification was by grace alone. 
a:nne, in turn, believed that Christian identity required salvation to 
involve a genuine transformation of the person (6). Today, soteriology 
finds itself once again the focus of concern, being held to be the 
criterion by which to judge the adequacy of Christian self-
understanding. 'OUtside' the Church this is taken to operate at an 
g 
implicit level ( 7) • In so far as Christ ian soteriology is identified 
with an other-worldly, individualistic vindication at the last 
judgement and admission to eternal beatitude, Christianity is held to 
be irrelevant to human Life in this world. 'Inside' the Church, or 
within theology, it operates at an explicit level (8). 
The dispute over recent theologies of Liberation concerns the 
question as to Whether Christian salvation is individualistic and 
other-worldly as outlined above, or Whether it is concerned with the 
liberating activity of God in the present order, establishing the life 
Which God intends for humanity and Which is to be enjoyed with God 
eternally. It is the question as to Whether Christianity represents an 
escape from the world into the spiritual realm or whether it is 
concerned with the transformation of the present order. The liberation 
theologians, in identifying liberation and salvation (9), consciously 
perceive this to be a question of the nature of Christianity (10). 
They claim that in the process of being sacralised and put into the 
context of religious salvation schemes of an individualistic and other 
worldly emphasis, salvation language and the nature of Christianity has 
been distorted (11). They believe that an authentic Christian 
perspective can only be regained through rooting salvation language in 
human life. ~ believe this to be a genuine concern that must be 
upheld. The theologians of the Magisterill11l however have evinced 
concern that liberation theology should not allow itself to become the 
captive of ideologies (12). They maintain that Christianity cannot 
dispose of its •other-worldly', •spiritual' significance and reduce 
itself to the level of secular and materialistic humanism without 
becoming: 
a novel interpretation of both the content of faith and of 
Christian existence Which seriously departs from the faith of 
the Church and, in fact, actually constitutes a practical 
9 
negation. (13) 
The concern is that in turning attention to the realities of human 
Life, liberation theology ceases to be theology and reduces to socio-
political analysis. Again, we would maintain that this is a genuine 
concern. Whilst soteriology must be rooted in human life it must 
continue to be soteriology. 
Behind the concern as to whether salvation language is emptied of 
content in being located in concern for the transformation of the 
present order lie wider issues: Is it sufficient for Christian 
theology to maintain the orthodox T!Ddel ( 14) where the object-referent 
of theology is exclusively understood as being authoritative past 
articulations of the Christian tradition (15)? Rather than leading to 
genuine dialogue with the concerns of human experience, such a model is 
unable to speak intrinsically to and from lived human reality (16) and 
gives the impression of dictating to human reality. Whatever the 
original intention, in practice the orthodox model invites the believer 
to be docile to a ready formulated system of theology which is to be 
secondarily applied to life (17). The question of the sufficiency of 
the orthodox model leads to other concerns. Can theology only be 
meaningful if it is contextual theology, i.e. self-consciously aware of 
the particular situation in human history from which it speaks (18)? 
Further, can contextual theology indeed be theology rather than simply 
a description of the situations with which it is concerned (19)? 
To pose the question differently, how do 'faith stories• and 
'faith discourse• relate to 'life stories• and 'life discourse• (20)? 
These questions pertain to the very nature and approach of Christian 
theology. They concern the starting point of theology, i.e. whether we 
start with common human experience or with the received Christian 
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tradition. They concern the focus of theology, i.e. whether it has a 
vertical or a horizontal focus, (21). Hence, they are brought to 
sharpest expression in soteriology where the divide between 'other-
worldly escape' and 'this-worldly transformation' is presented nost 
starkly. Soteriology can be seen to be a living issue in contemporary 
Christian theology, self-understanding and mission. It is here that 
the methodological questions of fundamental theology and the Church's 
understanding of her vocation in the world, what it is to be the agent 
of the salvation of the world (22), are brought to sharpest focus. We 
intend to pursue these questions in dialogue with the theology of Karl 
Rahner and in so doing to inquire as to the adequacy of his theology. 
1.2 The soteriological issue as a nnment within the res,POnse to 
modernity. 
1.2.1 The axial rotation of modernity. 
The issue as to whether Christian &-..'"1teri.ology is exclusively 
other-worldly, in a vertical trajectmy, or also this-worldly in a 
horizontal trajectory, can be seen to be a noment within the crisis 
occasioned for Christian self-understanding b¥ the nexus of 
perceptions, beliefs and attitudes comnonly referred to as modernity. 
It is impossible in a short introduction to present an adequate account 
of modernity and we shall content ourselves with outlining the basic 
shift in understanding that it occasions and presenting an overview of 
three of its major perspectives. 
The pre-modern world-view divided reality into the higher sacral 
realm of the spirit and the lower profane realm of nature. Theology 
had precedence over philosophy, church over state and grace over 2 
r-~-
nature. Intrinsic value was denied to human life in this order (23). 
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Tb focus one's attention on the present order rather than on the next 
was to lose one's soul. M:SWeeney paints an amusing characature: 
The catholic lived between two trinities: the Father' Son and 
lbly Ghost on the one side, attracting him, through the 
Church, towards the devout life and salvation, the W:>rld, the 
Flesh and the Devil on the other, placing obstacles in his 
way, enticing him towards evil and damnation. (24) 
From the late Eighteenth century onwards the Enlightenment 
announced the emancipation of the human from the previously endured 
spiritual adolescence. The pre-modern world-view underwent an axial 
rotation (25). Humanity no longer feels itself to be a stranger in a 
foreign land. No longer is it considered sufficient to devalue human 
life this side of the grave, treating it as a provisional stage lacking 
in intrinsic value; on the contrary, it is thought to be the correct 
focus of our concern (26). Albert Keller describes the change in 
humanity's perspective thus: 
There was a corresponding shift in perspective as regards the 
end of man. Flight from the world, with its neglect of the 
worldly, bodily and material, and its special connotation of 
contempt for the sexual, ceased to be regarded as an ideal to 
be valued for its own sake. Instead, these realms were 
assigned real values of their own, secondary no doubt at 
first in comparison to the religious realm contrasted with 
them, till finally a complete secularization was achieved •. 
It became clear that neither the church nor the orientation 
to an other-worldly goal was helping men to master the tasks 
which were incumbent on them in the worldly realm. (27) 
Times of crisis represent not only a threat to present self-
understanding but also an opportunity for creative re-examination and 
the recovery of an alienated self-consciousness. Attempts to 
reformulate soteriology in view of the shift in perspective (cf. 
Liberation Theology) are not to be considered simply as accomroodations 
to the zeitgeist of modern and post-modern thought. Rather, they are 
attempts to welcome the mment of crisis as presenting the opportunity 
of recovering an alienated, yet rore authentic, self-consciousness. 
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Before we survey the response made by theologians to the crisis posed 
by rocxierni ty we shall detail three areas of nodern thought which have 
profound repercussions for Christian soteriology and which we believe 
to have influenced Rahner's theology. These are in turn: the 
epistenological question of the limitation of human knowledge to the 
finite world: the autonomy of the human noral subject: the increasing 
scientific and political conscientization as leading to concern for 
this order. 
1.2.2. E;pisteoological concerns 
During the Middle Ages metaphysical theology reigned supreme as 
the queen of the sciences. Its position of unchallenged legitimacy 
then is only matched by its aloost universal displacement now. At 
best, the possibility of metaphysical discourse must be established 
before one can seek to pursue the metaphysical endeavour. At worst, 
metaphysics in the traditional sense is simply considered impossible, 
in which case metaphysical discourse is confined to a transcendental 
analysis of the categories of knowledge. This situation is largely due 
to the epochal work of Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason (28). 
Kant maintained that all knowledge was derived from our intuitions 
of sense-data as they were given form through the activity of the forms 
of sensibility (space and time) and the twelve categories of 
understanding (arranged in four kinds: quality: quantity: relation and 
I'OCldality). The concepts given by the categories enabled us to know the 
forms which in turn enabled us to know the intuitions of sense data. 
But the forms and categories could only legitimately function within 
the \\Orld of sense-data: '"Ihoughts without content are empty, 
intuitions without concepts are blind." (29) To inquire al:x:>ut objects 
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beyond spatia-temporal experience, or even to inquire about spatia-
temporal experience in its totality, was to go beyond the valid limits 
of human knowledge. Kant's work heralded the end of the legitimacy of 
an intellectual fascination with a higher spiritual \tK>rld. 
1. 2. 3. The autonomy of the mral subject. 
Just as Enlightenment thought, epitomised in Kant, led to a shift 
from metapnysical abstraction to What could be experienced in the 
spatia-temporal realm, so also there was a parallel shift in mral 
perspective. 
absolute. 
The mral autonomy of the human person was upheld as 
One's decisions should not be determined by the voice of 
external authority, tradition or revelation but rather by the dictates 
of one's own conscience. Nor should the individual seek the means to 
fulfil the demands of conscience in an external source. One had to 
take responsibility for one's own life. "With the starry heavens above 
and the mral law within" the person must act in accord with the good. 
The practical effects of the emphasise upon the ooral autonomy of 
the individual were twofold. Firstly mrality was reduced to an 
individual concern which found its purpose not in an other-worldly life 
but rather in an absolute demand in the present. Secondly, whilst 
Kant discussed the reality of evil in human Life ( 30), his assertion of 
the ultimate freedom of the human person to determine oneself had the 
practical effect of relativising the notion of a radical falleness in 
the human condition and consequent need of an equally radical healing 
transformation. 
1.2.4. Scientific and political conscientization: 
The axial rotation in perspective to which we referred earlier 
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received its most d~nic impetus from the progress of scientific 
achievement and the politicisation of previously docile classes. The 
rise of scientific understanding from the seventeenth century onwards 
transformed people's perception of the world as it explained the 
hitherto mysterious realm of nature. This increased understanding 
provided humanity with power over its environment, people were able to 
direct nature and to harness its potentials for their own ends (31). 
Humanity had 'come of age'. The human person came to see him/herself 
as master of his/her own environment, thus paving the way for the 
technological achievements (and environmental despoliation) of the 
present century (32). 
This optimistic assessment of human life was furthered by the all 
pervasive presence of evolutionary thought in the nineteenth century. 
The created order could be understood without recourse to the divine 
realm. In its origins humanity was seen to be firmly rooted in the 
dust of this earth. Whilst humanity might have been thought to have a 
unique status within the created order it was entirely beholden to this 
created order. Humanity belonged to the earth and with the aid of the 
scientific and technological resources available it could become master 
of its own destiny. In short, humanity no longer felt itself to be on 
a pilgrimage in a foreign land orientated towards its true heavenly 
abode. Rather it believed that this world was the legitimate sphere of 
its concern. Whilst the person continued to understand him/herself as 
directed towards the future, it was a future determined by his/her own 
activity in the present. 
This transformation of humanity's perception of itself as being 
the subject rather than the object of history extended into the socio-
political sphere. The French and Russian revolutions can be viewed as 
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milestones in the rise of this new consciousness. Indeed, one of the 
most influential critiques of the irrelevance and harmfulness of 
Christian soteriology due to its other-worldly spiritual emphasis came 
in the writings of Karl Marx. Whilst Feuerbach, equally convinced as 
Marx of the illusory nature of Christianity, saw in it the positive 
function of expressing humanity's alienated self-consciousness and so 
offering a way to integration, Marx ascribed to it no such positive 
function. He thought that the promise of eternal happiness beyond the 
grave Where the humble and virtuous would be relieved of their 
oppression and accorded their true dignity was the product of the need 
for an anaesthetic against the harsh realities of life. Far from being 
a harmless illusion, he believed that religion had the effect of 
baptising the status 9?0 (33). In projecting its hopes for a more just 
social order into the future, humanity reconciled itself to the present 
inequalities rather than seeking to transform the present world order. 
If Kant can be thought to have given definitive impulse to the 
'Enlightenment of theory', Marx can be thought to have initiated the 
'Enlightenment of praxis' (34). Fbr Marx, Christianity is "The sigh of 
the oppressed creature, the sentiment of. a heartless world, the soul of 
soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people." (35) This charge 
has to be taken seriously. It expresses one of the most profound 
difficulties that faces Christian soteriology (36). 
The net result of the epistemological crisis in metaphysics, the 
emphasise upon human moral autonomy and the rise of science and 
political conscientization has been the displacement of the sacral 
realm by the profane realm as the legitimate focus of human concern. 
No longer is a theooentric vision of human life a widely held 
presupposition. Indeed, theological language such as 'salvation', 
Which spoke with powerful uni vocacy to a former age, are coiiii'IDnly 
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experienced as meaningless concepts for nndernity (37). At this point 
we touch upon what Langdon Gilkey names as the second level of the 
crisis in modern theology (38}. Deeper than the call for the 
reinterpretation of traditional doctrines in a changed historical 
situation lie profound questions as to the continuing relevance of the 
very content of the doctrine itself. For many people concern for 
salvation is thought to be both irrelevant, lacking any empirical 'basis 
in human 1 ife, and harmful in that like a mirage it presents a false 
horizon which distorts and frustrates human activity. Any secular 
counterparts that may exist for the notion of salvation operate within 
the parameters of human life expressing the desire for full and free 
life in this world. To find salvation becomes the liberation from 
personal inauthenticity or from social, political and economic 
narginalisation. 
1:3 Dual task for theology 
We have outlined above something of the crisis posed by modernity 
to classical soteriology. If the living tradition of Christianity is 
not to be a dead repetition of outmoded formulas then it must seek to 
re-express itself within this context. Past articulations of the 
tradition were thought to be adequate to their context and univocal 
with human life because they were formulated in dialogue with 
contemporary thought forms and philosophy. Theological reflection 
could build upon the commonly held assumption of the theocentric nature 
of human life (39}. However, it is precisely these thought forms and 
philosophical structures that have been profoundly questioned in the 
modern and post-modern period. The central question facing the 
theological endeavour in the modern and post-modern period is as to how 
it is possible to articulate a theology univocal with human life when 
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the central presupposition of the classical theological tradition is so 
profoundly called into question (40). At the very least, it v.ould seem 
that theocentricity and a theological dignity for human life have to be 
established rather than assumed. It seems that for Christ ian theology 
to be Olristian theology it must listen to the concerns and 
perspectives arising out of today's contemporary situation as carefully 
as it seeks to do to the tradition. Mark Taylor argues that there is a 
consensus amngst contemporary theologians as to such a bi-polar task 
in theology ( 41), whereby theologians hold that there are tv.o sources 
of Christian theology, these being (in the language of David Tracy) 
classic Christian texts and comm:m human experience (42). This 
represents a significant development from the orthodox node! that we 
have already touched upon. 
It is with little wonder then that the present consensus as to the 
bi-polar task of theology did not come to immediate expression in 
catholicism. By contrast, Schleiermacher's Der Christliche GlaUbe 
(43}, representing the first great attempt at a constructive synthesis 
of Christian theology and Enlightenment thought, set Protestant 
.. 
theology on a pursuit upon which it would continue to be actively 
engaged through liberal theology and neo-orthodoxy. But the nineteenth 
century witnessed the growing entrenchment of Roman catholicism in a 
negative attitude towards modernity. There were notable exceptions to 
this trend, such as the Tlibingen school with Drey and r.t:>hler. Ibwever, 
they remained exceptions. The response of Pius IX to the political and 
intellectual insecurity of the time was to close ranks and seek to 
withdraw into a fortress of truth impermeable to the corrupting 
influence of modernity, culminating in his Syllabus Errortnn (44): "If 
anyone thinks that the Jbman Pontiff can and should reconcile and 
accommodate himself to progress, liberation and modern civilization, 
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let him be anathema." (45) The nroernist crisis at the turn of the 
twentieth century resulted in the vigorous condemnation of Catholic 
thinkers who sought to relate Catholicism to the modern world. Pius 
X's encyclical Pascendi Gregoris (46) sounded the death knell for any 
such attempts. 
'Ib the external observer it may seem that the IOC>nol i thic structure 
of Catholic belief and practice remained unchallenged and unaltered 
until the astonishing events of Vatican II. However, behind the scenes 
there were many Catholic thinkers conuni tted to the dual task of 
theology, that of expressing the tradition, but for contemporary men 
and women. Thinkers such as Adam, Guardini, de Lubac and Congar 
recognised that the living tradition could only realise itself through 
becoming incarnate in the social and historical situation in which the 
Olurch found itself, thus paving the way for Vatican II. 
1.4 Rahner set in context - his significance for the neo-orthodox 
pursuit. 
Karl Rahner is undoubtedly to be set aiOC>ngst the ranks of those 
thinkers named above who, conunitted to the dual task of theology, 
sought to express the tradition in the vastly changed milieu of the 
modern \«>rld. His position is that whilst theology finds its ''basic, 
norm and goal" (47) in the Olristian tradition, it must be concerned to 
speak to modern self-understanding. 
Theology is a theology that can be genuinely preached only to 
the extent that it succeeds in establishing contact with the 
total secular self-understanding which maintains in a 
particular epoch, succeeds in engaging in conversation with 
it, in catching onto it, and in all6wing itself to be 
enriched by it in its language and even IOC>re so in the very 
matter of theology itself. (48) 
Rahner is aware of the revolution that has taken place in secular 
19 
self-understanding. He likens it to the Copernican revolution in 
astronomy (49). The significance of this revolution is as great as 
that which took place in the early Middle Ages (50). Rahner 
characterises this revolution in terms of the turn to the human 
subject. Both in philosophy and also in the spheres of scientific, 
technical and political self-orientation, humanity has become the 
architect of its own destiny (51). 
Rahner holds that theology must seek to address itself to this new 
self-understanding if it is to seek to convey the meaning of the 
Christian revelation. As he remarks, if the content of revelation is 
held to be meaningless then so also will the event of revelation be 
doubted (52) • He believes that theology must follow philosophy in its 
turn to the human subject, so that the anthropological aspect of 
theology should be made explicit (53). Only in this manner can 
theology hope to show that it is concerned with realities which are of 
fundamental consequence for human life and so to seek to escape the 
charge of mythology. 
He declares that the a.PPropriate form for theology in view of the 
turn to the human subject, is a transcendental metaphysics of the sort 
proposed by Mar~chal (54) • Fbr Rahner, the transcendental method not 
only provides a means of showing that theological concepts are rooted 
in human experience (and hence not mere mythology); it also provides a 
means of seeking to counter the Kantian objection that knowledge cannot 
be gained of realities beyond the world. That is, it provides him both 
with his epistemlogical justification for metaphysical discourse and 
also his basic methodology and hence constitutes a root and branch 
attack on the charge of meaninglessness in theology. Kant argued that 
knowledge was only possible of finite spatia-temporal realities. Rahner 
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follows Kant in his turn to sense-data but maintains that knowledge of 
spatio-temporal realities is only possible due to a prior knowledge of 
the infinite horizon of Holy M¥stery. In Olapter Three we wi Ll follow 
Rahner as he seeks to turn the Kantian argument on its head, not by 
denying the validity of the transcendental turn but rather by welcoming 
it and seeking to show that if pursued logically it shows the final 
meaningfulness rather than meaninglessness of theology. 
Rahner also welcomes the emphasis upon human roc>ral autonomy. As 
we shall see in Olapters Three, Four and Five, 'Freedom' is a central 
tenet of Rahner's soteriology: 
Man is characteristically the being who has been handed over 
to himself, consigned to his own free responsibility 
Freedom is the inevitable necessity of self-determination, by 
which man. • • makes himself what and who he wants to be and 
ultimately will be in the abiding validity and eternity of 
his free decisions. (55) 
He seeks to reconcile a high place for human freedom in his theology 
with an objective salvation in grace through his notion of the 
supernatural existential. 
Finally, Rahner shows himself concerned to relate soteriology to a 
positive concern for the present order of creation and political 
structures. As we shall see in Chapter 'lhree, he seeks to do this 
through his equation of love of God and love of neighbour. This is a 
love which cannot be reduced to an individual level but must rather 
encompass the whole of htnnani ty in a political love. Hence, for 
Rahner, concern for one's salvation and concern for political realities 
do not stand in contradiction for it is precisely through the latter 
that we respond to the former. 
However, whilst the above few paragraphs are sufficient to 
indicate that Rahner fits within the ranks of those engaging in the 
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dialogue of the tradition with IOOdernity, it is less clear quite what 
his position is. The ranks of those who support a dual task for 1 
theology is a broad spectrum of positions encompassing at least four 
distinct models. On David Tracy•s analysis (56) it ranges from liberal 
theology, through neo-orthodoxy, radical theology and the revisionist 
model. According to this analysis, liberal theology represents the 
attempt to reconcile an explicit commitment to modern, secular self-
understanding with a reinterpretation of the Christian tradition (57). 
The neo-orthodox model is held to be a critical moment within this 
liberal tradition (58). 
Tracy maintains that the neo-orthodox criticism of liberal 
theology was not born from a disregard for contemporary self-
understanding (as is the case in the orthodox model) but rather because 
it shared a different contemporary self-understanding to that of 
1 iberal theology (59) • However, in addition to demanding and providing 
11criteria of adequacy.. to human experience, neo-orthodoxy also 
maintained .. criteria of appropriateness .. to the central meanings of the 
Christian tradition (60). Hence, neo-orthodoxy maintained that liberal 
theology was inadequate both to secular self-understanding and to the 
Christological core of the Christian tradition (61). Neo-orthodox 
theologians believed that the authentic Christian tradition addressed 
the questions raised by contemporary self-understanding. This belief 
may explain the tendency not to analyse the central doctrines of the 
Christian tradition in a sufficiently critical manner (62). Questions 
about the internal coherence of Christian doctrines and their actual 
fit with experienced human reality were often avoided (63). 
The radical theology ( 64) of the 11Death of God 11 theologians ( 65) 
sought to take the dialectical interplay between contemporary self-
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understanding and the Christian tradition to its limit. They claimed 
that a genuine commitment to the struggle for human liberation required 
not only a reformulation of traditional Christian doctrine but a 
negation of that tradition's central belief in God (66). "The radical 
argues that the Christian God cannot but alienate human beings from one 
another, from the world, and from their authentic selves .. " (67) 
Tracy uses the term "revisionist nndel" (68) to refer to the 
attempts to continue the critical task of the liberals and nndernists 
in a post-modern situation.. It is the attempt to reconcile an explicit 
commitment to post-nndern, secular self-understanding with a 
reinterpretation of the Christian tradition (69). Tracy describes the 
self-understanding of revisionist theology in the following way: 
"Contemporary Christ ian theology is best understood as philosophical 
reflection upon the mear1ings present in COIIIIIOn human experience and the 
meanings present in the Christian tradition." (70) The question that 
poses itself is where to place Rahner in this spectrum? 
On the one hand it is not adequate to maintain that he simply 
seeks to accommodate the tradition to secular self-understanding.. He 
perceives his reformulation of Thomistic metaphysics in terms of a 
transcendental analysis as being more faithful not only to the task of 
theology but to the authentic tradition. Yet on the other hand it is 
not adequate to maintain that his alleged sylllpathies with contemporary 
self-understanding are merely a guise to lure people into the same old 
scholastic system. Such a view would simply not take account of the 
creative reformulation that he has given to traditional Catholic 
theology. As we noted earlier, Rahner's transcendental method is not 
merely an attempt to justify an already existing edifice but is rather 
the method with which he does theology. Rahner genuinely seeks to 
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present the tradition in a way that is consonant with the concerns of 
modernity. In particular. Rahner believes that the Thomistic 
metaphysical tradition can be reconciled with an intellectual milieu in 
which the philosophical basis of that tradition has been called into 
question. The central question is as to whether Rahner simply seeks to 
justify the pre-modern assumption of the theocentric nature of human 
life. and thereb¥ justify the philosophical basis of Thomistic 
metaphysics. or whether he reformulates a theocentric vision in 
dialogue with modern and post-modern assumptions and experience? Does 
he genuinely engage in dialogue with modern and post-modern awareness 
and experience and seek the theological dignity of humanity within this 
context? Or does he simply seek to formulate a theology that will 
justify his primary awareness of. and conunitment to. human life as 
roving within the praise of God ( 71)? 
In the final analysis. we believe that there are grounds for 
viewing Rahner 's theology as having something of an apologetical 
function. He seeks to engage far more intimately with the dialogue 
partners than apologetics normally allows. He affirms the value of 
contemporary self-understanding and seeks to reform~late tbe meaning of 
the tradition accordingly. But one is left with the impression that it 
is a reformulation carried out from within an unchanged and 
unchallenged structure of faith. as distinct from an unchanged 
articulation of theology. Rahner can mre appropriately be called a 
'liberal Conservative' than a 'conservative Liberal' (72). He displays 
the surety and confidence of one who knows already what must be 
achieved in the dialogue rather than one who endures the dying to self 
of genuine dialogue ( 73) • As we shall see in Chapter Three. Rahner 's 
intention is not so much to formulate a new philosophical basis for 
theology which would cohere with contemporary secular self-
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understanding, rather his intention is to establish the continuing 
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validity and sufficiency of Thomistic metaphysics aided by Marechal' s 
transcendental interpretation. Again, it would seem that his intention 
is not so much to explore and rediscover the possible lcx::us of a 
thecx::entric vision inma.nent within the human realm but rather to 
justify the thecx::entric vision which he brings to the dialogue. In 
this manner Rahner is Seen to stand amidst the apologetics of neo-
orthodoxy. Indeed we hold that a transcendenta 1 metaphysics such as 
Rahner's represents the most creative attempt possible within neo-
orthodoxy at dialogue with secular self-understanding. It is in 
questioning the internal coherence of Rahner • s theology and its fit 
with experienced human reality, the questions that nee-orthodoxy \'tOUld 
not pursue, that we are led to see the inadequacy of Rahner 1 s theology. 
Therefore in judging the adequacy of Rahner 1 s theological methoo we are 
also judging the adequacy of the neo-orthcxlox approach as it is 
represented by Rahner. 
We argued earlier that the crisis in soteriology, as to whether 
salvation was rooted in particular human situations or was other-
worldly in its entirety, brought to fcx::us wider questions as to the 
nature and methcxl of theology. We prcx::eeded to claim that Karl Rahner 
is best understood to stand within the ranks of nee-orthodoxy i.e. the 
attempt to show how theological truth correctly expresses the human 
situation. Hence, the present thesis is concerned to examine the 
thought of this mst influential theologian on one of the mst pressing 
aspects of contemporary theological discourse in two ways: 
1) To engage upon a critique of Karl Rahner 1 s theology through an 
analysis of his soteriology. 
2) To examine the adequacy of the neo-orthodox approach as it is 
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represented by Rahner and the justification for a revisionary 
approach. 
In the process we will be able to investigate the basis for a 
fundamental soteriology. 
1.5. OVerview of the present work. 
In our second chapter we will formulate the criteria upon which we 
intend to judge the adequacy of Rahner's soteriology. These criteria 
are drawn from the second source for Christian theology which David 
Tracy names as "comm::>n human experience and language" (74). In the 
rest of the thesis we shall expound our understanding of Rahner's 
soteriology, mindful of these criteria. It is worth noting that the 
evolution of the thesis did not follow the pattern, of formulation of 
criteria then application to Rahner's soteriology, that might be 
suggested by the final product. The \\Ork originated as a straight 
forward presentation of Rahner's soteriology. It was only in the 
process of engaging with his thought that our own concerns were laid 
bare. In turn, our own concerns opened up new perspectives on Rahner • s 
thought. 
In Chapter Three. we shall follow Rahner as he locates the 
possibility and the method of theology in a transcendental analysis of 
human knowledge and freedom. In this manner we shall observe how 
Bahner seeks to present a soteriology that takes account of the charges 
of meaninglessness, of infringing noral responsibility, and of 
devaluing concern for the present world order. At this stage we will 
examine whether Rahner presents a soteriology that is truly rooted in 2. 
human life, or whether, in spite of a far deeper relationship to human 
life than is usual in scholasticism, it does not ultimately reduce to a 
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refined scholasticism. That is, Whether Rahner's soteriology 
ultimately reduces to an individualistic, a priori, pre-given structure 
which is then applied to life. We will proffer the seemingly l 
paradoxical statement that the very transcendental starting point that 
enables Rahner to locate theological discourse far nore intrinsically 
in the human realm than the scholastic approach would normally allow, 
is the reason why Rahner cannot ultimately overcome the deficiencies of 
the scholastic approach and Why he shares with it an a priori, 
individualistic emphasis. 
In Chapters Fbur to Six we shall observe how the position' 
outlined above is confirmed by a full examination of Rahner's 
soteriology. His transcendental starting point will be seen to prevent 
him from genuinely positing the presence and action of God in history 
and hence to lead to a formalism in his treatment of God's redeeming 
activity in grace and in Christ. His concept of the supernatural 
existential reduces God's redeeming ar.d <J~acious presence to a foriMl 
statement, Christ is reduced to the level Jf a cipher and the Cross to 
a statement of God's will to forgive. 
Hence, we shall argue that Rahner 's soteriology is inadequate both 
to the demands of common human experience (in that it is general, lacks 
redemption and is overly concerned with the individual's spiritual 
destiny) and to the demands of the Christian tradition (in that it 
reduces Christ to the level of a cipher and the Cross to a statement of 
God's will to forgive) • We come to see that Rahner does not enable us 
to pursue a theology that is genuinely rooted in life. Hence we come 
to see the inadequacy of the neo-orthodox approach as it is represented 
by Rahner and the need for the formulation of a revisionary soteriology 
and an adequate philosophical and hermeneutical 'basis for contextual 
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theology. 
As we have indicated, the present piece of w::>rk has led us to be 
far more critical of Rahner than was originally intended. Be that as 
it may, we w::>uld wish to record inunense gratitude to Rahner, both for 
the profound influence his thought has had on our own growth in 
understanding of Christian faith and for the critical function Which he 
restored to catholic theology. If solace should be needed it may be 
found in the reassurance that an ongoing critical pursuit is a more 
faithful response to his theological heritage than it would be to 
establish him as a new orthodoxy. In the w::>rds of Kerr: 
Even if one were to reject his own theological 'system' root 
and branch, doing so with questions and arguments one w::>uld 
be benefiting from the renewal of theologica 1 controversy and 
exploration in the catholic Church for which he more than 
anyone is responsible. Even if nothing else of his work 
endures (an unlikely supposition), he would be content to 
have renewed interest in, and to have excited courage to deal 
with, the central questions of theology. (75) 
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ENINJI'ES: CHAPTER ONE 
1. cf. "The gospel is about salvation from sin. That is one of the 
few statements that all Christians would agree about in the 
abstract." A. N:>lan, God In South Africa. The Challenge Of The 
Gospel, (london: CIIR 1988), pp. 31. cf. "Theology that loses 
contact with the gift and task of salvation is no longe!" truly 
Christian theology always concerned with the grace of God, 
• propter nos et propter nos tram salutem • • " Dermot A. Lane, 
Fbundations Fbr A Social Theology: Praxis, Process And Salvation, 
(Dublin. Gill and Macmillan 1984), pp. 73. 
2. Athanasius • argument against the Arians who wished to place Christ 
wholly on the side of created reality was that only God could 
save: "The W:>rd of God came in His own Person, because it was He 
alone, the Image of the Father, Who could recreate man made after 
the Image." St. Athanasius, De Incarnatione Verbi Dei, III: 13, 
translated h¥ a religious of C.S.M.V, (london. Mowbray 1953), pp. 
41 Hence, if Christ was our saviour then he must be identical 
with the Godhead. This was preserved in the Nicene formula (AD 
325) that Christ was 1>/"'oour•ov Tt' T'Wf{'l , (of the same being 
as the Father). Gregory Nazianzen maintained against Apollinarius 
that "'n) ~1\,0CT)\'t'J"TO"V -'&*'f"1\euTo'V (what has not been assl.Dlled 
cannot be restored). This was approved by Constantinople (AD 381) 
where it was laid down that Christ was both true God and true man. 
The Council of Ephesus (AD 431/AD 433) exhibits a concern to 
maintain the reality of the union between the divine and human 
natures in Christ. In order for there to be a saving union there 
had to be an ontological union, this was expressed through the 
notion of a hypostatic union. Against the monophysites who 
thought that the hypostatic union required there to be only one 
nature in Christ, thus implying confusion of the divine and human, 
or a swallowing of the human h¥ the divine, Chalcedon (AD 451) 
maintained that it was a union without confusion. 
3. cf. "However, once we begin to ask about the meaning or concrete 
contents of these two words 'salvation• and 'sin' all the 
differences begin to appear." Nolan, op. cit., pp. 31. 
4. cf., Jerome P. Theisen, O.S.B., Community And Disunity: Synibols Of 
Grace And Sin, {Collegeville, Minnesota: St. John 1s University 
Press 1985), pp. 2-9. 
5. cf., ibid., pp. 9-13. 
6. We will return to the Reformation dispute in order to illustrate 
our argument in Chapter Two. 
7. cf. "Critical theory challenges theology to account in praxis for 
its claim that all are called to freedom • in Christ •, that 
salvation has already taken place 'in Christ', that humanity and 
history have been saved 'in Christ', that the world is destined 
• in Christ •, and that all who belong to Christ are a New Creation. 
Such soteriological themes of the gospel come under scrutiny today 
not only h¥ critical theory but h¥ all who look at Christianity 
from the outside. I:b these doctrinal claims have any critical 
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import for society? Ibes the gospel really have an emancipatory 
thrust in praxis that affects the social situation of humanity? Is 
the orthodoxy of 'salvation in Christ' simply a matter of faith 
without an ortho-praxis? Is redemption just a theory about the 
next 1 i fe w1 thout any basis in present experience and social 
praxis? Is salvation simply a spiritual and private affair 
between the individual and God without reference to the rest of 
humanity?" Lane, op. cit • , pp. 82 . 
8. cf. "The primary task of ARCIC II is to examine and to try to 
resolve those doctinal differences Which still divide us. 
Accordingly, at the request of the Anglican Consultative Council 
(Newcastle, September 1981), we have addressed ourselves to the 
doctrine of justification, Which at the time of the Reformation 
was a particular cause of contention. This request sprang out of 
a widespread view that the subject of justification and salvation 
is so central to the Christian faith that, unless there is 
assurance of agreement on this issue, there can be no full 
doctrinal agreement between our two Churches. " ARCIC II, 
Salvation And The Church, (London: Church fk>use Publishing and 
catholic Truth Society 1987), pp. 6. 
9. cf. "The Bible presents liberation - salvation - in Christ as the 
total gift, Which, by taking on the levels we indicate, gives the 
Whole process of liberation its deepest meaning and its complete 
and unforeseeable fulfilment. Liberation can thus be approached 
as a single salvific process." Gustavo Guttierez, A Theology of 
Liberation, (London: SCM 1973 ) , pp. x. cf. "~ always knew that 
there were references to freedom and liberty in the Bible: the 
freedom of the Spirit and the liberty of the sons of God for 
example. And we knew that Jesus had freed us from sin, from the 
law and from death, as Paul says. But in the past we had not 
noticed that liberation was a broad, comprehensive theme and that 
it was an alternative way of speaking about redemption or 
salvation and that it included liberation from oppression." A. 
Nolan, 'lb Nourish Our Faith: Theol ical Reflections On The 
Theology Of Liberation, London. CAFDD 1989 , pp. 33. cf. 
Tirothy Gorringe, Redeeming Time: Atonement Through Education, 
(London. DLT 1986), pp. xiv. 
10. cl. "The question regarding the theological meaning of liberation 
is, in truth, a question about the very meaning of Christianity 
and about the mission of the Church" ibid., pp. xi. 
11. cf. "It is not easy to say What the exact content of the theology 
of liberation is for all the Christians involved in it. Certain 
basic points, however, are clearly shared by all. They would 
maintain that the longstanding stress on individual salvation in 
the next world represents a distortion of Jesus' message. He was 
concerned with man's full and integral liberation, a process which 
is already at work in history and which makes use of historical 
means." Juan Luis Segundo, The Liberation of Theology, (London: 
SCM 1977), pp. 3. 
12. Sacred Congregation for the Ibctrine of the Faith, Instruction On 
Certain Aspects Of The Theology Of Liberation, (Vatican 1984), 
II:3. Quoted in Juan Luis Segundo, Theology And The Church. A 
Response 'lb cardinal Ratzinger And A warning 'lb The Whole Church, 
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(London: Geoffrey Chapman 1985), pp. 171. 
13. ibid.; VI:9, quoted in Segundo, op. cit., pp. 176. 
14. In our discussion of models in Christian theology we have drawn on 
the \\Urk of David Tracy, Blessed Rage Fbr Order: The New Pluralism 
In Theology, (New York. The Seabury Press 1975), Chapter '1\tJo, pp. 
22-42. 
15. cf. ibid., pp. 24. The best example of the orthodox model within 
Cathollc theology is nee-scholastic theology. 
16. cf. ibid., pp. 25. 
17. Tracy refers to the First Vatican Council's understanding of 
theology as a classic formulation of the orthodox model. "For 
Vatican I, the aim of theology is not "proof" of mysteries of the 
Catholic faith, but an "understanding" of those mysteries. That 
understanding is best achieved by following the classical medieval 
model." ibid., pp. 24. cf. "Classical theology seems to be 
concerned w1th theoretical interpretation of a given biblical and 
ecclesial tradition. The task of theology is to support the faith 
of the Christian community that keeps alive the integrity of this 
given tradition." Lane, op. cit., pp. 69. We acknowledge that 
the theologians of the orthodox model would not necessarily 
perceive their theology to be a renoved articulation which was 
secondarily applied to life. In contrast they would have 
maintained the univocacy of theology with life. cf. "Some 
clarifications are called for here. It must be noted that the 
origin and continued existence of the Christian tradition was and 
is the outcome of the praxis of the faith of the community." ibid. 
Paradoxically, the exclusive focusing of the orthodox model on the 
received Christian tradition, and hence the apparent gap between 
theology and life, is not due to a fideistic belief in the 
absolute equivocacy of theology and life but from a belief in 
their univocacy. On this model, received systems of theology are 
held in high regard precisely because they are believed to witness 
to the way in which Christian faith is the most coherent 
articulation of human reality. Theologians of the orthodox model 
perceive their job as being to speak from within these received 
articulations of the tradition to the world of lived human 
reality. Herein lies the cause of the division between the 
articulations of the orthodox model and lived reality. Theologians 
seek to interpret, or repeat, theological articulations that were 
adequate for past contexts in the very different contexts of the 
twentieth century. This is a far cry from engaging in the same 
process of genuine dialogue with contemporary human reality that 
originally led to the articulation of theology that was adequate 
to past contexts. In this manner, the living tradition becomes 
fossilised into dead traditionalism. Rather than being the 
articulation of reality, as assumed, theology of this sort ends up 
seeking to dictate to human reality. 
18. cf. "There has been an important shift in perspective in theology 
in recent years. While the basic purpose of theological 
reflection has remained the same - namely, the reflection of 
Christians upon the gospel in the light of their own circumstances 
- much more attention is now being paid to how those circumstances 
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shape the resp::mse to the gospel. This focus is being expressed 
with terms like "localization," "contextualization," 
"indigenization," and "inculturation," of theology. Despite 
slightly different nuances in meaning, all of these terms point to 
the need for and responsibility of Christians to make their 
response to the gospel as concrete and 1 i vely as possible." Robert 
J. Schreiter, Constructing IDeal Theologies, (London. SCM 1985), 
pp. 1. cf. "Rather than trying, in the first instance, to apply a 
received theology to a local context, this new kind of theology 
began with an examination of the context itself." ibid., pp. 4. 
19. we will return to these questions in Chapter Two When formulating 
our criteria of adequacy for soteriology. Suffice it to state at 
this stage our conviction with Segundo et al that theology must be 
rooted in the context of hwnan particularity. However, we also 
recognise that it is not yet at all clear how theology can do this 
and yet still be theology, and this for two reasons: i) In order 
to be able to theologise at all we must be capable of involving 
ourselves in same degree of generalising discourse. That is, in 
order to be able to name God's presence in a situation we must be 
able to compare it with other similar situations rather than to 
remain captive by the data of this particular situation. 
Ultimately the ability to generalise is necessary because theology 
is formed in dialogue with the Christian tradition and the ability 
to carry on the dialogue demands the ability to generalise. Unless 
we can genuinely begin with the data of a situation yet still 
recover enough perspective to be able to reflect upon and judge 
the situation then genuine contextual theology is not possible. 
However, the phenomenological approach, (Which lies at the root of 
the methodology of contextual theology), finds it difficult to 
move from the observation of particular data to generalising 
discourse. Contextual theology has a problem: In order to be 
theological it must dialogue with the tradition but its own 
contextual, phenomenological emphasis militates against the 
possibility of such a concern. There is the need for an adequate 
fundamental theology Which will establish the possibility of 
moving from a phenomenological starting point to generalising 
discourse. ii) In order for contextual theology to be Christian 
theology it must be formed in dialogue with the sources of the 
Christian tradition. H:>wever, from the time of the Apologists 
onwards this tradition has been formulated in large part under the 
influence of Greek metaphysics. Hence, the Christian tradition 
eXhibits the very tendency towards abstract generalisations (as 
opposed to all inclusive generalisations) Which is held to be 
unacceptable by contextual theology. cf. Lane, op. cit., pp. 35. 
Hence the advocates of contextual theology are posed with a second 
dilemma: In order to be genuinely theological, contextual theology 
must dialogue with the tradition. However the vast majority of the 
texts of the tradition are expressed in the universalising, 
abstract manner considered to be unacceptable by contextual 
theology, so how is dialogue possible? cf. Schreiter, ibid., pp. 
76. There is the need for an adequate hermeneutic Which will 
enable us to read back from the texts of the tradition to the 
living tradition itself. ~th these two difficulties in mind we 
can appreciate the concern of the magisterium that contextual 
theology reduces theology. lbwever, we believe that the need for 
contextual theology is so crucial that the above difficulties 
should not lead us to abandon the endeavour. On the contrary we 
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feel that they call for further work so as to establish on the one 
hand an adequate philosophical basis for theologising from the 
particular and on the other hand an adequate hermeneutic that 
enables genuine dialogue with the inherited tradition. cf. 
"carrying out this project is an enormous task. On the one hand, 
one must engage in a semiotic study of culture, reading the 
culture texts to discern the signs, codes, and messages in the 
sign systems. On the other hand, one must reappropriate the 
church tradition in such a way as to make it available for the 
dialectic with the culture, Which will give birth to a genuinely 
local theology." Schreiter, ibid., pp. 78. 
20. cf. John Shea, Stories Of God: An Unauthorized Biograph , (Chicago. Thomas ="'M:>=--re--=P=-r_e_s_s---:::1-=9~7~8-r-a-nd--=-_,l,.,d=-.-,--=s~to_r_lre-s--=o,...,f~=Fa,......·!ri t~h, 
(Chicago. Thomas M:>re Press 1980). 
21. we accept that each of these juxtapositions represents a false 
dilemma. The starting point for theology is the dialogue between 
common human experience and the iriherited tradition and the focus 
of theology is both vertical and horizontal in as much as it 
articulates the transcendent dimension immanent within human 
experience. cf. "What we are dealing with here is not a one-way 
street from the Bible to the context or from the context to the 
Bible. What we are dealing with here is a circular rnovement that 
proceeds forward 1 ike a Wheel. we rnove from Bible to context to 
Bible and back again, making progress all the time as we come to a 
better and better appreciation of both the shape and the content 
of the good news for us today." Nolan, God In South Africa, pp. 
28. cf. E. Schillebeeckx, Christ: The Christ1an Expenence In The 
M:>dern W:>rld, (lDndon: SCM 1980), pp. 76-77. cf. Segundo, The 
L1berat1on Of Theology, (lDndon: SCM 1977), pp. 7-38. -
22. Vatican II, "Gaudium Et Spes", 7th December 1965, published in Ed. 
Austin Flannery O.P., Vatican Council II: The Conciliar And Post-
Conciliar Documents, (Leominster, Fbwler wright Book Ltd. 1980), 
pp. 903-1001. 
23. cf. "The world as such (in contradistinction to the Church) and as 
much rnore than simply the scene of concern for human necessities, 
as a condition of attaining salvation, scarcely really existed 
yet. The world was something ready made by God, in Which man 
works out his salvation; and it was not yet explicitly something 
Which by God's connnand had still to be brought about." Karl 
Rahner, "Man, (Anthropology)", Encyclopaedia Of Theology: A 
Concise Sacramentum Mundi, hereafter referred to as E.T., (lDndon: 
Burns & Qates 1981) 1 PP• 89. --
24. W. M:SWeeney, Roman catholicism: The Search Fbr Relevance, 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1980), pp. 4. 
25. cf. Schreiter, gp. cit., pp. 64-65. 
26. cf. r:avid Tracy • s claim that fundamental to modern and post-rnodern 
self-consciousness is a "fundamental conunitment to those purely 
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CHAPTER 'JW): SCME CRITERIA OF ADE}JUACY FOR OO'I'ERIOI..DGY 
2.1 The need for an approach to theology which works from particular 
concerns to general theories. 
2.1.1 The crisis of meaning in religious language. 
From my religious upbringing I was left with the impression that 
concepts such as sin and salvation belonged to a specifically religious 
area of life ( 1) • Sin could be described as a refusal to obey God's 
rules and salvation as the restoration to divine favour (2). These 
religious concepts were then applied to every facet of life, all 
circumstances had their soteriological significance or their sin value. 
The result was that the religious concern to avoid sin and to attain 
salvation was a dominating concern that accompanied all other concerns 
but did not actually originate within them (3). The religious concern 
and the human concern could not be identified. This 
compartmentalisation could function perfectly adequately provided I was 
content to derive my understanding of What sin and salvation were from 
my religious interpretation of life and to allow precedence to 
religious concerns over human concerns. 
However, as life concerns came to the fore it was increasingly 
difficult to allow precedence to religious concerns. It seemed that 
life must be lived in the human realm. Increasingly, my understanding 
of what was ultimately important, of what sin and salvation were, was 
coming from life and not religion. When I sought to bring these human 
concerns into contact with my religious understanding no easy dialogue 
could take place. A crisis posed itself as to how to overcome the gulf 
between my inherited religious interpretation and the concerns of human 
life. My own personal difficulty with the meaningfulness of religious 
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discourse does I believe reflect a far wider crisis within contemporary 
Christianity: "One of the gravest errors of our time is the 1 
dichotomy between the faith Which many profess and the practice of 
their daily lives." (4) W:! can see the same concern lying behind the 
ongoing pursuit, through liberal theology, neo-orthodoxy, radical 
theology and revisionist theology, for· an adequate method of 
theological discourse. As M:>nika Hellwig writes, "'lhe struggle of 
Christian theology in our times is to re-establish contact with the 
experience of contemporary Christians." ( 5) Further, we would maintain _j 
that this is not only a linguistic crisis requiring translation into 
nore familiar language (Which would imply that we all know What 
religious concepts mean: it is just that the .language is not helpful) 
(6). Rather we believe that there is a genuine crisis of meaning: not I 
only is the language Which is used to express religious concepts felt 
to be unhelpful but the religious concepts themselves are felt to have 
no meaning or relevance for human life (7). We touch here upon What 
Gilkey terms the second level of criticism of religious language (8). 
2.1.2 Why this crisis? 
W:! believe that we can isolate two interrelated reasons Which I 
contribute to the present crisis in religious discourse: Firstly the 
pre-IOC>dern world view has had a formative influence on religious 
discourse and the self-consciousness of the religious mind. Secondly, 
all too often theology has been deduced from abstract, universal 
principles. This stands in profound tension with the particularity of 
_j 
lived human life. 
Let us first examine briefly the influence of pre-IOC>dern cultural 
assumptions on the theological endeavour. 'lhe language of the 
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Christian tradition is largely the product of an unrestrained use of 
what Tracy terms the orthodox nmel (9). That is, theology was 
formulated by believers for believers who already interpreted life 
through the mediation of these concepts and assumed the theocentricity 
of human life. The theology that was formulated was considered to be 
univocal with human life. In this manner, theology was considered to 
be an adequate and true articulation of human reality. Fbwever, the 
context within which theology was written was either the medieval 
monastic cloister or the University school. The lived human reality 
that was theologised upon was an intellectual, monastic, clerical, 
celibate, male, medieval perspective ( 10) • 
There are obviously constraints as to how adequate to lived human 
reality theology written from such contexts could be (11). Even if 
theology written from such contexts could be considered adequate to 
past human experience, a point that we would question, it hardly seems 
possible that it be immediately adequate to the very different contexts 
of the modern and post-modern world ( 12). However, within the orthodox 
nmel for theology, belief in the uni vocacy of theology with 1i fe tends 
to justify a domination of life by past articulations (13). The 
'religious' realm, as expressed in the inherited tradition, comes to be 
thought of as the truth through which reality should be interpreted 
(14). When pursued in this manner, theology gives more the impression 
of dictating to human reality rather than genuinely expressing it. This 
approach fails to take account of the axial rotation in world-view that 
has taken place since the Enlightenment. It assumes that the 
theocentricity of life is part of the cultural presuppositions and 
perspectives of the twentieth century (15). 
such an approach to theology comes into difficulties when human 
1-1 
life concerns come to be seen as having an importance in their own 
right. The charge of meaninglessness ensues when the human realm is 
viewed as the legitimately prior focus of concern. Gabriel t:aly gives 
voice to this problem: "Traditional soteriology, which in former ages 
spoke with imaginative effectiveness and power, now seems to inhabit a 
world of its own which appears to be sealed off from daily rocxiern 
experience." (16) The question posed by this crisis is as to whether 
the process of demystification of the world will lay waste the "rich 
and mythical imagination" (17) of Christianity or merely eliminate the 
mystifying components of the Christian vision of the world and free the 
basic vision to speak with contemporary integrity. 
We maintain that a genuine belief in the uni vocacy of theology I 
with life should lead us to seek an intrinsic connection between the 
concerns of human life and religious concerns. If the crisis in 
__J 
religious discourse is to be overcome then we believe that religious 
discourse must be grounded in an analysis of comrocm human experience 
(18). That is, we believe that we must seek to rediscover the locus of 
the transcendent God immanent within human life rather than simply 
assume, with the classical tradition (19), that life is centred in the 
'praise of God'. In the twentieth century theocentricity has to be 
established rather assumed. We have to go behind the written tradition 
to the reality in our experience to which it refers. Gabriel Daly 
refers to this process as the "search for the element of univocation" 
( 20) , Tracy refers to it as a phenomenology of the "Religious 
Dimension" that is present in everyday, and scientific, experience and 
language (21). 
In terms of atonement theology we believe that sin and salvation 
should not be predefined as personal noral indiscretion and restoration 
1-2 
to grace respectively but should rather be discerned through a study of 
the human realm and the finding there of the .rrost appropriate locus of 
such designations (22). As Ialy states: 
It will not do simply to continue repeating the classical 
formulas of Christian soteriology as if they possessed self 
evident meaning and had merely to be invoked catechetically 
or intoned liturgically for their effect to take place. The 
reality to which they refer has to be experienced in all the 
contexts which go to make up any human 1 i fe, however 
seemingly hllllrlrum. ( 23) 
Once such a locus in human 1 i fe has been recovered for 
soteriological discourse then genuine dialogue with the tradition can 
conunence. However, until such a locus has been established we suspect 
that any theological discourse will give the impression of speaking 
with ever greater exactitude about religious concepts that are felt to 
have no meaning for life (24). With this concern in mind, we shall 
examine Rahner•s transcendental metaphysics. 
The second reason that we isolated as contributing to the 
meaninglessness of religious discourse concerns the question of the 
a priori universalism prevalent in much theology as distinct from the 
particularity of human life. Human life, whilst complex in its 
interrelatedness, is always experienced in its particularity. Fbr 
example, whilst each divorce may be a statistic in a records office, 
each has its own uniqueness. It involves uniquely individual human 
persons with their own e.rrotional, psychological and physical ~Y\i,~lly ., 
(.'>dj\c.-J ;,,j",{"j· 
determinations interacting in unique circumstances. The continuity of 
life is lived and experienced through particular situations. As we 
compare our various experiences and those of other people general 
patterns emerge which help us to better understand the particular 
situations of life. However, the generalisations which provide 
perspective on particular situations always come after the lived 
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particularity. Further, the generalisations can never do complete 
just ice to the level of particularity ( 25} • 
Fbr these reasons we are unable to sUbscribe to the view of 
Platonic Idealism which would consider all human 1i fe and experience to 
be passing !lOdes of universal forms. However, we do allow for the 
necessity of generalisations in human discourse. Without them we 
cannot see, judge and act. In accepting the need for generalisations, 
we accept the need for what Tracy terms the "transcendental roment" 
(26} in philosophical and theological inquiry. Hence, we would l 
distinguish between a posteriori generalisations with maximum 
inclusiveness, Which are born from a semiotic analysis (27) of the data 
of human life, and a priori universalising generalisations which are 
not rooted in the particularity of human Life. In this manner we 
distinguish between transcendental reflection born from a prior 
semiotic inquiry on the one hand and an exclusively transcendental 
reflection on the other hand which chooses particular data as a 
secondary "proof" of the adequacy of the transcendental reflection. It j 
-, 
is this a priori, universal ising method of general ising that has 
dominated much theology. This tendency contributes to the crisis in 
meaning in religious discourse. Whilst a priori, universal systems of 
J 
theology may have been adeuate to the pre-modern situation, they are 
not felt to be adequate for the HK>dern and post-HK>dern world with its 
awareness of a pluralism in world-views and the contextualisation and 
particularity of knowledge and experience. Theology written from an I 
a priori, general, exclusively transcendental pers_pecti ve is thought to \ ~·a::ro;lc \ 
be a self-contained system secondarily applied to life which can have 'ZI 
~ ' 
no meaning or relevance to particular life situations (28}. This means 
that in addition to having to root theology in life, and seeking to 
establish a theocentric pers_pective rather than simply assume one, it 
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is further necessary to root theology in the particularity of life. It 
is insufficient to seek to justify the univocacy of theology with life 
by means of a general, a priori argument. Rather it is necessary to 
engage upon an a posteriori analysis of life, in its particularity, in 
a way that uncovers the foundations of a theocentric vision and allows 
for a consequent transcendental analysis. Even if one should desire to 
overcome the religion/life divide, an a priori transcendental ) 
perspective would militate against this concern. This point will be of 
_j 
prime importance in our critique of Rahner. 
In terms of atonement theology, this will cause us to hold as 
inadequate any theory which abstracts Jesus' life, death and 
resurrection from their historical context and makes universal claims 
for their salvific import without seeking to relate this claim to the 
in-situ details of particular situations. Atonement language that is 
phrased in renoved, a priori abstractions is felt to be meaningless. 
~
Unless God is saving particular situations in their particularity then 
God is not saving at all. 
We have maintained that soteriological language should be the 
articulation of common human experience and concerns rather than the 
articulation of distinct religious concerns. We further maintained 
that this requires that soteriological language should be born from 
reflecting on particular human situations rather than functioning as an 
a priori idealism. In turn this requires that adequate soteriology 
must think of God as genuinely present in the human realm in all its 
particularity. From this discussion( c) we can formulate our first I 
criterion of adequacy for soteriological discourse: 
fbteriology must be rooted in the human realm. it must flow 
fraa. and address the particularity of human life and hence 
Qxl must be tbougbt of as genuinely present within the 
particularity of human life. 
~~ ~~~ ~~~~\ 
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We may compare here the words of Tirothy Gorringe: 
To speak of God as being at work in • the whole of human 
history• raises the problem which we have stumbled across 
again and again ••• 'history• is not a universal, but a record 
of particulars. God can only commit himself to history, work 
within history and redeem history by committing himself to 
the particular. (29) 
Before we move on to the formulation of our second and third criteria, 
which in part follow as a consequence of our first, we feel it is 
necessary to clarify what we are and are not maintaining in this our 
first criterion: 
Firstly, in claiming that theology should be rooted in COIIlllk)n 
human experience and language we are not claiming that theology is 
simply a representation of the most superficial understanding of COIIlllk)n 
human experience. We are not claiming with the Death of God 
theologians that theology is best understood as a .language of ultimacy 
for purely secular realities, and thereby introducing "trojan horses 
into the camp of Christians" (30). Nor are we seeking to speak of God 
by • speaking of man in a loud voice • ( 31). We are simply claiming that 
religion and life are not contradictory realms such that theology then 
requires application to life (32). Rather than claiming that theology 
is as 'empty• as COIIlllk)n human experience, we are saying that COIIlllk)n 
hurnan experience moves within the richness that theology articulates. 
We are claiming that life is profoundly theological and is indeed the - 1 
original locus for theology, that the sociological, anthropological and . 
1 II\"'''~ . 
political aspects of life are intrinsically theological (33), that 
..J 
theology is rooted in the phenomena with which they are concerned. 
Further, we are claiming that whilst theological discourse is rooted in 
the data of COIIlllk)n human experience, it encompasses the perspectives of 
socio~ogy, politics and anthropology and sets them within the wider 
context of God • s relationship with men and women as mediated by the 
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Christian tradition. In the words of Leonardo and Clodovis Boff: 
In these realities, considered to be secular, there is a 7 
real, but hidden, theological element... It is the task of 
Christian reflection to unveil and extract this hidden 
theological element, to bring it to the light of day in 
reflection, in liturgical celebrations, in an expression of 
prayer. (34) 
With David Tracy, we believe that a "proper understanding of the 
explicitly Christian faith can render intellectually coherent and 
symbolically powerful that conm:>n secular faith which we share" (35). 
The theological presupposition here is that God is genuinely present in I 
\J 1-\, ""' '-"c ~. 
the particularity of human life and hence that human life is 
intrinsically theological ( 36). A friend 1 s connnent, "'Ihere is nothing 
_1 
mre to life than life itself", is not so much a reconciliation to 
finitude as a declaration of the locus of the divine in human life 
(37). We endorse the words of Lane: 
In effect, we must rid ourselves, therefore, of any 
artificial conflict that is alleged to exist between the so-
called vertical and horizontal dimensions of our Christian 
faith. We must realise.... that the horizontal dimension is 
constitutive of the vertical and that the vertical dimension 
sustains the horizontal. (38) 
We believe this to be a profoundly scriptural perspective. In 
scripture the whole of life is understood to be the locus of God 1 s 
presence: historical narrative and theological reflection a~e JnulvL .1 
inter\\Oven. It is a return to this manner of theologising that 1s 
being called for ( 39) • We are arguing for some form of what Tillich 
termed "self-transcending naturalism" (40). Further, we would' suggest 
that the realm of COnm:>n human experience is the original locus of 
religious concerns and ritual (41), that long before God and theology 
are banished to the realm of the sacred they are rooted in the COIIIIIDn 
clay of human life. 
We believe that before sin and evil are named as moral 
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indiscretions and defiance of God they are understood to be that which 
deals death and destroys human life (42). As D:tly says: "The 
experience of evil precedes every attempt to name it." (43) Likewise 
we believe that before salvation is understood to be the quest for a 
divine destiny it is understood to be the quest for healing and 
restoration to truth. With D:tly we agree that: "The need to be saved 
precedes the commission of sin." (44) When seen from this perspective 
sin and salvation do not appear to be irrelevant religious hang ups but 
rather speak to basic questions in human life: 
I wish to contend that the scope of salvation includes, but 
far exceeds, the scope of sin. We are saved not merely from 
our sins but also from the alienating effects (or, better, 
side-effects) of the creative process. (45) 
The human being comes to be seen as the person who looks for 
redemption. Hence we can claim that the question of atonement is not 
only central to Christianity but also central to the human endeavour: 
"To be human is to find oneself aitDngst the walking wounded, constantly 
in need of healing, forgiveness, acceptance, affirmation, 
reinvigoration and hope." (46) 
In claiming that sin and salvation are rooted in common human 
experience before they are named as specifically religious concepts we 
are not intending to deny that they can only be fully appreciated when 
set within an explicitly religious context (47). Whilst sin and 
salvation may be rooted within the experience of what destroys and 
gives 1i fe, we accept that this does not exhaust their meaning. Not 
everything that destroys life can be thought of as sin in the 
traditional sense of the word. 
"- \)v\~ "! 
Traditional usage maintains that sin 
can only finally be understood to be a free personal self-determination 
vis-a-vis the very ground of reality itself (48). The tradition would I·, I\ i~..l-1 1• 
maintain that sin does not refer in general to that which destroys life 
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but rather refers to the culpable refusal to share God's conununitarian 
life, by choosing narrow self-interest, which leads to the destruction 
of life. We feel fully able to work within this tradition. We 
understand sin to be an inversion of human horizons which seeks to 
centre the world around self in a futile attempt at self-fulfillment 
rather than around conununity ,~· grace,'' God. However, whilst accepting 
that sin is only fully understood when it is set within an explicitly 
religious context, we would claim that it is never a 'purely religious' 
reality. We believe that sin language articulates the depth-language 
of the C0Jlll10n hwnan experience of self-willed frustration, of seeking 
fulfilment and security through narrow self-interest which destroys 
relationships and community. 
Secondly, we have formulated a criterion which performs the 
function of judging the adequacy of theological method. We do not 
claim to have articulated a methodology that is adequate to this 
criterion. Indeed, we are aware that there are appreciable 
difficulties with the demand for a theological methodology that is 
adequate to this criteria: 
i) There is the question of the theology of revelation which underpins 
our criterion. We have claimed that hwnan life is intrinsically 
theological. Hence the theology of revelation that we would adopt 
is consonant with that manifested by such as Rahner. That is, we 
share the same principle that truth is not divisible and that human 
truth is reli2ious truth. lbwever, we would wish to change the 
emphasis. Rather than starting with theological truth and seeking 
to reconcile this with human truth, we would start with the truth 
that could be discerned in particular human situations. We would 
seek to gain deeper perspective on this through comparing various 
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situations and finally viewing the discerned truth within the 
"""'I~ embracing perspective of Theology. We recognise that this presumed 
theology of revelation would need to be explicated at much greater 
length if we were to seek to derive a methodology from what is at 
present only a criterion. In particular the relationship between 
natural theology and revealed theology would need to be explored in 
greater detail. 
ii) There is the question of how it is possible, from the perspective 
of experienced reality, to dialogue with the inherited tradition. 
Vk have claimed that adequacy to the demands of C01l111Dn human 
experience means that theology must be rooted in the particularity 
of human life rather than in a priori universalising statements. 
However, the tradition with which theology must dialogue is, in 
large part, formulated in just the sort of a priori abstract 
statements that we believe to be incapable of addressing genuinely 
human concerns. Schreiter is aware of this problem ( 49) • There is 
the need for an adequate hermeneutic which will enable us to 
recover the original life significance of the tradition. Such a 
hermeneutic would liberate the tradition which would in turn 
illuminate our particular concerns. 
[ 
With 
criterion: 
the above provisos 
~
in mind we can restate our first 
Soteriology must be rooted in the human realm. it must flow 
fraa am address the particularity of lnmBn life am hence 
QXl DI.ISt be thought of as genuinely present within the 
particularity of lnmBn life. 
2.2 The inadequacy of a soteriology focused upon individual salvation. 
When I was younger, my inherited notions of sin and salvation were 
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very individualistic in emphasis. Sins were the ways in Which I broke 
the divine commands, offended the holiness of God and ran up a debt to 
God (50). Salvation was the hoped for admission into heaven despite my 
sins on account of the intercession of Christ and the Saints. Whilst 
allowing for varying emphasise, we believe that Western soteriology has 
shown a marked tendency to become narrowly focused upon the salvation 
of the individual (51). This is possibly due to the influence of legal 
metaphors whose original context was the upholding of the rights of 
individuals. Whatever the cause, soteriological Language focused 
exclusively upon the salvation of the individual becomes increasingly 
meaningless as the wider concerns of human life come to the fore (52). 
If we follow our first criterion we see the need to reformulate 
the locus for soteriological language. We believe that before evil is 
associated with an offence against the majesty of God it is identified 
with that which destroys human life. That is, evil is an offence I 
against God because it is destructive of human life and not vice versa 
(53). As we come to see that evil JIDSt properly designates that which 
destroys human life we come to see that it cannot be confined to an 
individualistic level. Lurking behind individualistic salvation 
1 
schemas is the notion that the human person is an autonomous, isolated 
JIDnad. This assumption, despite its widespread influence in Western 
philosophy and theology (54), is quite inadequate to both comnon human 
experience and the Judaeo/Christian tradition. Enda l.ltD:>nagh writes: 
It is not possible to be historical even about the individual 
without being social. The isolated individual with a 
personal, asocial history of salvation is an abstraction 
owing JIDre to IOOdern individual ism than to Hebrew or 
Christian tradition. (55) 
Human life is constituted by relationships (56). Through the 
immediate material environment of their own embodiedness human persons 
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relate to each other and to the natural order as a whole (57). It is 
through these relationships that we act and are acted upon both for 
good and for i 11. It is in and through these relationships that we 
exist (58). We cannot subscribe to a metaphysic that would view the 
essential person as an abstract substance to whom relationships were 
merely accidental. In contrast, we maintain a dynamic notion of 
personhood. We are defined by the relationships that we have with 
other people and with the natural order: 
I am the person I am precisely because of my relationship to 
this history, this family, these friends, those mentors, 
these ideas appropriated and experiences shared. I am, in a 
word, a profoundly relative not substantial being. Whether I 
know it or not, I am the person I am because this idea has 
taken hold in me, this friend has literally entered my life, 
this set of historical experiences has affected me. Indeed 
love, the most human and the most religious of all 
experiences, is by definition a relative concept. (59) 
i:\br would we limit this to the level of one-to-<>ne interaction. 
Individuals group together and organise themselves as communities, the 
structures that groups inherit and the structures that they create 
determine Who these people are. Human life at a societal and 
organizational level is Life governed and enabled by structures. 
Through these structural forms in life we stand in mediated 
relationship with people within our inunediate connnunity, within our 
nation and within the global community. 
In contrast to the prevalent attitude in western thought, we would' 
claim that comnnn human experience teaches us that the individual does 
not exist in isolation. Rather we claim that the individual exists in 
and through a whole nexus of relationships: relationships with the 
created order, relationships with family, neighbours, work colleagues, _1 
friends, local coonnunity, nation, people throughout the world (60). We 
would claim that these relationships are mediated, determined and 
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established by the structures of society. In truth "No man is an 
Island, entire of itself" (61). Human Life is fundamentally social and 
communitarian in character (62). Once we become aware of the 
interrelational nature of life then we also become aware of the 
interrelational character of evil (63). The very relationships through 
Which we exist are the same relationships through which we deal death 
unto ourselves, our environment and our sisters and brothers (64). 
Our embJdiedness, without Which we could not be a person, limits 
us and frustrates us (65). The traditional phobia about sexuality 
recognises that our materiality can dominate us. we are essentially 
orientated towards finitude. The bodies that enable us to be are the 
bodies in Which we anticipate our death and in our bodies we cry out 
for liberation (66). 
In our relationships also with the wider material environment of 
the natural order here too misery impinges, if not dominates. 
Ecologists, environmentalists and zoologists berate us with a litany of 
woes of the despoliation of rainforests, intensifying pollution, 
encroaching deserts, extinction of species and the squandering of non-
renewable resources. The technology which has enabled us to harness 
the vitality of the created order has been used to dominate and destroy 
it. Enda MCDonagh expresses the dilemma succinctly: 
Pacification by obliteration and famine in the shadow of meat 
and grain mountains offers adequate comment on the continuous 
disastrous combination of technical achievement with moral 
and political failure. (67) 
The promethean desire to dominate the natural order has resulted 
in the threat of our own extinction, symb:>lised most horrifically in 
the nuclear capabilities (68). Fbr the first time a generation has 
grown up with the possibility that it may be the last (69). The human 
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community has fashioned for itself a life-style that cannot be 
supported (70). Through frustrating the natural order in seeking our 
own gain we have only succeeded in frustrating ourselves. In this 
relationship we cry out for liberation. 
It is, perhaps, the interpersonal sphere that displays the depths I 
of evil ItOst clearly. Personal insecurities and feelings of inadequacy 
are compensated for by dominating other people and measuring self-worth 
in terms of power, wealth and status. Such relationships depersonalise 
both victim and perpetrator. 
healing and liberation. 
In our relationships we cry out for 
-1 
As we turn to the level of social and political interaction, we 
can again view them as the locus of What can only truly be named as sin 
and evil in human life (71). We noted that the social character of 
human life inevitably gives rise to the formation and maintenance of 
structures in a society Which enable that society to function. Through 
these structures the individuals in a society exist in relation to each 
other, and through them the mutual dependence of all members of the 
global village is lived out. Should the structures of a society 
determine that a third of the population becomes increasingly ItOre 
destitute Whilst, and because, another third becomes increasingly more 
wealthy then they exist in a relationship of oppressed to oppressor 
(72). This is in fact What we find (73). The structures that function 
to give us life also deal death (74). They exhibit the same evils that 
we notice in individuul rct.ationshipc and this with little wonder; the 
structures of a society are created by fallible humans and incarnate 
their flaws (75). We believe there to be a vital relationship between 
personal and structural evil (76). Structural evil may arise from and 
incarnate personal evil but it also in turn determines the vision of 
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the indi vidua 1 ( 77). There is a 'lock-on' effect between structura 1 
and personal evil such that evil structures in a society perpetrate 
their own existence (78). Within these structures the human community 
cries out for liberation and redemption (79). 
As we become aware of the interrelational character of evil, and 
the reality of structural sin, we come to see the inadequacy of 
salvation schemas Which focus exclusively upon sin as a private and 
personal matter concerning only the sinner and God. Schleiermacher 
maintained that sin is "in each the work of all and in all the work of 
each" (80). Sin and evil pervade the communal aspects and structures 
of human society (81). We agree with Nolan: 
All sin is both personal and social at the same time. All 
sin is personal in the sense that only individuals can commit 
sin, only individuals can be guilty, only individuals can be 
sinners. However, all sins also have a social dimension 
because sins have social consequences (they affect other 
people), sins become institutionalised and systematised in 
the structures, laws and customs of a society. (82) 
Having claimed that sin and evil are interrelational, so also we I 
believe that 'salvation' language should find its locus here. We do 
not seek a salvation Which takes us out of our relationships in the 
human spbere and Which goes on within a private relationship with God._j 
Unless the sought-for redemption is a liberation of the interpersonal 
and material relatedness of human life then it is not a redemption of 
human life at all. Timothy Gorringe reminds us that a solidarity in 
sin demands a solidarity in redemption: 
There is a solidarity in sin which reaches back to the very 
origin of human history and which is embedded in the 
structure of every human society in its patterns of family 
life, of relationships, of education, of employment and so 
on. But this means that if we are to speak meaningfully of 
redemption we must also speak of a redemptive solidarity 
there Which, like human solidarity in sin, is also an 
historical reality. Because human beings only exist in 
complex patterns of social relationships they can only be 
redeemed in those patterns - They cannot be miraculously 
lifted out of the historical process Which would in any case 
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be a reverse of the redemptive movement of the incarnation. 
(83) 
Gabriel Daly echoes the same concern: 
No one can be human on his or her own. Consequently no one 
can be saved on his or her own. We are members one of 
another. Human interdependence necessarily implies the need 
for salvific relationships. (84) 
Fbllowing our first criterion that theology should be located in 
COI1111'Dn human experience, we maintain that the true soteriological 
question is not How can I as an individual achieve salvation out of my 
human context? Rather it is, Is redemption possible for the human 
context as a Whole? (85) In seeking to be faithful to our first 
criterion we are led to formulate our second: 
A soteriology will be found to be inadequate if it is centred 
upon the sal vat ion of the individual wi tlnlt a true 
appreciation of the need for a corporate redeapt. ion of the 
hlDIBD cammmity. 
We believe that this realisation lies behind the beautiful English 
soteriological metaphor, atonement. The very word at-one-ment suggests 
that redemption involves a reconciling process within the 
interrelational dimensions of life. 
2.3 The need for a soteriology of healing liberation and radical 
transformation. 
2.3.1 Idealistic perspectives on humanity 
There is a recurrent tendency towards idealistic (86) accounts of 
human life, witnessed to in literature, theology and philosophy. 
HUmanity is viewed as having an all surpassing beauty, dignity and 
destiny. Sin, evil and suffering are thought of as intruders into the' 
human condition which contradict our true nature ( 87) • The existence 
of a flaw in human nature is admitted but it is a manageable flaw that J 
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can certainly be overcome. The soteriological question is reduced to 
How might restoration best be aChieved? The more fundamental question 
as to whether there are any grounds at all for hope in a redemption, or 
fulfilment is avoided. In defining the human person in a priori manner 
as having an essential and all surpassing greatness, the ineradicable 
possibility of redemption has already been affirmed and sin has thus 
been dealt with. The very possibility of redemption is not radically 
in doubt. 
2.3.2 The depth of the soteriological question. 
In rejecting an Idealistic starting point for soteriology we then 
rejected any soteriology that did not take account of the corporate 
dimension of evil. Now we must reject any idealistic soteriology that 
does not take account of the extent of the required redemption. In 
face of the atrocities that our own century has witnessed it is very 
difficult to maintain an idealistic vision of humanity. The ovens of 
Auschwitz make it difficult to maintain the presence of an 
inextinguishable spark of divinity in humanity (88). When we forego 
Idealistic abstraction and view humanity as it is in the flesh, then 
the march of progress appears not simply as an ascent to greatness but 
also as a descent into increasingly sophisticated and depraved means of 
waging war, inflicting political and economic oppression and 
despoliation of the created order (89). We become less confident in 1 
claiming that selfishness is a perversion of our nature, and not our 
true nature (90). We begin to appreciate the radical and all pervasive ..J 
presence of sin and evil reaching right into the depths of our lives. 
As our perception of humanity's need of salvation increases the 
confidence with which we claim that such a sal vat ion is possible 
decreases. The question as to how the human person might recover the 
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deformed image of God is eclipsed by the quest ion as to whether it is 
even possible to speak in this way about humanity. 
Having sought to rid ourselves of idealistic presuppositions about 
the ineradicable goodness of the human person and to stand naked before 
the radical presence of evil in human life, a vortex of despair opens 
up which threatens to engulf us and to empty us of all hope (91). This 
may be a diet for madmen and mystics but hardly for those who would 
retain their sanity. However, we believe that theology must taste this 
bitter draught if it is to address itself to the experienced reality of 
human life. The only notion of redemption that is credible will be one 
forged and tested within this hell of human making. Only if theology 
enters into the Jordan of our iniquity will it be a theology that can 
be lived. 
It might be objected that because God is creator then we know that 
humanity is fundamentally redeemable. However, it is precisely the 
articles of faith that God is creator and redeemer that we cannot state 
with a priori certainty as we approach the close of the second 
Christian 
profound 
grounds 
That is, 
millennium (92). It seems that we will only recover a 
faith in God as creator of all things as a result of finding 
for hoping in God's redeeming presence in all things (93). 
we look to a continuing creativity to establish for us that 
all that exists is God's creation. Where are such grounds to be found 
within human history (94)? 
The question of whether in the face of the radical evil in human 
life there are grounds for hope in a better humanity does, we believe, 
represent the fundamental quest ion of human 1 i fe. Can we 1 i ve as 
genuine community or is selfishness and domination of others the only 
basis to life? Ultimately, this question cannot be suppressed or 
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escaped and the answer we give will determine how we live. However, 
rrost of us, nost of the time do indeed seek to suppress or escape this 
question and with little wonder. Should we conclude that evil is the 
sole reality then suicide poses itself as the definitive question. As 
Camus appreciates: 
There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that 
is suicide. Judging Whether life is or is not worth living 
anounts to answering the fundamental quest ion of philosophy. 
(95) 
The radical evil in human life poses only two real options: 
Either a profound, genuine hope rooted in the human context or 
despairing nihilism. With this realisation, we are able to give 
initial expression to our third criterion of adequacy in soteriology: 
An adequate soteriology DJSt have a profound awreciation of I 
the radical preserx:e of evil in human life and must be able 
to give grounds for 1qle in a redeaption of this situation. (96) 
Consistent with the realisation of the radical presence of evil in 
human life is the realisation of the illusory nature of the search for 
enclaves of purity and integrity safe from the colllllOn nor ass of human 
life. It comes to appear as impossible for individuals and groups to 
escape aU involvement in the evil in human life. As we have already 
argued in formulating our second criterion, we believe that life is 
determined by relationships with other people, with the created order, 
and with the human community as a Whole through the structures of a 
society. Moreover, all these relationships are co-determined by their 
wider contexts and so to a greater or lesser degree are determined by 
evil (97). The structures and relationships Which mediate life to us 
are permeated by evil and so also mediate death to us (98). At a 
communal level there can be no such thing as a pure, ~lite ( 99) • At an 
individual level we can say that it is impossible to think of a person 
Who does not find him/herself in a situation determined by evil (100). 
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An awareness of the radical presence of evil in human life means! 
that we cannot equate salvation with a rem::>val from the cormon nnrass 
of humanity and an entrance into the elect. If soteriology is to mean 
anything at all then it must be rooted within the human situation. 
That is, it must be a transformation of the evil present within human 
Life rather than a salvation out of human life {101). This in turn 
requires that it is possible to think of God as present to the evil in 
r~._r-,j" 
human life, redeeming it within its context, rather than as isolated in 
_j 
a pure realm into which people are transported { 102) • 
Also consistent with the realisation of the radical presence of 
evil in human life is the apparent inadequacy of attempts to minimise 
the significance of evil through reducing it to the level of m::>ral 
indiscretions that can be overlooked. We have argued that evil is that 
which destroys human life both at a conununal and an individual level-. 
It is radical, not superficial { 103) • Hence, it cannot be ignored but 
has to be overcome. Further, we maintain that there is a dynamic 
quality to evil such that it does not exist in isolation from other 
acts but rather influences them { 104) • We become what we do in our 
relationships {105). Hence, an individual's self-chosen determination 
for evil in one relationship will affect his/her other relationships 
and in turn will affect the persons s/he has dealings with { 106) • At 
the wider conununal level we have already touched upon the way in which 
structures both free us and limit us. They mediate and determine our 
relationships and hence preserve the dynamics of destruction and death 
which they incarnate { 107). The world view of white South African 
children, will understandably develop in a vastly different manner to 
the world view of black and coloured South African children. Again we 
may say that evil cannot be ignored but has to be overcome. 
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In religious terms this suggests that salvation cannot be I 
exclusively identified with divine forgiveness. Whilst it is the need 
for forgiveness that gives the human quest for salvation its 
distinctively religious character, an overemphasis upon the need for 
forgiveness to the exclusion of our need for healing represents the 
same superficial understanding of sin and evil that we have decried 
above. It reduces sin to an external, noral infringement of an 
arbitrary code that can be overlooked by a well disposed deity, rather 
than it being a willed orientation of the free human person in a 
direction that frustrates and depersonalises oneself and others. 'Ib 
say that God turns a blind eye to the evil in the world no nore answers 
our problem than if we say that we wi 11 turn a blind eye to it, for as 
long as it exists then it stands in need of redemption. In the words 
of Hardy and Fbrd: 
If it is granted that evil is a possibility in a world where 
freedom is valued, the answer to evil must be in the 
possibility of a free response to it that genuinely meets and 
overcomes it. Evil is both particular and dynamic, and the 
answer to it must be primarily in the language of action. Sol 
God will be justified if he does in fact respond to evil so 
that its distortion of order and non-order is overcome and 
taken up into something new. (108) ~ 
In line with this, we claim that genuine redemption requires that evil 
be transformed or healed and not just forgiven ( 109). We agree with 
Nolan: 
We need to have our guilt renoved but we also need to 
overcome the consequences of original sin: weakness and 
alienation ••• salvation in the Bible is the victory over the 
pOwers of evil that oppress us, alienate us and tempt us -
over the whole cycle of sin... salvation includes the 
forgiveness of sin (liberation from guilt) but it cannot be 
reduced to that alone. (110) 
Fbrgiveness and healing cannot ultimately be separated. Either we 
must say that the person is continually accepted by God and led, 
through healing forgiveness, to an ontological sharing in the divine 
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life (justification unto sanctification). Or we must say that God 1 
comes close to the human person in forgiving healing which brings the 
person to know the acceptance of full communion with God, 
(sanctification unto justification) (111). Tb phrase this in rather 
more traditional language, the imputed righteousness of forgiveness 
must lead through sanctifying healing into the full realization of 
sanctification and the full enjgyment of forgiveness denoted b¥ 
__j 
imparted righteousness (112). 
When we transpose our concern, that salvation should include both 
forgiveness and healing, into the arenas of the communal and structural 
dimensions to human sin and evil then we come to see that the 
denunciation of communal and structural sin and the forgiveness of 
individuals enmeshed in these situations must lead through liberating 
activity into new social and political realities. Redemption requires 
what Jon Sobrino (113) refers to as the "forgiveness of sinful 
reality", including the eradication of structures of oppression and 
violence, in addition to the forgiveness of the sinner. In this way, 
our 'turn to human experience' (criterion one) has led us to see the 
necessity for the 'turn to praxis' in theology that is evident in the 
European political theologies of such people as M:!tz ( 114), M:>ltmann 
(115) and D:ivis (116) and in the Third-W:>rld theologies of liberation 
( 117) • From this perspective, the primary experience U.[X>n which 
theology (academic and otherwise) is called to reflect is not a 
dispassionate, theoretical experience but the experience of critical 
engagement to change human reality (118). 
An initial expression of our third criterion of adequacy in 
soteriology was that an adequate soteriology must have a profound 
appreciation of the radical presence of evil in human life and must be 
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able to give grounds for hope in a genuine redemption of this 
situation. On closer examination we came to see that this requires 
that it is possible to think of God as present to the evil in human 
life redeeming it within its context rather than as isolated in a pure 
realm into which people are transported. ~ were also led to conclude 
that it requires that soteriology should not limit salvation to the 
securing of divine forgiveness alone but must also maintain the need 
for, and the possibility of, a transforming liberation. ~ might say 
that salvation must be truly 'sUbjective' and truly 'objective': 
'SUbjective• in as much as the human person and society require a 
salvation that is a true healing / liberation of that which is 
broken rather than a salvation that is tangential or extrinsic to human 
life; 'Objective• in as much as the human person and community feels 
itself to be unable to actualise this salvation. It seems JIDst 
appropriate to seek an 'objective• process of salvation within the life 
and history of the human person and society. Hence, a full expression 
of our third criterion of adequacy is as follows: 
An adequate soteriology will be one that is formulated in 
dialogue with an appreciation of the radical nature of sin 
and evil in bUIIIiHl life and M'lich allows for the possibility 
of God's transforming, liberating presence to evil. 
~ believe that these concerns are deeply rooted in the Christian 
tradition (119). ~ shall seek to illustrate this by looking at the 
Reformation dispute which we feel can in part be seen as a dispute over 
the dual principle that God must be present to evil both in forgiveness 
and in healing. Having done this we will be able to ask why it is that 
in practice Catholic theology has seemed to fall foul of this 
principle. In turn, this will enable us to link our third criterion 
(that soteriology should be rooted in an appreciation of God's healing 
presence to the radical evil in human life) with our first criterion 
63 
(that theological language should be born from the particular rather 
than from a priori generalisations). We will claim that an abstract 
starting point makes it difficult to take the reality of human life 
seriously. This wi 11 set the scene for one of our IOC>st important 
criticisms of Rahner. In Chapter Five we wi U claim that whilst Rahner 
states the need for radical healing his a priori starting point 
militates against him securing this. Firstly let us explore some 
aspects of the Reformation dispute. 
2.3.3 The Reformation dispute over justification and the dual 
principle that God must be present both in forgiveness and in 
healing. 
With varying emphasis both Protestant and catholic theology 
maintained that salvation involved a transformation of the entire 
person brought about b¥ God's gracious presence. However, the varying 
emphasis contributed to the mutual suspicion between the parties (120). 
In reality, catholic and Protestant alike had failed to appreciate each 
other's theology, if not practice, upon this issue. Fbr centuries, the 
doctrine of justification remained one of the points of most bitter 
dispute between the western churches. It is to be counted a great 
blessing for our own age that we have been enabled to see that whatever 
difference in emphasis might exist on this point, there does not exist 
sufficient doctrinal divergence to warrant a continuing separation of 
the churches (121). 
The Roman catholic understanding of justification as to make 
righteous (imparted righteousness) caused it to be identified with the 
fulfilment of God's Sa.nctifying action (122). The justified person was 
the sanctified person. In contrast Protestant theologians interpreted 
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justification as to pronounce righteous (imputed righteousness) {123). 
This caused it to be identified with God's gracious forgiveness; the 
justified person was the forgiven person. Whilst Luther maintained 
that the righteousness that was imputed fully to a person's spiritual 
nature still had to become manifest in his/her corporeal nature ( 124) , 
he distinguished justification from sanctification whereas they were 
identified in Catholic theology. Ibwever, it must be noted that for 
Luther, the imputed righteousness of Christ was not a pretence or a 
legal-fiction. For Luther, the righteousness of Christ was not simply 
thought of as covering human sin, the righteousness of Christ actually 
becomes our righteousness { 125) : 
This is an infinite righteousness, and one that swallows up 
all sins in a moment, for it is impossible that sin should 
exist in Christ. On the contrary, he who trusts in Christ 
exists in Christ; he is one with Christ, having the same 
righteousness as ·he. It is therefore impossible that sin 
should remain in him. ( 126) 
The difference in terminology, fuelled by the Catholic practice of 
indulgence and a merit system which placed great emphasis on good 
works, led to a profound rejection by Protestants of Catholic belief 
and practice. Tb the Protestant mind, the Catholic interpretation 
seemed to make God's saving, forgiving acceptance (justification) 
dependent upon one's sanctification which was in turn dependent upon 
oneself (127). Ultimately it seemed as though it was the person who 
saved him or herself. Such a conclusion was abhorrent to the 
Reformers. To make the person's justification in any way dependent 
upon his/her own initiative was to compromise the free sovereignty of 
God's grace ( 128). For the Reformers, the Catholic position not only 
sought to manipulate God, but it ultimately condemned humanity to a 
hopeless fate. Quite simply, if the human person was responsible for 
his/her own sanctification yet knew him/herself to be unable to achieve 
65 
this s/he was given over to perdition and eternal wrath. With profound 
insight, Luther had plumbed the depths of the human abyss and known our 
absolute need of the God Who comes close to us in forgiving love before 
we are pure. He proclaimed that we are both sinners and justified (i.e 
forgiven) simul iustus et peccator. 
On the other hand, the Catholic mind with its identification of 
justification with the final fulfilment of sanctification could only 
hear the phrase simul iustus et peccator as a cheapening of salvation. 
It was thought that salvation was thereby reduced to a legal fiction 
that left the corruption and sin in human life unhealed and 
not transformed ( 129) • Catholics thought that the Protestant 
understanding of salvation was confined solely to a granting of 
forgiveness without reference to sanctification and the consequent need 
for responsible ccr-operation in one • s own transformation ( 130-). Here 
again a profound insight was being maintained, that the human person 
stood in need of a salvation that was a transformation of his/her 
entire life so that the sanctified person could really share in the 
triune Life of God. '!hat is, humanity stands in need of a salvation 
that transforms the sin and evil in human life rather than one Which 
pretends that it does not exist. 
As we have seen, if soteriology is to take the human dileJIDna 
seriously, then it must preserve both the Protestant emphasis on the 
God of forgiving acceptance who comes close to • fallen • humanity, and 
also the Catholic ~~sis on humanity's need of a transforming healing 
of evil. To emphasise either one of these concerns to the exclusion of 
the other is to cease to focus on the liberation of the entire human 
person in Christ and so to issue in an inadequate account of Christian 
salvation. As we have further stated, both the Protestant and Catholic 
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doctrines of justification, each with their own emphasis, managed to 
maintain the balance, holding that salvation included both forgiveness 
and healing, justification and sanctification (131). However, the 
longstanding mutual suspicion was not entirely the result of bigoted 
misrepresentation, but rather because their respective salvation 
schemas all too often in practice approximated to that considered to be 
abhorrent by the other party. We hear a great deal today about the 
difference between a catechesis of the head and a catechesis of the 
heart. So also on a cooununa 1 level there can be a great difference 
between the explicit official theology of a church and the implicit 
theology that is 1 i ved out both in church organisation and piety. Of 
particular interest to us is this divergence between theology and 
practice in Catholic theology. 
-2.3~4. The catholic tendency to make salvation conditional upon the 
fulfilment of a near impossible ideal. 
Popular Catholicism has displayed a tendency to become obsessed by 
the extent of human sinfulness. This may seem strange when it is 
recalled that traditionally it is Protestantism that comes closer to 
affirming humanity's utter corruption whilst Catholicism has maintained 
the original gracedness of human life. However, it is not so strange 
when we realise that humanity's accountability for sin, and the horror 
according to our sin, is in inverse, not direct, proportion to the 
inevitability of our depravity. The evangelical who knew the human 
person's inability to free him/herself from sin, believed that God had 
provided the answer through forgiving us. Hence sin could cease to be 
a problem. In contrast, catholic Piety could too easily leave humanity 
with the major problem of sin. Great stress was laid upon the horror 
and depth of sin as leading to a fundamental distortion of the person 
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that could not simply be pronounced forgiven, the catholic was warned 
against sin and told to avoid it. Far less stressed, however, was the 
practically endemic nature of sin in human life. 
This led to a major problem for the devout Catholic. Catholics 
knew themselves to be responsible for their own sin and further knew 
themselves to have a responsibility to co-operate in their own 
transformation. Hence, Catholics knew themselves to be continually and 
freely rejecting the call to authentic life. In knowing this they were 
locked into a circle of guilt. They were caught between the two poles 
of, on the one hand, believing that they could not enjoy communion with 
God until they had turned away from sin and on the other of finding 
themselves unable to complete this transformation. This was backed up 
with a theory of the gracedness of human nature which implied that the 
human person was capable of making this transformation. Hence the 
human person was convicted of his/her own freely responsible and guilty 
rejection of God. 
The human cost of this was immense. Tb the over sensitive 
Catholic, aware only of guilt and failure, God appeared to be distant 
and demanding rather than liberating and merciful. Such an image of 
God does not attract the sinner to bring his sin before God for healing 
and forgiveness. Rather one will seek to avoid God's company, and seek 
to appease God from afar. Is it 110re than coincidental that the 
Catholic would seek to approach God indirectly through the intercession 
of the saints and the Blessed Virgin Mary ( 132)? To the person 
conscious of his/her continued solidarity in human sinfulness, to whom 
Christian living was a messy affair, the picture of Christian life as 
one of purity and sanctity beyond the mess of 1 i fe had the sad appeal 
of a greatly desired, yet unattainable, beauty. The novels of Graham 
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Greene are replete with characters who are unable to integrate the mess 
of their lives with the pure and high ideals of the Catholic piety in 
which they had been nurtured. 
Unable to achieve self-transformation and unable to trust in the 
forgiving, healing love of God, Catholic piety all too easily slip~ 
into legalism. The futile attempt at self-transformation was forgotten 
and the attention was focused on limiting the damage. Grace came to be 
seen not so much as the transforming life of God but more as a 
qualification of which one must be in possession in order to gain 
admittance to salvation (133). Religious practices seemed to be rrore 
like an attempt to qualify for grace and so to insure against damnation 
rather than being a means of disposing oneself to receive God's 
gracious forgiveness and healing. An elaborate series of religious 
devotions guaranteed certain quanta_of grace, thus provid-ing a -fully 
paid up insurance policy ( 134) • Provided one managed to remain somehow 
within the sphere of grace, one could no~ in having wrestled salvation 
from the hands of God, the necessary grc-.... th in spiritual purity could 
be undergone in purgatory. 
2.3.5 The cause of Catholicism's retreat from a high theology of 
grace into legalism. 
Should the above characature of Catholic piety authentically 
represent a tendency to which it is prone then we are posed with a 
dilemma. On the one hand Catholic theology maintains a consistent 
balance in holding that salvation involves a transformation and that 
this is the result of God's gracious work. On the other hand, catholic 
piety has all too often ranged from futile attempts at self-
transformation through to near despair at achieving this self-
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transformation resulting in the attempt to earn God's favour in other 
ways ( 135) • Why is this so? In reply, we would claim that the 
reduction of Catholic piety to legalism is due to the inability of 
Catholic theology of grace to speak to the conunon human experience of 
the all pervasiveness of sin. 
Catholic theology maintains that the person needs to undergo an 
entire transformation in order to enjoy conununion with God. It further 
maintains that because human nature is graced then the human person 
already has the resources to effect this transformation. In face of 
this, the experience of continued sinfulness and apparent inability to 
do otherwise not unnaturally prompts the search for another way to 
God's favour. Catholic spirituality appeared to demand that the human 
do b¥ nature What s/he feels him/herself unable to do without grace. 
Catholic theology of _gJ:"_ace did not translate easily into practical 
living. Catholic teaching on the human person as graced nature could 
be charged with starting from an a priori Idealistic perspective rather 
than beginning with the reality of human experience and constructing an 
account of nature and grace that fitted that experience. The result is 
that the nature that is held to be graced seems already to be a 
• supernature • at one renove from normal human nature ( 136). SUch 
Idealism results in a very neat intellectual system with its own 
internal integrity. It can eXplain how in theoretical terms salvation 
is both all from God and all from man ( 137) in a way that requires the 
onus of responsibility to be laid upon the human person. However, it 
integrates far less happily with the realities of human life. It 
states that life is graced without eXplaining how. Consequently, 
Catholic piety has often retreated into just the kind of impossible 
demands for self-transformation and attempts to appease God that are so 
hateful to Protestants. With Bernhard whse we agree that: 
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"superstition, the system of indulgences, pilgrimages, and the rest are 
in the last analysis the result of a deficiency in the theology of 
scholasticism and of the entire medieval church." (138) The Catholic 
system fell upon the stumbling block of the C01111IDn hwnan experience of 
sinfulness (139). 
OUr third criterion of adequacy in soteriology was as follows: 
An adequate soteriology will be one that is formulated in 
dialogue with an appreciatioo of the radical nature of sin 
and evil in hUIIBD life and which allows for the possibility 
of God 1 s transforming. liberating presence to evil. 
We have examined the Reformation dispute in the light of this and have 
claimed that a contributory factor in the dispute was a differing yet 
ultimately complementary emphasis upon the need both for God's 
forgiving presence to evil and the need for a transformation of evil. 
We have further examined why it is that Catholic piety has all too 
often differed from Catholic theology b¥ reducing the concern to 
maintain God's gracious transforming presence into a petty legalism. 
In doing so we came to see the connect ion between our third and our 
first criteria: 
lie cannot DBintain a soteriology of God 1 s gracious and 
transforming presence to sin and evil unless it is a theology 
rooted in o '"" •1 hUIIBD experience rather than one born of a 
reaoved apriori perspective. 
The present analysis of criteria of adequacy in soteriology has 
taken us full circle. Starting with the general principle that 
theology must be rooted in human life we . formulated our first 
criterion: 
Soteriology must be rooted in the hUIIBD realm, it must flow 
fran and address the particularity of hUIIBll life and hence 
God must be tbought of as genuinely present within the 
particularity of hUIIBD life. 
We called for the formation of an appropriate fundamental 
71 
theology. In turn, our principle that theology must be rooted in an 
aposteriori account of human life led us to formulate our second and 
third criteria: 
and: 
A soteriology will be found to be inadequate if it is centred 
upon the salvation of the individual witlnlt a true 
awreciation of the need for a corporate redellption of the 
huDBn ronnmmity. 
An adequate soteriology will be one that is formulated in 
dialogue with an awreciation of the radical nature of sin 
am evil in human life am Mrlch allows for the possibility 
of God's transforming, liberating presence to evil. (140) 
Finally, we have come to see that there is a connect ion between 
our first criterion and our third criterion (and so also presumably 
between our first and second criterion). The apriori mode of 
theologising (criterion one) excludes the possibility of formulating a 
soteriology that is adequate to the need for God • s transforming and 
gracious presence in human life (criterion three). 
In other t«>rds we cannot formulate a soteriology awropriate 
to the tt«:> criteria born from human life (200 am 3rd) mtless 
we also foiliiUl.ate an appropriate theological methodology. 
This will be of prime importance in our analysis of Karl Rahner to 
Which we now turn our attention. 
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be two parallel lives in their existence: on the one hand, the so-
called "spiritual" life, with its values and demands; and on the 
other, _the so-called "-secular" life, that is,- life in- a family, at 
work, in social relationships, in the responsibilities of public 
life and in culture." Pope ,John Paul II, Christifideles Laici, a. 
59, (I.Dndon: CTS 1988), pp. 57. 
40. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 2, (W:!lwyn City: James 
Nisbet & Cb. Ltd. 1960), pp. 5-10. 
41. cf. Tracy, ~· cit., pp. 119-136. cf., F. Kerr, Theology After 
Wittgenstein,Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1986), pp. 160, 180-184. 
42. cf. "Sin is an offence against God precisely because it is an 
offence against people." A. N:>lan, op. cit., pp. 38. cf. "God is 
not offended by us except insofar as we harm ourselves and 
others." St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III cap. 133. 
43. Daly, gp. cit., pp. 150. 
44. ibid., pp. 1. 
45. ibid., pp. 4. 
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46 o ibid • 1 pp • 1. 
47. cf. "Sin is a religious word. When we look at some wrong doing 
and call it a sin, we are bringing God into the picture. We are 
not simply saying that we think something is wrong, we are saying 
that God disapproves of it, that God condemns it, that it is an 
'offence against God'." Nolan, op. cit., pp. 32. 
48. cf. "When we speak of something as a sin we are saying that in a 
religious sense the one who is being wronged or sinned against is 
God." ibid., pp. 32. cf. "Sin is also a nnral word. When we 
call some wrongdoing a sin, we are claiming that it is not the 
result of chance or fate but that somebody is morally responsible 
for it, somebody is to be blamed for it. Sin implies guilt ••• 
when we say that something is a sin, we are not only saying that 
God is involved, we are also saying that human beings are guilty 
or in some way responsible for it. What is being contradicted here 
is fatalism and determinism of any kind." ibid., pp. 32-33. 
49. cf. "In the midst of this tremendous vitality that today's 
Christians are showing, one set of problems emerges over and over 
again: how to be faithful l::x:>th to the contemporary experience of 
the gospel and to the tradition of Christian life that has been 
received. How is a connnunity to go about bringing to expression 
its own experience of Christ in its concrete situation? And how 
is this to be related to a tradition that is often expressed in 
language and concepts vastly different from anything in the 
C_ll!'_ren!_ situatiQI'!~. Sch_r~iter, __ op. _cit., pp. xi.--cf. ibid.-, 
pp.95-121. cf. "'!bat encounter with the tradition can raise many 
problems for the churches as they develop their l~al theologies. 
They are not trying to dilute or avoid aspects of the tradition: 
there is a deep desire to remain truly faithful to the apostolic 
tradition and to be themselves faithful witnesses to the gospel in 
their own circwnstances. The problems arise instead from 
wondering whether or not the encounter with the tradition actually 
takes place at all, whether or not there is sufficient dialogue 
taking place to allow for mutual understanding between tradition 
and- cultural situation. A heightened 9ensi£fviti tocult.ure has 
made 1~1 churches only more keenly aware of the difficulties in 
connnunication. How can the tradition be truly received if the 
very grounds for dialogue are not first achieved?" ibid., pp. 95. 
50. cf. MbOormick, gp. cit., pp. 69. 
51. cf. "Until fairly recently the impression was often given that 
Christian faith was a highly private affair. Christianity seemed 
to be a religion concerned primarily with the development of 
• individual' faith, the elimination of 'personal' sin, and the 
promotion of the salvation of 'my' soul." I..ane, op. cit., pp. 1. 
52. We may compare here Hans Kling commenting on the relevancy of the 
doctrine of justification today: " ••• it is a question not merely 
of individual justification, or purely of saving our own souls, 
but also of the social dimension of salvation: ~rehensive care 
for our fellow human beings and work on changing the structures of 
l::x:>ndage and the constraints of society. We cannot be concerned 
merely in a spiritual way with salvation hereafter and peace with 
God, but must be wholly concerned with the COtnm:)n good and the 
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total good of mankind in love of neighbour and of those who are 
far away." H. Ki.ing, "Justification Today",Justification: The 
IX>ctrine Of Karl Barth And A catholic Reflection, (IDndon: Burns & 
oates 1981), pp. Xxiii. 
53. cf., Nolan, op. cit., pp. 38. 
54. cf., Lane, op. cit., pp. 88-93. 
55. Enda r-tlbnagh, Between Chaos And New Creation: Ibi At 
The Fringe, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1986 , pp. "The 
ideal of individual self-sufficiency, so exalted in our liberal 
culture, is recognized in Christian thought as one form of the 
primal sin. Fbr self-love, which is the root of all sin, takes 
two social forms. One of them is the domination of the other life 
by the self. The second is the sin of isolationism." Reinhold 
Niebuhr, The Children Of Light And The Children Of Ia:rkness: A 
Vindication Of Democra And A Criti e Of Its Traditional 
Defense, New York: c. Scnbner s & Sons, 1944 , pp. 55. 
56. Lying behind this emphasis on the interrelational character of 
human life is the work of the dialogical philosophers, cf. Martin 
Buber, I And Thou, (New York 1958) and the process philosophers 
and theolog1ans, cf. Iavid M. Rasmussen, "Between Autonomy And 
Sociality", in Cultural Hermeneutics 1 (1973), pp. 3-47. cf. 
"Today, we know only too well ui the light of the behavioural 
sciences that the individual is never merely an individual. He or 
she belongs to social network of hlllTian relatiqn~s]:li.ps ._ The 
individual is -aiWays an individual in relation to a conununity: 
family, friends and country. The individual is radically social." 
J~ne, op. cit., pp. 1. 
57. cf. "First of all, our bodies obviously insert us into the 
material world. ~become part of the cosms and the cosms part 
of us. Once upon a time people naively assumed a far-reaching 
autonomy and stability for the human body. They had not yet 
discovered that our life is a dynamic process of constant 
circulation between our bodies and our material environment. " 
O'Cbllins, op. cit., pp. 182. 
58. cf. "Human agency, subjectivity and selfhood are a social reality 
in process. Tb this extent the individual as agent is always 
situated historically in a particular historical situation. The 
agent as subject is part of a wider network of complex social 
relations." Lane, op. cit., pp. 75. 
59. Tracy, gp. cit., pp. 178. 
60. cf. "An isolated bodily person would be a strange anomaly. OUr 
bodies make us share in and incessantly relate to the universe." 
O'Cbllins, gp. cit., pp. 182. cf. Lane, gp. cit., pp. 89. 
61. cf. "No man is an Island, entire of itself: everyman is a piece of 
the Continent, a part of the main: if a clod be washed away by the 
sea, Europe is the less, as well as if aprom:mtory were, as well 
as- if a manor of thy friends or of thine own were: any man's 
death diminishes me, because I am 1nvol ved in mankind: And 
therefore never se~to know for whom the bell tolls: It tolls Dor 
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thee." John Ibnne, "~ditation XVII", 'Ihe Oxford Dictionary Of 
Quotations 'Ihird Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989), 
pp. 190. 
62. cf. "SUch an anthropology needs to recognize that experience and 
reality are transpersonal, reaching beyond both individualism and 
a localized interpersonal i ty. There must also be a recognition of 
the essential intersUbjectivity or communitarian character of 
human personhood, a character neither extrinsic nor secondary to 
the experience of being a person." ~rmick, op. cit., pp. 92-
93. cf. "M:>st of us were brought up to think of ourselves as 
isolated individuals with some personal relationships. W:! 
pictured the \tK>rld as a collection of millions of independent 
individuals Who were different from one another only because they 
freely chose to be different. What we now realise is that we are 
in the very first place social beings Who belong to social groups 
that are dynamically related to other groups within a broader 
social structure." N::>lan, To N::>urish Our Faith, pp. 48. 
63. cf. '"Ibis means that human freedom is radically interpersonal in 
its experience and expression. Persona 1 freedom is contextualized 
and actualized within the organism of the interpersonal human 
community." ~rmick, op. cit., pp. 93. 
64. Jerome 'Iheisen suggests that the symbol of disunity is better able 
to disclose the multiple aspects of conflict and dividedness in 
the human situation than is the traditional theological symbol of 
origina_l si!l·~·- <:~·-• ____ Jer~ P. _'!'!l~isen, __ 9.S!B., Community .And 
DisririH: : ls Of Grace And Sin, (Collegeville, Minnesota: St. 
John's Un1versity Press 1985 , pp. 53-86. 
65. cf. "'Ibrough sickness, old age, imprisonment and other causes, our 
bodies can bring us radical solitude and terrifying loneliness. 
That bodily loneliness finds its ultimate expression When the tomb 
encloses a newly-buried corpse. Our material bodies do not merely 
separate and alienate us from one another, the \oK>rld and God. 
Through weariness, physical weakness, sickness and sleep they 
al-ienate us from ourselves. OUr bodiliness can make us feel not 
fully free to be ourselves and to be with others." O'Collins, ~ 
cit., pp. 183. 
66. cf. "We saw that there really was no way to overcome the real 
dilemma of existence, the one of the 110rtal animal who is at the 
same time conscious of his 110rtality. A person spends years 
coming into his own, developing his talent, his unique gifts, 
perfecting his discriminations about the \tK>rld, broadening and 
sharpening his appetite, learning to bear the disappointments of 
life, becoming mature seasoned - finally a unique creature in 
nature, standing with some dignity and nobility and transcending 
the animal condition; no longer driven, no longer a complete 
reflex, not stamped out of any DDld. And then the real tragedy, 
as Andre Malraux wrote in '!he Human Condition: it takes sixty 
years of incredible suffering and effort to make such an 
individual, and then he is good only for dying.... He has to go 
the way of the grasshopper, even though it takes longer." Ernest 
Becker, 'lbe Denial Of Death, (New York: The Free Press 1973), pp. 
268-269. 
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67. Enda 1\tlbnagh, op. cit., pp. 1-2. cf. ''What is perhaps roc>st 
alarming is the way the passion for technical production -
electronic, computer and socio-biological - has significantly 
outstripped the human. spiritual, and psychological needs of 
humanity." Lane, op. cit., pp. 93. 
68. cf. "The rapid rise of science to fame has suddenly become a 
matter of serious concern, a concern centred less on the success 
of science itself and roc>re on the implications of these successes 
on the larger issues of life itself." ibid., pp. 85. cf. "The 
man of today seems ever to be under threat from what he produces, 
that is to say from the result of the work of his hands and, even 
more so, from the work of his intellect and the tendencies of his 
will. • • • Man therefore 1 i ves increasingly in fear. He is afraid 
that what he produces - not all of it, of course, or even roc>st of 
it, but part of it and precisely that part that contains a special 
share of his genius and initiative - can radically turn against 
himself: he is afraid that it can become the means and instrument 
for an unimaginable self-destruction, compared with which all the 
cataclysms and catastrophes of history known to us seem to fade 
away." Pope John Paul II, Redernptor Horninis, 4th March 1979, a. 
15.1. 
69. cf. "In fact, in the process of enlightenment and secularization 
man has freely taken into his own hands the responsibility for the 
world and history in all areas, but this responsibility -
originally an act of liberation - has increasingly turned out to 
~-a !t~~yy bur<len. _EPr ___ tQday man _no _longer_ finds in the world 
traces of his Creator, but only of himself. This is a hominized, 
but very often not humane world, in which man is continually 
confronted with his achievements, with his imposing creations, but 
increasingly also with his horrendous destructions. Many older 
people, once accustomed to success, cannot understand why there is 
a widespread aversion to the very idea of achievement among the 
younger generation." Kiing, "Justification Today", pp. xxiv. 
70. cf. "The world of nature can no longer be treated simply as an 
object available for external rnanipuU:t'f"ioh.... Without. --attention 
to the sensibilities of nature, the future of the human species is 
in danger of extinction. The ecological question is no longer the 
curious preserve of the naturalist. Instead the unity that exists 
between natural life and human life is something that must not 
only be respected but restored in the future if we are to ensure 
the survival of the human race." Lane, op. cit., pp. 90. 
71. cf. ''W:! live in a world that is divided unevenly into 'the haves' 
and • the have nots' , the rich and the poor, a northern hemisphere 
of over-production and a southern hemisphere of under-development, 
a first world of extravagant waste and a third world of extreme 
want. These signs of the t irnes are easily illustrated by some 
stark statistics: 800 million people live in a condition of 
'absolute poverty'; 20 million die of starvation each year; races 
of people like the Kampucheans and Ethiopians are being wiped of 
the face of the earth through starvation. Alongside these 
staggering statistics we learn that over two hundred thousand 
million pounds (£200,000,000,000) is spent yearly by the 
superpowers on the arms race. Other disturbing facts and figures 
could be instanced. Interpreted in the 1 ight of the gospel of 
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Jesus Christ these signs of the times disclose that we live in a 
situation of sin and injustice wnich has become institutionalised 
in our economic, social and political structures. Such a 
situation is now commonly described as one of 'social sin'." Lane, 
op. cit., pp. 110-111. cf. ""Sin" and "structures of sin" are 
categories which are seldom applied to the situation of the 
contemporary world. However, one cannot easily gain a profound 
understanding of the reality that confronts us unless we give a 
name to the root of the evils which afflict us." Pope John Paul 
II, Solicitude Rei Socialis (36), 30th December 1987, (London: CTS 
1988), pp. 69. 
72. cf. "As long as our world remains unequally divided into a first 
world of over-production and a third world of under-development 
with the excesses of increasing richness and poverty, growing 
unemployment, illiteracy and violence, 'successes' and 
'achievements ' remain at IOOSt an ambiguous experience." Lane, ~ 
cit., pp. 89. cf. The Brandt O':>nnnission, N::>rth-South: A 
programme Fbr Survival, (London: Pan Books 1980). 
73. cf. "Any serious analysis of our social reality will soon begin to 
reveal that our human world is structured in such a way that some 
people are on top and others are down below. It may be the social 
hierarchy of classes in a society or simply the rich and the poor 
or male and female or white and black or the First W:>rld and the 
Third W:>rld (N::>rth and South) but there is a top and a oottom and 
the dynamics of the relationship generally is that the top 
dominates and oppresses the oottom." N::>lan, To N::>urish Our Faith, 
i)p. 48-49. -cf. ''Many of-the~ 'achievemeriFs' of ID5dern governments 
such as the creation of a thriving economy, the establishment of a 
high GNP and the development of a strong defence system are now 
seen to be viable only at the expense and exploitation of others: 
the third world, the poor and the weak. Indeed, many of the 
structures that citizens took great pride in promoting through the 
political process are now seen to be something of an embarrassment 
because of their adverse effect on the rest of the world." 
Lane,op. cit., pp. 92. cf. "It is now generally agreed by social 
scientists and economic planners that under-development in the 
third world is related causally to over-development in the first 
world.... To this extent those who belong to the first world must 
bear some responsibility for the situation that exists in the 
third world. " ibid. , pp. 112. 
74. cf. "Even though it is not for us to elaoorate a very profound 
analysis of the situation of the world, we have nevertheless been 
able to perceive the serious injustices which are building around 
the world of men a network of domination, oppression and abuses 
which stifle freedom and which keep the greater part of hwnanity 
from sharing in the building up and enjoyment of a more just and 
more fraternal world." Synod of Bishops, Justice In 'lhe W:>rld 
(1971), a. 3., in Johannesburgh Diocesan Justice and Peace 
O':>nnnission, Our Best Kept Secret: 'lhe Church's Social Teaching, 
(Johannesburgh 1989), pp. 61. 
75. cf. "If the present situation can be attributed to difficulties of 
various kinds, it is not out of place to speak of "structures of 
sin", which, as I stated in my .Apostolic Exhortation Reconciliatio 
Et Paenitentia, are rooted in personal sin, and thus always linked 
83 
to the concrete acts of individuals who introduce these 
structures, consolldate them and make them difficult to remve." 
Pope ,John Paul II, Solicitude Rei Socialis (36). In talking of 
structures of sin, we are reminded of Reinhold Neighbour's claim 
that the behaviour of social groups is by its nature less moral 
than the behaviour of individuals, cf. f.bral Man And I1111lDral 
Society, (London: SCM 1963), pp. xi-xii. 
76. cf. Lane, gp. cit., pp. 75-76. 
77. cf. "And thus they (structures of sin) grow stronger, spread, and 
become the source of other s1ns, and so influence people's 
behaviour." Pope John Paul II, op. cit., ibid. cf. "~see the 
broad and deep acres of history through a mental grid, ••• through 
a system of values which is established in our minds before we 
look out on it ••• [A]nd it is this grid which decides ••• what will 
fall into our field of perception." J. Cone, God Of The Oppressed, 
(New York 1975), pp. 44, quoted in Austin Smith, Passion Fbr The 
Inner City, (London: Sheed & ~rd 1983), pp. 73. 
78. cf. Lane, gp. cit., pp. 75-76. 
79. cf. "This is our predicament as persons. ~ need society in order 
to develop into our full humanity, but the societies to which we 
perforce belong are conditioned by the dead (or undead) past. And 
by belonging to them we become their captives." H. A. Williams, 
True Resurrection,, (London: Mitchell Beazley 1979), pp. 141. 
cf., ibid., pp. 105-113. 
80. F. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. by H. R. Makintosh and 
J. s. Stewart, (Edinburgh: T & T Clark 1928), pp. 288. 
81. cf. "Sin in the Bible means something m:::>re than individual acts of 
wrongdoing. There is another dimension to the whole experience of 
sin. In very general terms we could say that it is the corporate 
or social dimension of sin... ~ have only to think of how the 
prophets condemned not merely the individual sins of individual 
~1~ but also, . and much more frequently, the sin of whole 
nations and empires including the sin of Israel itself as a 
nation. In fact the social dimension of sin is the major concern 
of all the Biblical writers." liblan, God In South Africa, pp. 42. 
cf. "The ills and evils of our world today are as much social as 
they are individual, structural as much as they are personal, 
institutional as much as they are private." lane, OJ?· cit., pp. 
102. cf. "Obviously, not only individuals fall v1ctim to this 
double attitude of sin: nations and blocs can do so too. And this 
favours even m:::>re the introduction of the "structures of sin" of 
which I have spoken. If certain forms of m:::>dem "imperialism" 
were considered in the light of these moral criteria, we would see 
that hidden behind certain decisions, apparently inspired only by 
economics or politics, are real forms of idolatry: of m:::>ney, 
ideology, class, technology." Pope John Paul II, Solici tudo Rei 
Socialis (37), pp. 71. 
82. Nolan, gp. cit., pp. 43. 
83. Timothy Gorr inge, Redeemi Time: Atonetnent Thro 
(London: tartan, Longmann & Todd Ltd. 1986 , 
84 
Education, 
84. Daly, op. cit., pp. 1. 
85. cf. "Disunity is the human condition that calls out for 
redemption, a reaching for community." Theisen, op. cit., pp. 83. 
86. we distinguish between Platonic Idealism as a philosophical 
methodology founded upon apriori claims and idealism as 
representing romantic, unrealistic perceptions of humanity. 
However idealistic accounts of human life can only be supported, 
we believe, by an Idealistic methodology. In the present work, 
Idealism refers to a methodology and idealism to a naivety. 
87. cf. N. I.Dbkowicz • s comparison between the tradition flowing from 
Aristotle and that flowing from Hegel and Marx: "In Aristotle 
nothing is or even can be wrong as it is in its natural state. The 
problem for Aristotle does not consist in correcting the universe 
or in making it rational: it consists in discovering its inherent 
order and rationality.... In Hegel almst everything is wrong. and 
consequently has to be auf gehoben, transfigured, transformed, 
revolutionized." I.DbkOWicz, Thee And Practice: History Of A 
Concept From Aristotle 'lb Marx, South Bertch University of Notre 
Dame Press 1967), pp. 340. 
88. cf. "On the occasion of the profound crisis of western liberal 
culture (the horrors of two w:>rld wars, the extermination of 
millions, the demnic outbursts of Fascist and Stalinist terror), 
both existentialist philosophy and nee-orthodox theology retrieved 
the classical Christian image 91 man_ as C\J-ieng.ted, es_tranged,_ 
fallen, -sinful. -That ---class-ical Christian picture of humanity's 
radical possibilities for good and evil was and is antithetical to 
both the classical Greek philosophical view of humanity's inherent 
knowledge and goodness conquering error, and even to the classical 
Greek dramatists' profound view of humanity's tragic situation." 
Tracy, op. cit., pp. 212-213. 
89. Habermas explores this dilemma in terms of it being a consequence 
of the dominance of technical reason in modern society Which 
represses ethical concerns, cf. J. -Habermas, Towards A Rational 
Society, (I.Dndon: Hienemann 1971), pp. 112. cf. Lane, op. c1t., 
47-63. cf. "Habermas's analysis of the supremacy of techn1cal 
reason in modern society helps us to understand some of the 
extraordinary anomalies that beset the latter half of the 
twentieth century. Such anomalies include the spending of mre on 
militarism than on people, the build-up of nuclear arms that could 
destroy the world many times over in the name of peace, the 
'management • of news in the name of truth, the indiscriminate 
crossing of geographical boundaries for the sake of security, and 
the muffling of truth by government news agencies. These anomalies 
are, in one way or another, the result of an all-pervading 
instrl.D'Ilental rationalisation of society." ibid., pp. 61-62. cf. 
ibid. , pp. 84-87. cf. "There can hardly be any doubt that the 
contemporary situation of humanity in the western world is in a 
serious state of crisis: scientific, social, ecological, nuclear, 
economic, political and cultural." ibid., pp. 84. cf. "M:>re and 
mre it is becoming clear that much of the technological progress 
we rate so highly today has brought with it a loss of human 
values, and the liberation it was expected to bring has become 
oppressive and enslaving." ibid., pp. 87. cf. "The paradox lies in 
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the fact that within this perspective of unity the forces of 
division and antagonism seem tbday to be increas~ng in strength. 
Ancient divisions between nations and empires, races and classes, 
today possess new technological instruments of destruction. The 
arms race is a threat to man's highest good, which is life: it 
makes poor peoples and individuals yet m::>re miserable, while 
making richer those already powerful: it creates a continuous 
danger of conflagration, and in the case of nuclear arms, it 
threatens to destroy all life from the face of th~ earth. At the 
same new divisions are being born to separate · man from his 
neighbour. Unless combated and overcome by social and political 
action, the influence of the new industrial and technological 
order favours the concentration of wealth, power and decision 
making in the hands of a small public or private controtling 
group." Synod of Bishops, Justice In The \thrld, (9), op. cit., pp. 
62-63. 
90. cf. "It is conunon. knowledge, universally assumed by all who 
pretend to know the world, that in our economic striving, our 
political allegiances, and our group loyalties, we are mtivated 
by self-interest: and every statistical survey of voting habits 
bears out this uni versa! tendency of our values and opinions to 
follow the direction of our interests. In each of these areas, 
the men who dominate the real world, the advertisers, businessmen, 
real estate agents, judges, politicians - and even social 
scientists - never question but that our behaviour is dictated by 
our self-interest rather than by our proclaimed ideals." Langdon 
Gilkey, Nami The Whirlwind: The Re___n~~·~Cil_ Of God-____ e., 
(Indianapolls and New York: The Bobbs-Mernll Company, Inc. 1969 , 
pp. 386. 
91. cf. "The symbol of disunity has the power to induce emtional 
responses in those who perceive its symbolic expression. It is 
difficult to remain unmved in the face of this symbol. The 
symbol draws the person to look more closely at the underlying 
reality of fautt and failure. It induces agony over the human 
condition. As it calls attention to the depths of human 
brokeneSS 1 the csymbo:l prodUCeS mixed em::>t ions Of disccoura9einent 1 
anger, resignation and fear. There is discouragement with the 
failure that pervades human existence and that seems to perpetuate 
itself. There is anger that a failure beyond one's control 
reaches personal life and affects it to the core of its being. 
There is sad resignation to the condition which pre-exists one's 
birth and life which seems incapable of amelioration. There is 
fear that the condition of failure will eventually overcome the 
self as it has overcome many persons in the past. In short, the 
symbol is able to bring about an emotional response in those who 
perceive it and who allow it to enter their life." Theisen, 9E.!_ 
cit., pp. 68-69. 
92. cf. "That evil is a necessary constituent of our being, we may 
know we cannot state without contradicting the metaphysical 
necessity of our own freedom or the metaphysical and Christian 
theological belief in the loving actions of a good God ( 49) • But 
that physical and mral evil is our actual condition: that such 
evit is an omnipresent fact, whose inevitability we realize - in 
this century surely - on both individual and scx::ietal terms, is a 
reality which only the most urihappily and self-destructively 
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innocent among us feels free to deny (50). Tracy, op. cit., pp. 
212. 
93. We may compare here a corrunent made by Daniel W. Hardy and David F. 
Fbrd: "To argue that •••• God is creator of man is not a very 
effective challenge. There is needed an alternative way of life 
in which this option is experienced." Jubilate: Theology In 
Praise, (London: DLT 1984), pp. 13. 
94. cf. "N:>twithstanding the fact that such a reconstitutive act in 
the materiality of a human being is required by the economy of 
praise in God, did it actually occur? There has to be evidence 
that this reconstitutive act took place in a particular historical 
person, and in quite a different way than could be claimed for 
others." ibid., pp. 165. 
95. Albert camus, The Myth of Siw.hus, translated by Justin O' Brien, 
(London: Hamish Hamilton 1955 , pp. 11. 
96. cf. "If revisionist theology is to succeed materially, I believe, 
it should incorporate that nee-orthodox anthropological vision 
into its own twin vision of a common faith in the worthwhileness 
of existence which sustains us even beyond good and evil and a 
reflective belief in a credible, a suffering and loving Christian 
God (65)." Tracy, op. cit., pp. 214. 
97. cf. "hl.y local agitation shakes the whole universe." A. N. 
Wli_teJ:!~c!. M:ldes Of ~)Jgll_t, (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 
138. cf. Lane, gp. cit., pp. 103. 
98. cf. "There is a human solidarity in sin which has an inescapably 
historical dimension, and it is this which Paul calls 'the power 
of sin' (Rom. 3:9) and the tradition 'original sin'. This power 
of sin, the principalities and powers which oppress us, may be 
named in structures such as racism, casteism, patriarchy, class -
structures and deeply rooted attitudes into which an individual is 
born, which form a 'second skin' which it is not possible simply 
to jump-out of."-Gorringe, op. cit., pp. 52. 
99. cf. "If the vast laboratory of man's history, secular or 
religious, illustrates any one general truth, it is that human 
freedom, however creative it may be, is not simply a freedom 
capable of choosing and then following its own ideals. Despite 
our best intentions, we do do something else; what we do gets 
corrupted and ends up sadly different from what we had intended; 
an evil that was not part of our purpose -or of the purpose we 
told ourselves was ours - appears from noWhere as an aspect of 
what we have done. Fbr our human lot is filled with bitter 
tensions and destructive conflicts between persons and between 
groups - each side knowing nothing of ''bad intentions" but on the 
contrary being sure of its own virtue and RDrali ty. This 
complicates endlessly our creative relation to culture and the 
role of our human autonomy in history. Fbr it means, on the one 
hand, that every culture, created by the ambiguity of this 
freedom, is sinful and sick, always and in part, and thus, 
speaking theologically, under the judgement of God and of our 
judgement if we be Christians. But it also means that we, too, 
are under judgement, and that the only man who can be a faithful 
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prophet against the sin of the world or a creative reformer of its 
ills is one who sees that the cdnununity of sin includes himself, 
his directing revolutionary group, and even the shape of the new 
world he envisions in his protest." Gilkey, op. cit., pp. 388-
389. 
100. cf. "A person is never born into a neutral situation where there 
is complete autonomy and where one one would be free of the good 
or bad suggestions of others." Theisen, op •. cit., p. 33. This, 
of course, does not exclude the possibility of a person who whilst 
in a situation determined by evil did not personally choose evil 
as the tradition maintains in upholding the sinlessness of ,Jesus. 
101. cf. "Third, the empty tomb expresses something vi tal about the 
nature of redemption, namely that red~mption is much mre than a 
mere escape from our scene of suffering and death. Rather it 
means the transformation of this material, bodily world with its 
Whole history of sin and sufferi~~ •••• God did not discard Jesus' 
earthly corpse, but mysteriously raised and transfigured it so as 
to reveal what lies ahead for human beings and their world. In 
short, that empty tomb in Jerusalem is God's radical sign that 
redemption is not an escape to a better world but a wonderful 
transformation of our w-:>rld. Seen that way, the open and empty 
grave of Jesus is highly significant for our appreciation of what 
redemption means." O'Collins, op. cit., pp. 178-179. 
102. We may compare here the phrase of Gregory Nazianzen: "That which 
is not assumed is not h~led'~. 0;>!1Urenting on this recurrent 
Patristic -~analogy ol-rE!demption as God's liberating solidarity 
with humanity in the incarnation, Gorringe writes: "If we begin by 
asking about the function of sol idari. ty in this analogy we note 
that it is of the essence of these '!Tr.)Vements that a liberating 
pedagogy cannot be conducted from a' .:tafP distance beyond the 
struggle. In fact it can only be conducted from a position of 
complete solidarity with thot;;e who are oppressed." op. cit., pp. 
59. cf., Hardy and Fbrd, gp. cit., pp. 165. 
103. c£. "Sin is described by Trent as the- rule of the devil and of 
death through which man loses his innocence and becomes a child of 
wrath (D 793). Sin as aversio a Deo et oonversio ad creaturas, 
drives directly toward total death and the ruin of the creature. 
It means much more than deprivation of an ornamental accident or 
of a white robe of grace. It means an attack on substance and 
heart. And because it is an attack on God it is really an attack 
on man, an attempt at sinful self-destruction. That is the final 
radicality and power of sin." Kiing, Justification, pp. 175. 
104. cf. "Evil at its worst has a dynamic of its own which counterfeits 
the movement of praise. There is a logic of overflow in evil too, 
magnifying itself in a widening spiral and sucking up whatever it 
can into its destructiveness." Hardy and Fbrd, op. cit., pp. 89. 
cf. "Evil in this form tends to be all-consuming. Its dynamic, 
historical nature emerges the more it is opposed. It is never a 
matter of simply isolating it and dealing with it. Each such 
attempt provokes new developments of evil in oneself and the 
situation, and exposes new depths of it." ibid., pp. 100. cf., 
lane, op. cit., pp. 103-104. 
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105. cf., ibid., pp. 74-76. cf. " ••• how an actual entity becomes 
constitutes what that actual entity is; so that the two 
descriptions of an entity are not independent. Its 'being' is 
constituted by its 'becoming'. 'This is the principle of 
process. •" A. N. Whitehead, Process And Reality, corrected edition 
(New York: The Free Press 1978), pp. 23. 
106. cf., Gilkey, op. cit., pp. 388. 
107. McCormick points to the way in which sinful structures can be self 
generating: "In this sense such structures are not merely static 
realities but function in a dynamic and cyclical fashion. M:mlbers 
(whether individuals or sUbsets of the organic institution) 
respond to their weakened and contextual ized freedom with learned 
patterns of behaviour which support the ongoing relationships of 
injustice and/or contribute to the progressive disintegration of 
the group. Such cycles are ongoing, incorporating new members and 
generations in structures of oppressive and alienating injustice." 
op. cit., pp. 94. 
108. Hardy and Fbrd, op. cit., pp. 104. 
109. cf. ·~t is required is not external, juridical absolution but 
healing of real injury - inner healing, inter-personal healing and 
even healing of dehumanizing structures or systems." Kelly, op. 
cit., pp. 493. cf. "What is centrally necessary to this 
reconstitution is the presence of the economy of God's praise made 
effect-ive -through i-ts-eloseness and -through -i-ts -supplantation -Of 
that which in man renders it ineffective. And for this to 
regenerate humanity, God's econoiny of praise would actually have 
to become operative in man, displacing that which undermines it." 
Hardy and Fbrd, op. cit., pp. 165. 
110. N:>lan, op. cit., pp. 108. cf. Schillebeeckx, Christ: The 
Christian Experience In The r.txiern \*>rld, pp. 832-833. 
111. cf. "It is ()~ thing that God turns in free grace to sinful man, 
and quite another that in the same- free grace- He converts man- to 
Himself. It is one thing that God as the Judge establishes that He 
is in the right against this man, thus creating a new right for 
this man before Him, and quite another that by His mighty 
direction He claims this man and makes him willing and ready for 
His service ••• But we have to say that to ignore the mutual 
relationship of the two can only lead at once to false statements 
concerning them and to corresponding errors in pract1ce: to the 
idea of a God who works in isolation, and His 'cheap grace' (D. 
Bonhoeffer) and therefore an indolent quietism, where the 
relationship of justification to sanctification is neglected; and 
to that of a favoured man who works 1n isolat 1on, and therefore to 
an illusory activism, where the relationship of sanctification to 
justification is forgotten." K. Barth, Church I)?gmatics, Vol. 
IV/2, pp. 503-505, quoted in Kling, Justification, pp. 70-71. 
112. cf. "Genuine forgiveness is not about a simple pardoning or 
forgetting of sins but about empowering the sinner to an 
experience of conversion through which there can be an integration 
of the whole of human experience." McCormick, op. cit., pp. 76. 
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113. cf., Jon Sobrino, "Place Of Sin And Place Of Forgiveness", 
Ooncilium, n.l84, pp. 45-46. 
114. cf., Johann Baptist Metz, Faith In History And Society: 'lbward A 
Practical Fundamental Theology, (IDndon: Burns & Qates 1980). 
115. cf., Jurgen MJltmann, Theology Of Hope. (IDndon: SCM 1967), The 
Crucified God, (lDndon: SCM 1974), The Church In The Power Of The 
irit: A Contribution 'lb Messianic Ecclesiol , (IDndoa: SCM 
1977 , The Trinity And The Kingdom Of God: The I:bctrine Of God, 
(IDndon: SCM 1981). 
116. cf., Charles Davis, Theology And Political Society, (Cambridge: 
C.U.P 1980). 
117. cf., Lane, op. cit., pp. 6-31. cf., ibid., pp. 56-86. cf. 
"Once theology rediscovered its foothold in experience, as it did 
formally at the Second Vatican Council, it was simply a matter of 
time, in fact only a few years, before praxis would move to centre 
stage. Praxis is an extension of the experiential base of 
theology; praxis is the application of the principle of experience 
to the realm of transforming activity; praxis is a particular form 
of human experience; praxis is the experience of reflective 
activity." ibid., pp. 8-9. 
118. cf. "In this sense, then, fundamental theology is bound to be 
s}1t.ematically interrupted by this praxis. This is why it can and 
should never be~ a theology that is pure-ly con-fined to books or 
lectures - because of its claim to justification. It has to 
absorb new praxis and new expeiences if it is to prevent itself 
from reproducing the concepts of earlier praxis and experiences." 
J. B. Metz, gp. cit., pp. 10. 
119. cf. "The whole point of the doctrine of salvation is to bring 
about a change from the old order of sin into the new order of 
grace." Lane, gp. cit., p. 79. cf. "Had it been a case of a 
trespass only, and not of a subsequent corrupt ton, repentance 
would have been well-enough; but when orice transgression had begun 
men came under the power of the corruption proper to their nature 
and were bereft of the grace which belonged to them as creatures 
in the Image of God." St. Athanasius, De Incarnatione Verbi Dei, 
II.7, translated byareligiousof C.S.M.V., (IDndon: t-t>wbray 
1953), pp. 33. 
120. In claiming this we do not claim that a breakdown in theological 
communication was the sole reason for the crisis at the time of 
the Reformat ion. 
121. ~ may compare here the conclusion to salvation And The Church, 
the Agreed Statement by the Second Angl1can lbnan Cathollc 
International Conunission: ''WE! are agreed that this is not an area 
where any remaining differences of theological interpretation of 
ecclesiological emphasis, either within or between our communions 
can justify our continuing separation." salvation And The Church: 
~IC II, (lDndon: Church H::>use Publishing and Catholic Truth 
Society 1987), pp. 26. This speaks for a wide consensus in IOOdern 
theology: "I want to say quite simply what a Catholic Christian 
thinks about justification, or, to express it more cautiously, 
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what he is allowed to think. In my opinion this presentation 
will be acceptable to official catholic doctrine which derives 
from the Council of Trent and need not be opposed either by 
contemporary Protestant Christians. This implies tllat the doctrine 
of justification, i.e. the sola-gratia, is no reason for the 
separation of the Churches today." Karl Rahner, Grace In Freedom, 
(London: Bums & oates 1969), pp. 96. cf., Joint statement agreed 
in 1983 by Lutheran-Roman Catholic Consultation in U.S.A: 
Justification py Faith, (~nneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House 
1985). cf., Hans Kling, Justification: The J:bctrine Of Karl Barth 
And A Catholic Response, (IDndon: Burns & Qates 1981), pp. 
xxxn1, 275-284. c£., Rahner, "The Question Of Justification", 
T.I. (4), pp. 189-218. 
122. cf. "Roman catholic interpreters of Trent and Anglican theologians 
alike have insisted that justification and sanctification are 
neither wholly distinct from nor unrelated to one another. The 
discussion, however, has been confused by different understandings 
of the word justification and its associated words ••• The Catholic 
theologians, and notably the Council of Trent, tended to follow 
the usage of patristic and medieval Latin writers, for whom 
iustificare (the traditional translation of dikaioun) signified 
'to make righteous' • Thus the Catholic understanding of the 
process of justification, following Latin usage, tended to include 
elements of salvation which the Reformers would describe as 
belonging to sanctification rather than justification." ARCIC II, 
Salvation And The Olurch, (London: Church H:>use Publishing and 
catholic Truth Scx:iety_ 1987), pp. 16~11 •. 
123. cf. "'nle theologians of the Reformat ion tended to follow the 
predominant usage of the New Testament, in which the verb dikaioun 
usually means 'to pronounce righteous ' • " ARCIC I I, ibid. , pp. 17. 
cf."There are two kinds of Christian righteousness, just as man's 
sin is of two kinds. The first is alien righteousness, that is the 
righteousness of another, instilled from without. This is the 
righteousness of Christ by which he justifies through faith... ", 
M. Luther, "Two Kinds Of Righteousness" in ed. __ by __ J.ohn 
Dillenberger, Martin -Luther. Select lOriS -From His Wil. ti s ali ted 
And With An Introduction, New York: Ibubleday & Company, 
Inc.l961), pp. 86. 
124. cf. "'nle first kind of righteousness is our proper righteousness, 
not because we alone work it, but because we work with that first 
and alien righteousness. This is that manner of life spent 
profitably in good works, in the first place, in slaying the flesh 
and crucifying the desires with respect to the self, of which we 
read in Gal. 5 [:24]: ••• This righteousness is the product of the 
righteousness of the first type, actually its fruit and 
consequence." ibid., pp. 88-89. cf. Martin Luther, "The Freedom 
Of A Christian", in Luther's W:>rks, General- Frlitors: Jaroslav 
Pelikan and Helmut T. U!hmann, (st. Louis: Fortress Press 1955). 
125. cf. "'nlrough faith in Christ, therefore, Olrist's righteousness 
becomes our righteousness and all that he has becomes ours," 
Luther, "The Two Kinds Of Righteousness" in Dillenberger, ££=_ 
cit., pp. 87. cf. "Lutheran theologians insist that the event of 
JUstification is not restricted to individual forgiveness of sins 
and they regard it as more than a merely external declaration of 
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the sinner's justification. Through the message of justification, 
God's righteousness realized in the Christ-event is conveyed to 
the sinner as a reality that encompasses him, establishing a new 
life for the believer." Kling, "Justification Today", op. cit., PP• 
xviL cf., ibid., pp. xiv-xv. cf., K. Barth, Church Il?gmatics, 
Vol. IV/1, pp. 95, 553f. 
126. M. Luther, "'IWo Kinds Of Righteousness", quoted in DiLlenberger, 
op. cit., pp. 88. cf. "\\bile in a human law-court an acquittal 
is an external, even impersonal act, God's declaration of 
forgiveness and reconciliation does not leave repentant believers 
unchanged but establishes with them an intimate and personal 
relationship. The remission of sins is accompanied by a present 
renewal, the rebirth to newness of life." ARCIC II, op. cit., pp. 
19. 
127. cf. "As a consequence, Protestants took Catholics to be 
emphasising sanctification in such a way that the absolute 
gratuitousness of salvation was threatened." ibid., pp. 17. 
128. cf. "Both sin and grace are understo:xi as quantities, and on this 
assumption they are compared and pragmatised and tamed and 
rendered quite innocuous. The meaning of the conflict between the 
Spirit and the flesh, of the new man in Jesus and the old in Whose 
form we confront Jesus, of freedom and bondage as totalities which 
do not complement but mutually exclude one another, is not only 
unpercieved but actually concealed in a Whole sea of obliterating 
formulae and objections and p~q_te~ts which are directed-- against 
ever-y -kind of-qu-ietTsm and -fatalism, which have nothing whatever 
to do with What has to be said seriously concerning either the 
liberum or the servum arbitrium, and which can only secure us 
against having to see and say what really ought to be seen and 
said at this point. The teaching office [of] the Roman Church 
neither willed nor could say this ••• It will not and cannot say it 
to-day. Instead it speaks on the one hand of that assent ire and 
oogperari of the unregenerate man in his relationshlp to the 
obscure gratia praeveniens which is arbi t_rar!Jy_ !nYented and 
calll!Qt 'be defined with-any precision but which results in his 
capacity for faith and penitence and a turning to grace. And on 
the other hand it speaks of the good works of the regenerate man, 
who is only a little sinner and Who commits only tiny sins, and 
who is in the happy position of being able to increase the grace 
of justification in co-operation with it, and even to augment the 
degree of his eternal bliss. The practical consequence of all 
this is that the misery of man is not regarded as in any way 
serious or dangerous either for Christians or non-Christians. The 
Reformation communions could not reunite with a Church which held 
this doctrine, and they cannot accept the call to reunion with it 
to-day." Barth, Church ~tics, Vol. IV/2, pp. 498, quoted in 
KUng, pp. 48-49. cf. '1Xles Catholic theology really take 
justification seriously as the free sovereign act of God? Does it 
really accept grace as grace? Is its assertion about the unity of 
grace really mre than an assertion? lie know that this is not a 
new question; it was asked by the Reformers." Kiing, Justification, 
pp. 30. 
129. cf. "But does this conception of justification not leave man in a 
state of passivity? How is it possible to base a Christian ethic 
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upon Luther's understanding of justification? In the sixteenth 
century catholics repeatedly raised this question with reference 
to Luther's doctrine of justification, and in the literature 
discussing Protestant-catholic differences it is still found 
today." Bernhard l.Dhse, A Short History Of Christian r:octrine 
From The First Cent To The Present, translated by F. Ernest 
Stoeffler, Philadelphla: Fbrtress Press 1980}, pp. 159. 
130. cf. "On the other side, catholics feared that Protestants were so 
stressing the justifying action of God that sanctification and 
hLUnan responsibility were gravely depreciated." ARCIC II, ~ 
cit., pp. 17. 
131. cf. "Protestants speak of a declaration of justice and catholics 
of a making just. But Protestants speak of a declaring just which 
includes a making just; and catholics of a making just which 
supposes a declaring just. Is it not time to stop arguing about 
imaginary differences?" Kling, Justification, pp. 221. 
132. cf. "There is also a private dimension to popular religion, built 
around the seeking of favours from God via the mediators. 
Individuals develop a personal cult or devotion to a particular 
image of the Virgin or to specific saints. The regularity of the 
cult or devotion assures that the Virgin or the saint will be 
familiar with the supplicant when need arises. Seeking favours is 
a major part of devotional religion. The favors include protection 
from evil forces, from illness, from unforeseen crises (sickness, 
marriage problems}, as well as certain boons (a spouse, good 
crops, successful travel, success in business transactions}. Often 
vows are taken or promises made by persons to engage in certain 
penitential or prayerful activities if protection is extended or 
the boon granted. Sometimes vows are in response to protection or 
favor received." Schreiter, op. cit., pp. 129. cf., ibid., pp. 
128-130. 
133. cf. "This data is inadequately utilized from a pastoral point of 
view if an entirely too anthropocentric and materialistic popular 
notion of grace prevails - grace as a quasi-physical entity and a 
supernatural-natural fluid or "lump". To cite just one example, 
the effect of the Sacrament of Penance in people's minds is often 
not much nore than a soul's being made pure again (with God as the 
condition for this) - a freshly cleaned suit for the soul (as 
though we had here the problem of getting a nice "white garment"). 
The question of personal relationship to God, of my again standing 
in favor with Him, of His being friendly and not looking angrily 
upon me any nore - all this has, in many instances, receded into 
the background." Kiing, Justification, pp. 199. 
134. The prevalence Of the catholiC tendency towards I insurance policy 
piety' is witnessed to in many writings of authors with a catholic 
background. We may quote Joyce's description of a sernon preached 
to business men: "He told his hearers that he was there that 
evening for no terrifying, no extravagant purpose; but as a man of 
the world speaking to his fellow-men. He came to speak to 
businessmen and he would speak to them in a business like way. If 
he might use a metaphor, he said he was their spiritual 
accountant: and he wished each and every one of his hearers to 
open his books, the books of his spiritual life, and see if they 
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tallied accurately with conscience." .James Joyce, "Grace", 
Dubliners, (I.Dndon: Jonathan cape 1967} 1 PP• 197-198. ~ may 
compare Joyce's characature with t::evid I.Ddge' s account of the pre-
Vatican II catholic metaphysic: "Up there was Heaven; down there 
was Hell. The name of the game was Snakes and Ladders: sin sent 
you plummeting down towards the pit; the sacraments, good deeds, 
acts of self-mortification, enabled you to clinch back towards the 
light ••• There were two types of sin, venial and mortal. Venial 
sins were little sins which only slightly retarded your progress 
across the board. Mortal sins were huge snakes that sent you 
slithering back to square one, because if you died in a state of 
mortal sin, you went to Hell. If, however, you confessed your sins 
and received absolution through the sacrament of Penance, you shot 
up the ladder of grace to your original position on the board, 
though carrying as penalty a certain anount of punishment awaiting 
in the next world... There was also such a thing as a plenary 
indulgence, which· was a kind of jackpot, because it wiped out all 
the punishment accruing to your sins up to the time of obtaining 
the indulgence. You could get one of these by, for instance, 
going to Mass and Holy Communion on the first Friday of nine 
successive nnnths. In theory, if you managed to obtain one of 
these plenary indulgences just before dying you would go straight 
to Heaven n6 matter how many sins you had conunitted previously." 
r:evid I.Ddge, How Far can You Go?' (Harnnndsworth: Penguin 1981) I 
pp •. 6-8. 
135. cf. · "In catholic theology "grace" is generally defined correctly 
in a philological and in an exegetical way, though it is true that 
this knowledge is neither theologically and systematically nor 
practically and pastorally made adequate use of." Kilhg, op. cit., 
pp. 198. 
136. cf. "And as to catholic teaching on the justified man, has it not 
in practice been forgotten that this justified man was a sinner? 
With all his grace does he not have only a very loose bond to the 
gracious God? Does not grace dwell within him in such-a way that 
he .really needs God only as Creator and Sustainer? Is the grace 
·wnich justifies him not something which he "has", rather than 
something he receives afresh at each new instant?" Kling, op. cit., 
pp. 94. 
137. cf., St. Thomas Aquinas, Stnmna Theologiae, l-2ae, QQ. 111, a. 1-3. 
138. Bernhard Lohse, gp. cit., pp. 159. 
139. cf., Kung, op. cit., 93. 
140. We may . compare the order in which we have progressed with a 
· com111ent made by David Tracy: "If revisionist theology is to 
succeed materially, I believe, it should incorporate that nee-
orthodox anthropological vision into its own twin vision of a 
common faith in the worthwhileness of existence which sustains us 
even beyond good and evil and a reflective belief in a credible, a 
suffering and loving Christian God (65}. A first step in that 
direction can be taken when, singly and as a society, we admit to 
the reality of that central fact of our own experience which we 
name evil or, in explicitly religious limit-language, sin. A 
second step can be taken when we follow that admission with a 
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second one: that for character forming action we need to study any 
symbols of transformation which both face and promise 
authentically to transform that situation." Tracy, Blessed Rage 
Fbr Order, pp. 214. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE OPENNESS OF THE HUMAN PERSON 'ro '!'HE INFINITE 
HORIZON OF HOLY MYSTERY. 
3.1 Introduction 
In the following chapter we will explore Rahner 's theological 
anthropology which he develops in dialogue with Kant's critique of 
human reason. Rahner 's theological anthropology is not simply a 
philosophical prolegomena in which he seeks to establish the 
possibility of metaphysics before nnving onto theology proper. Through 
it he develops his basic understanding of the human person as being 
open to God. This provides him with the means of seeking to root such 
concepts as 'salvation' in what he takes to be the essential structures 
of human life. His anthropology grounds his soteriology. 
In Chapter One we outlined three charges that nndernity might., 
bring against soteriology: That it is meaningless mythology: That it 
COII'promises the autonomy of the human person: That it militates 
against a concern for the transformation of the present order. Rahner 
..J 
seeks to answer these charges by means of his theological anthropology. 
He hopes to escape the charge of mythology by rooting salvation 
language in the essential structures of the human person. He shows a 
sensitivity to the enlighterunent emphasis on the radical autonomy of 
the human person by developing his understanding of the human person in 
terms of freedom and responsibility. Rahner equates salvation with the' 
freedom of the human person to 'choose him/herself' before God. 
Finally, Rahner seeks to reconcile a soteriological concern with an 
active concern for the transformation of this order. Ibwever, we shall 
.-1 
have cause to question whether Rahner's a priori starting point 
militates against his concern to root 'salvation' in human life and the 
;:,L-y; j J:,~l' ,L, ·l'"' 
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transformation of the political order. First, let us explore the 
Kantian critique of reason. 
3.2 The Kantian critique of human reason 
'Nh.en Immanuel Kant started upon his Critique of Pure Reason (1) 
his intention was to establish the possibility of metaphysics (2). 
However, his investigations led him in quite the opposite direction. 
Rather than having established metaphysics, he concluded that he had 
revealed the illusory nature of metaphysical discourse and the 
impossibility of a natural theology constructed on metaphysical 
foundations. 
With Hwne, Kant accepted that all human knowledge must be rooted 
in sense data. However, he believed that in addition to the 
experienced pole of sense data, the mind must also contribute some 
activity which makes it possible to synthesise the sense data. Only in 
this way would it be possible to form judgements and so to gain 
knowledge. Hence, Kant maintained that there were certain organising 
principles of the mind which operated in the format ion of all 
knowledge. Kant further maintained that whilst these principles were 
necessary . for the synthesis of all sense data _the fact of their 
existence could not itself be derived from sense data. He thought of 
them as pre-given determinants of knowledge which we become aware of 
indirectly through their role in forming judgements. In order to 
analyse these pre-given determinants of knowledge Kant developed the 
transcendental method. 
Kant distinguished between the forms of sensibility (space and 
time) and the categories of understanding, (quality, quantity, relation 
and nodality). The only valid knowledge is empirical knowledge (3) 
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made possible by the union of intuitions (i.e. sense data given in the 
forms of sensibility) with the concepts (the categories of the 
understanding). The forms of sensibility can only supply data and the 
categories of understanding can only supply concepts. Each requires 
the other for genuine knowledge: "Thoughts without content are empty, 
intuitions without concepts are blind." (4) The categories of the 
understanding can only legitimately function within the spatia-temporal 
world of possible experience. To inquire about objects beyond the 
realities of spatia-temporal experience, or even to inquire about 
spatia-temporal experience in its totality was to go beyond the valid 
1 imi ts of human knowledge. 
Kant accepted that the human mind does in fact make constant use 
of the concept of the "totality of all reality". It is this tendency 
that makes it possible to think of the individual because the idea of 
limitation presupposes the totality to be limited: "Nothing is an 
object for us, unless it presupposes the sum of all empirical reality 
as the condition of its possibility." (5) However, Kant maintained 
that the concept of the totality of all reality had a purely practical 
function. The positing of the concept may be necessary in order to 
know limited sense data, but it cannot legitimately be claimed that it 
is "a principle which must be valid of things in general" ( 6). However, 
the mind displays a strong tendency not only to use the concept of "all 
reality" 
Vt.uiL .. ~ V'l"IU""' (ens rea!,.ismtls) as a practical function but in a way that 
> 
assumes that there is such a thing in reality. Kant referred to this 
as the transcendental ideal. He accepted the legitimacy of the 
transcendental ideal provided that it is acknowledged that we can 
neither investigate or speak meaningfully of the transcendental ideal 
in itself. 
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Kant referred to the metaphysical illusion which argues for the 7 
actual existence of God from the functional necessity of the concept of 
all reality (the transcendental ideal). This illusion firstly 
identifies the concept of all reality (the transcendental ideal) with 
the concept of God. The shift is then made from claiming that the 
concept of God is a necessary function in knowing finite beings to 
claiming that God must therefore exist in reality. To do this is to 
forget that we cannot speak meaningfully about the totality of reality 
because it is outside the scope of human experience. To seek to derive 
the existence of God from the transcendental ideal is to overstep "the 
limits of its purpose and validity" (7). Kant's transcendental turn to 
the human sUbject which was intended to establish the possibility of 
metaphysics seemed to result in showing the impossibility of 
metaphysical discourse. 
As we noted in the Introduction, Rahner considers this ' 
transcendental anthropological turn to the human subject to be so 
fundamental to nodern philosophy that it cannot be ignored (8). If 
metaphysical theology is to be pursued post-Kant, then it must either 
be content to operate within the parameters that Kant allowed, or Kant 
must be shown to have drawn erroneous conclusions from the 
transcendental turn. Rahner takes the latter option (9). He believes 
that a consistent application of the transcendental turn to the sUbject 
reveals the human person not as autononous and closed against the 
transcendent, but rather as that being who is open to reality in its 
entirety, and who depends upon an unthematic knowledge of God in order J 
to know anything at all. 
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3.3 Rahner in dialogue with Kant 
3. 3 .1 The place of anthropology in Ra.hner • s theology 
In his first major work Geist in Welt { 10), Rahner engaged in 
dialogue with the Kant of the Critique by way of an extended 
philosophical commentary on the article of Thomistic metaphysics 
relating to the conversion to the phantasm (11). In this dialogue, 
Rahner was greatly influenced by the transcendental Thomism of Marechal 
and by Heidegger's ontology. Whilst one of Rahner's concerns in 
writing Spirit was to establish the possibility of metaphysics, this by 
no means represents the limit of his concerns. Spirit was not simply a 
prolegomena before roving onto theology proper. Through the 
investigations in §Pirit, and later ROrer des Wbrtes (12), Rahner ' 
established the basic thrust of his theological anthropology: that the 
human person is spirit in world (13). The human person has an innate 
openness . to the infinity of God but can only come to consciousness of 
this and respond to it through his/her material environment. This 
posit ion remained foundational for Rahner • s entire theological 
methodology (14). In 1966 he said: 
As soon as man is understood as the being who is absolutely 
transcendent in respect of God, anthropocentricity and 
theocentricity in theology are not opposites but strictly one 
and the same thing, seen from two sides. Neither of the two 
aspects can be comprehended at aU without the other" ( 15) 
Fbr Rahner, the transcendental question about the human person is 
"the whole of dogmatic theology itself" ( 16). Rahner believed that in 
order to avoid the charge of mythology in theology, the Christian 
mysteries had to be related to the a priori structures of human 
experience ( 17). Hence for Rahner the transcendental analysis of the 
a priori structures of the human subject determines not only that we 
can make theological statements but also what these theological 
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statements must be. This method of theological anthropology is brought 
to bear on a host of issues, governing the approach that he takes in 
Christology, the relationship between nature and grace, sacraments and 
many IrOre. Indeed, the very notion of salvation is read off from the 
a priori structures of the human person: "Only those things can belong 1 
to ma.n's salvation which, when lacking, injure his 'being' and 
wholeness. Otherwise he could eschew sal vat ion without thereby being 
_j 
in danger of losing it." (18) 
3.3.2 The necessity of the metaphysical question 
Rahner accepts the Kantian starting point that all knowledge must 
be grounded in the sense data of spatia-temporal experience (19). He 
expresses this using the Thomistic principle of the conversion to the 
phantasm which claims that the universal concepts of the intellect can 
only be known in relation to an experienced something (20). However,' 
Rahner proceeds with Aquinas to ask how the intellect can know things 
that transcend that which is given in sense data. He claims that this 
is made possible by the abstracting, judging activity of the agent 
..) 
intellect. 
With Aquinas, Rahner holds that this abstracting activity is one 
of the t~ composite nnnents of the conversion to the phantasm, the 
other IrOrnent being sensibility. Hence, the question as to how 1 
knowledge of metaphysical objects is possible (by abstraction) is 
identical with the question as to how the conversion to the phantasm 
operates ( 21). The principle that states that all knowledge must be 
grounded in sense data (i.e. the conversio) turns out to also hold the 
key to explaining how the intellect might reach beyond sense data to an 
....J 
unthematic knowledge of God (22). 
Rahner seeks to establish this by means of a transcendenta 1 
analysis of the ultimate conditions of sense knowledge. Fbr Rahner, 
the question about the possibility of sense knowledge is already the 
question about the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. Further, 
Rahner maintains that asking about the possib11ity of metaphysical 
knowledge is already to ask a metaphysical question. Hence Rahner 
states: "let it be said here explicitly in the concern of the book is 
not the critique of knowledge but the metaphysics of knowledge." (23) 
Rahner claims that the metaphysical questiorl is unavoidable, "man -1 
questions necessarily" (24) and this is a radical questioning which can 
never be content with a finite answer~ everything can be put into 
question (25). This inescapable dynamism of the questioner reveals the 
human person as the question about being in its totality (26). Even if 
one declares that the metaphysical question is absurd or unimportant, 
one is implicitly giving an answer to it: it is unavoidable (27). 
.J 
Before nDving onto the transcendental analysis of sense knowledge, 
Rahner seeks to establish, in a preliminary manner, his thesis that the 
human person has an unthematic knowledge of God. He attempts this on 
the basis of the necessity with which the person asks the metaphysical 
question. Rahner states that: "Wlat is absolutely unknowable cannot be.., 
asked about, in fact what is absolutely unknown cannot be asked about." 
.J 
(28) Since the human person necessarily questions being in its 
totality, Rahner claims that all being is already implicitly known. 1 
Further, on the basis of this knowability of all being Rahner argues 
that knowing and being exist in an original unity of "being present to 
self." (29) He refers to this ability of being to be present to self 
as the luminosity of being. fbwever, guarding himself against idealism 
J 
and ontologism, Rahner stresses that being is not known as one object 
annngst others but rather is known in an unthematic manner. Indeed, 
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for the question about being to be possible requires that being is 
both unknown and known ( 30). Rahner explains that being can be both 
known and unknown due to its analogical nature (31) ~ being is known to 
the extent that one is or has being (32). 
In Fbundations of Christian faith Rahner again seeks to establish 
the unity of being and knowing but from a rather different tack (33). 
Rather than claiming that the necessity of the metaphysical question 
implies the knowability of all beings, Rahner begins with the 
inescapable experience of sUbjectivity. In all knowledge and 
experience the human person not only knows the object of his/her 
experience but also knows him/herself as the sUbject of this 
experience. When I love I know that it is I who love. . -, On the bas1s of 
this, Rahner argues that knowledge is not a "coming into contact with 
something", or an "intentional stretching outwards of a knower to a 
known" but is rather a presence to self (34). Hence in all knowledge 
and experience there is a logically prior presence to self (35). 
However, this self-awareness is different from the experience of 
objects. Whereas objects are experienced directly, the sUbject 
experiences itself indirectly, implicitly, along with the experience of 
the object (36). Rahner 's understanding of the "sUbjective, 
unthematic, necessary and unfailing consciousness of the knowing 
sUbject" ( 37) as "transcendental experience" is fundamental to his 
theology. Ultimately for Rahner, transcendental experience is the ~ 
subject's experience of itself as being placed over against all of 
reality and hence a~_open to God. He maintains that this implicit 
experience of self is a condition of the possibility of explicit 
experience of objects. It is this that drives the person to ask 
questions {38). What Rahner seeks to establish in a preliminary manner 
(that knowledge extends beyond the limits of spatia-temporal 
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experience) through an analysis of the question about being and the 
experience of subjectivity, he seeks to establish fully through his 
transcendental analysis of sense knowledge. 
3.3.3 Rahner's metaphysical analysis of the transcendental structure of 
the knowing and willing hwnan subject. 
For Rahner, metaphysics does not give any new knowledge. It is 
"the conceptually formulated understanding of that prior understanding 
which man as man is" (39). It makel3 explicit the implicit knowledge 
that the human person already has. Through pursuing a transcendental -1 
analysis of the ultimate conditions of sense knowledge, Rahner seeks to 
bring to explicit consciousness the pre-apprehension of being that is a 
constituent factor in all human knowing. Rahner proceeds to analyse 
the two constituent, and temporally inseparable, IIDments of the 
Conversion to the Phantasm: Sensibility and Abstraction. In much of his 
work he is in accordance with Kant. However, he develops the dynamic 
aspect of abstraction and judgement which teaded to become submerged in 
Kant 's thought. 
--1 
In the moment of sensibility (40), the subject finds itself given 1 
over to the being of the other (41). That is, the subject exists with 
the being of the other without knowing explicitly what that being is. 
In order to judge the quiddity ( "whatness") of the object of knowledge, 
the knower needs to return to itself. That is, having existed with the 
other, the subject needs to gain perspective or difference from the 
other in order to judge what the other is. This judging what the other 
is involves placing the experienced sense data within the wider horizon 
of all known types of things and deciding which type of object this 
particular being is. Hence, the ability to return to self is 
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identified with the power of abstraction, whereby the universal concept 
is abstracted from the particular sense-data (42). The role of 
judgement is the synthesis of the abstracted universal concept with the 
given sense-data. It is the synthesis of a 'what' with a 'something'. 
Rahner considers it to be inadequate to think of judgement as a passive 
synthesising of two elements, the joining of the categories of the 
intellect with the sense data supplied in the forms of sense. He 
maintains that judgement involves an act of affirmation which · reaches 
to the 'in-itself of the object and which is made possible by an ~ 
priori drive of the intellect towards Absolute Being. Rahner argues 
for the need for an active affirmation due to what Aquinas terms "the 
concretising synthesis" (43). The conversion to the phantasm states 
that universal concepts can only be known in relation to a particular 
something, and that a particular something can only be known in 
relation to a universal concept (44). This applies even in the case of 
judgement. Hence, the universal concept that is made the predicate of 
the subject of the judgement is already thought of in relation to 
another particular something. In turn, the subject of the judgement is 
already concretely conceptualised in reference to another universal 
concept (45). Thus, both the subject and predicate of a judgement 
always exist as a "concretising synthesis", that is as "a universal in 
its being in a 'this.'" (46) 
The act of judgement is then seen to be the synthesis of two 
concepts, each of which is a concretising synthesis. This does not 
mean that the quiddity (whatness) of one concretising synthesis is 
synthesised with the quiddity of the other. If this was the case then 
we would have no knowledge of the object in itself as we would not have 
affirmed anything of any particular object. ve would only have claimed 
that two general concepts were related. This, Rahner believes, is the 
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mistake that Kant made and which led him to conclude that knowledge 
confined to the 
synthesis of the 
the concretising 
remained on the side of the knowing subject, 
phenomenal. However, whi 1st the concret ising 
predicate refers a general concept to any this, 
synthesis of the subject determines a definite this. Fbr Rahner, the 
act of judgement involves an affirmative synthesis of the predicate, 
which previously in its own concretising synthesis had been applied to 
any this, with the definite this of the subject's concretising 
synthesis. Hence, for Rahner the affirmative synthesis of the act of 
judgement reaches to the in-itself of the known object: "Objective 
knowledge is given only when a knower relates a universal, known 
intelligibility to a supposite existing in itself" (47) 
Rahner proceeds to ask about the possibility of the affirmative 
act. How can the knower complete the return to self by referring the 
universal concept to a particular existent in an act of affirmation? 
He seeks to answer this through an analysis of the agent intellect 
(48). This is the intellectual power which liberates the form from 
matter in the sense that it causes one to recognise that the form's 
potential reference is not confined only to the matter in which it is 
presently known. "'Ihe form can be liberated from matter, and so 
universalized, due to the agent intellect recognising that the form is 
limited by the this whose form it is." (49) 
FUrther, the knowledge of the limitation of the form in the matter 
is only possible if the agent intellect comprehends all the further 
possibilities of the form. If the knowledge of limitation was known 
against a 
how this 
further limited range the question would again arise as to 
further limitation was known (50). Hence the knowledge of 
limitation is a transcendent knowledge made possible by a pre-
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apprehension (vorgriff) of the a priori illimited horizon which 
accompanies and enables all particular knowledge of finite objects. 
"Human consciousness grasps its single object in a vorgriff which 
reaches for the absolute range of all its possible objects." (51) 
3.3.4 God as the illimited horizon of all human knowing and willing 
Rahner identifies the a priori horizon which accompanies and 
enables all particular knowledge of finite objects with being, Aquinas' 
~· which in turn is God (52) • For the sake of brevity we shall 
follow his argument in Hearers (53) rather than in Spirit. The a priori 
horizon, that is the whither (woraufhin), of the vorgriff cannot be an 
object in the strict sense, for that would then require a further 
vorgriff. However, the vorgriff can only be conceived as some kind of 
knowledge, and hence in this sense the object of the vorgriff can be 
asked about (54). This object has already been defined as the 1 
"totality of the possible objects of human knowledge." (55) Hence the 
question about the woraufhin of the vorgriff is the question as to the 
nature of the totality of all objects of knowledge. J 
Rahner considers the three answers that western philosophy has ' 
given to this question: that of the philosophia perennis which claims 
that the vorgriff extends towards illimited being in its totality, 
including the absolute being of God: that of Kant who claimed that the 
vorgriff extends only to the limited being of sense intention and that 
of Heidegger who claimed that the vorgriff extends to nothingness. 
Rahner seeks to refute Heidegger's solution, then by reducing Kant's 
solution to that of Heidegger he maintains with the philosgphia 
__J 
perennis that the vorgriff must extend to absolute being. 
As we have discussed, Rahner claims that in the act of judgement, 
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the human knower affirms the finite objects of sense experience as 
existing in themselves. Hence, against Heidegger he maintains that~ 
knowledge aims towards existence and not nothingness, which would 
suggest that the vorgriff is towards being rather than non-being. 
Rahner seeks to establish this by claiming that a pre-apprehension of 
nothingness could not ground our knowledge of the finitude of sense 
objects. The negating concepts of finitude and nothingness exist only 
in relation to a prior affirmation of that which they are the negation. 
_) 
Hence, it is only a prior knowledge of the illimited that could enable 
us to negate and so to know objects in their finitude: "It is not 
'nought that noughtens', but it is the infinity of being, at which the 
vorgriff aims, which unveils the finiteness of all that which is 
inunediately given." (56) 
Kant had claimed that the woraufhin of the vorgriff was the' 
relatively illimited spatia-temporal horizon of the imagination. In 
reply Rahner maintains that Kant contradicts this principle in the very 
act of formulating it. His argument is that one can only conceive of a z 1 
finite horizon if it has already been surpassed and is known as finite 
against a further infinite horizon (57). This leaves either the 
infinite horizon of being (philosgphia perennis) or the infinite 
horizon of nothingness (Heidegger) as possible options. As Kant had_.~ 
ruled out the possibility of attaining to illimited being he must in 
effect be forced to say that the recognition of finitude is made 
p:>ssible by a vorgriff towards nothingness. That is, Kant's 
contradiction and presupposition aligns him with the discredited 
solution of Heidegger. 
We are left with the solution of the pl1ilosophia perennis as the' 
only credible alternative. The vorgriff aims towards the illimited 
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totality of all being, God. Hence, a prior awareness of God 
accompanies and makes possible, aU human knowing. Rahner quotes 
Aquinas approvingly: "All knowing beings implicitly know God in 
everything they know." (58) For this reason, Rahner refers to the human 
person as having a transcendental knowledge of God, that is one "that 
belongs to the necessary and ina lienable structures of the knowing 
subject itself." (59) 
However, guarding himself against the charge of ontologism, Rahner 
stresses that such transcendental knowledge does not constitute a 
direct intuition of God. It is an unthematic and pre-conceptual 
knowledge. Indeed, whilst an unthematic, pre-apprehension of God might 
be the a priori grounding which enables us to know anything whatsoever, 
we only become conscious of this unthematic knowledge of God I 
a posteriorily: 
What we are calling transcendental knowledge or experience of 
God is an a posteriori knowledge in so far as man's 
transcendental experience of his free subjectivity takes 
place only in his encounter with the world and especially 
with other people (60) 
A posteriori knowledge of God, however, differs from a posteriori 
knowledge of objects: our pre-apprehension of God (vorgriff) is what 
enables us to know any finite object but it cannot itself be made an 
object of knowledge ( 61} • Should we seek to turn our attention upon 
the vorgriff, we find that it constantly alludes us, each act of 
reflecting upon transcendence itself requires "another original act of 
J 
transcendence" (62}. Nor, in our a posteriori knowledge of God, do we 
gain a thematic knowledge of God that had previously been unthematic. 
'lb claim such 1r.0uld be to forget the transcendental element in our 
a posteriori knowledge of God (63). Rather, our a posteriori knowledge l 
of God consists in the fact that we 'become aware that we always already 
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had a pre-conceptual apprehension of God. We cannot know in what the 
woraufhin of the vorgriff consists, only that it is. The human person 
stands ever present before the infinite light of God as one to whom it 
appears as impenetrable darkness: "The concept (of God) is its original 
ground and the reality itself to which this concept refers move beyond 
us and enter the unknown together." ( 64) 
.J 
In Hearers Ra.hner is at great pains to establish that his thesis 
of the necessary pre-apprehension of God, which makes all knowledge 
possible, does not exclude the essential hiddenness of God ( 65) • If 
this were so then it would suggest that the human person was not only 
orientated towards God but that by nature s/he was capable of attaining 
to a full and perfect knowledge of God. Such a view would compromise 
the gratuity of God's free self-communication. After having briefly 
referred again to the analogical character of being, Rahner considers 
it necessary to establish that even the analogical knowledge of being 
available to man is a negative knowledge. It results from the negation 
of finitude rather than a positive knowledge of infinite being, and so 
he maintains "the essential hiddenness of all positive aspects of the 
infinite being" (66). In Chapter Seven, Ra.hner continues on to ' 
establish that the unknowability of God is not due to a provisional 
imperfect ion on the part of man's knowledge, 
very essence of the freedom of God. 
3.4 God is mystery. 
but rather belongs to the 
The hiddeness and freedom of God are central to Rahner 's 
understanding of God as mystery. His major treatment of this is to be 
found in his essay "The Concept Of Mystery In Catholic Theology" (67). 
In contrast to the scholastic notion of mystery, Rahner understands it 
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"not as the provisional but as the prirordia l and permanent" ( 68) • NOr J 
is it a property belonging only to certain statements but is rather an 
essential element of all knowledge. For Rahner, mystery is the horizon 
of all human knowing: "Man is the being who is orientated to the _, 
mystery as such, this orientation being a constituent element of his 
being. 11 (69) For Rahner this mystery is the unlimited unknowability of 
God ( 70) • He maintains that God remains incomprehensible even in the 
Visio Beatifica which is not the abolition or diminution of the mystery 
but its final assertion, its eternal and total immediacy (71). Rahner 
.J 
develops this position in Foundations of Christian Faith by starting 
with the human person•s essential orientation towards mystery (72). 
we find in the human person an irresistible dynamic to question 
reality, to remain ever unsatisfied with the finite. Rahner maintains 
that the human person•s fundamental orientation to mystery is the 
ground and context of his/her being (73). This orientation towards 
mystery is inescapable (74); it is the question posed by our knowledge 
of finitude and we must give an answer, even if our answer is to avoid 
giving an answer (75). It can be hated, suppressed or loved, however 
it is ineradicable. In limit situations of grief, loss, suffering, 
death, anxiety, love, joy or hope, we can recover an awareness of this 
orientation. Indeed, Rahner can say: "mystery in its 
incomprehensibility is what is self-evident in human life. 11 (76) 
For Rahner, saying that the human person is orientated towards ' 
mystery is identical with saying that the human person is orientated 
towards God. He seeks to establish this through a reflection on the 
word God (77). His argument is that the word God does not so much 
describe an object as rather act as reference to the transcendent 
mystery surrounding the human person. Without such predicates as 
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fatherhood, personhood, Gcxl is an empty word, but this is the correct 
form of the word which by its very emptiness points towards the 
inescapable mystery in human life (78). 
Rahner claims that the word Gcxl does not come to us from outside 
but rather flows from the depths of human life. "~ hear and receive 
the word God" ( 79) • Even if the word God is suppressed the experience 
which it names continues to exist. Fbr this reason the word God 
continues to occur for it is only so that the human person can "be 
brought face to face with the single whole of reality" (80). In that 
the word God refers to this fundamental human experience, it could only 
fall out of use if the human person were to change, if s/he were to 
cease being human. Due to the many presuppositions and categorical 
images that the word God evokes, Rahner prefers to refer to the reality 
to which it refers as Holy mfStery (81). 
Hence, in Fbundations, Rahner seeks to affirm the human person's 1 
knowledge of God by starting with the fundamental human experience of 
transcendence towards mystery ( 82) • He had sought to do the same thing 
in Spirit and Hearers by reflecting upon the transcendental condition 
for human knowledge. Fbr Rahner, theoretical proofs for the existence 
of God are not intended to establish something new, but rather to draw 
the human person into awareness of his/her fundamental experience of 
standing before mystery and so to show the human person to be the one 
who stands in absolute nearness before the ever distant God (83). 
_j 
Rahner's approach in Fbundations makes explicit what his intention\ 
was in Spirit and Hearers. He not only intended to establish the 
possibility of metaphysical discourse but to show that "it belongs to 
man's fundamental make-up to be the absolute openness for being as 
such" (84) by establishing a metaphysics of knowledge (85). This theme_, 
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governs Rahner's entire theology, it defines his notion of salvation, 
his understanding of the nature-grace relationship and ultimately his 
Christology. It is for these reasons that it has been important to 
investigate Rahner's reasons for considering the human person to be 
Spirit in W:>rld, the one who whilst always open to God can only refer 
to God through his/her material environment. 
3.5 The place of freedom in Rahner's anthropology. 
If we were to focus our attention solely upon §Pirit we could be ~ 
forgiven for accusing Rahner of rampant intellectualism. Thus far it 
would seem that he confines the human orientation towards God merely to 
the level of an unthematic knowledge which whilst we affirm it 
implicitly in all knowing is otherwise peripheral to human life. There 
has been a recurrent tendency in Christ ian soteriology, influenced by 
Nee-Platonic mysticism, to reduce salvation to the attainment of true 
knowledge. Such a concern with right gnosis rather than with right 
praxis is unable to accommodate the concern for the transformation of 
this order that we claimed in Chapter '1\«> was so essential (86).J 
Should Rahner confine the human person's relationship to God to the 
level of knowledge then he would be in danger of reducing salvation to 
such an intellectual pursuit. However, to accuse Rahner of rampant 
intellectualism would be to miss his point that the epistemlogical 
considerations of Spirit were not for their own sake but rather for 
their metaphysical implications. He uses those investigations in order 
to establish his thesis of the human person 1 s fundamental openness to 
God. It is this broader emphasis that guides his theology, not an arid, 
intellectual emphasis on the person 1 s pre-conceptual knowledge of God. 
In Hearers Rahner widens his concept of the person 1 s openness to 
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God to include freedom through a transcendental analysis of the 
ultimate structures of human freedom (87). This analysis remained 
determinative for his theology. As we IOC>ve to his later writings it is 
freedom rather than knowledge that is in the ascendant. Indeed, human 
freedom is Where he roots his understanding of salvation. His 
discussion of freedom in Hearers follows three movements: firstly the 
importance of volition in knowing~ secondly, human knowledge of God as 
consisting in freely willed love and thirdly, the nature of human 
freedom as being the choice of self in love and therefore the choice of 
God. 
Firstly, Rahner argues that the human person can only question 
being in its totality by first affirming his/her own contingence: "Only 
the man Who resolutely assumes his own finiteness and thrownness finds 
access to being's true infinity." (88) On account of the necessity 
with Which the human person asks about being in its totality, Rahner 
argues that the human person is necessarily contingent. This absolute 
contingency of the human person creates problems for Rahner. 
Understanding, or the act of judging, finds its reason for affirming an 
object in the object alone, but there is no sufficient reason to· be 
found in a contingent, and-therefore accidental, object for affirming 
it absolutely. Hence, Rahner argues that more than static insight must 
be involved, the reason must be sought in the reason for the object • s 
affirmation rather than in the object itself. Rahner finds this reason 
in will and argues that the human person's transcendence towards being 
"is brought about by the will as inner IOC>Ve of knowledge itself" (89). 
Hence, there is no such thing as pure intellectualism in Rahner; 
knowledge itself includes will. 
Secondly, Rahner turns his attention to the question of how it is 
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possible for the finite human person to know the free God (90). He 
defines freedom as being primarily a choice of self before ever it is a 
particular choice of a particular something: 
Now, a free act is originally not so much the positing of 
something else, of something external, of some effect which 
is distinct from and opposed to the free act itself. It is 
rather the fulfilment of one's own creative power over 
oneself. Thus it is a corning to oneself, a self-presence in 
oneself. (91) 
As the original choice of self, one person's free act is unknown 
to another. The free act can be known to the agent because it is none 
other than the agent itself. However, through love it is possible for 
one person to enter ernpathetically into another person's free act and 
so to know his/her act. l.Dve is to be seen as the perfection of 
knowledge: "In the final analysis knowledge is but the luminous 
radiance of love." (92) It is through love that we are able to enter 
into the free act of the free personal God and to know him. Indeed 
love does not flow from knowledge of God but is its condition ( 93) • 
Rahner's understanding of knowledge being perfected in love is 
significant. It enables him to put to rest the over-intellectual 
emphasis that could be conveyed by his argument in Spirit. A pre-
apprehension of God which remained solely on an intellectual level 
could have very little significance for lived human life. However, if 
this knowledge ultimately consists in love then we can see how it could 
be made the basis for an understanding of the person's orientation 
towards God as being lived out in the various actions and choices of 
life. 
The third and nost significant way in which Rahner seeks to nove 
away from a narrow intellectualism (gnosis) to lived human life 
(praxis) is through a transcendental analysis of human freedom which 
complements and resembles his transcendental analysis of human knowing 
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(94). He argues that whilst the person may freely affirm him or 
herself in various ways, the person absolutely has to affirm him or 
herself in some fashion. As we have seen, without such willed 
affirmation knowledge is impossible. As with knowledge, the necessity 
of such volitional affirmation suggests a prior orientation (95). 
Whereas in knowledge we know things as objects, in freedom we know 
things as values, and freedom, as with knowledge, has a transcendental 
noment to it. The free affirmation of finite values is only possible 
due to a vorgriff towards the absolute being of God. In this pre-
apprehension ''being itself is grasped as a value" (96). It is within 
this pre-grasp of the absolute order of values that the person is able 
to affirm finite values. Whilst a particular act may affirm or 
contradict the person's pre-affirmation of the "right order of values", 
Rahner claims that there is an even nore intimate relationship between 
a person's affirmation of finite values and the horizon of values 
within Which they make each affirmation (97). It is here that we 
approach the core of Rahner 's understanding of human freedom as being 
fundamentally the choice of self. 
Rahner argues that each decision about finite values has an effect 
upon the person's fundamental orientation towards the "right order of 
values". A decision about a finite value which is not in accord with 
the "right order or values" does not merely transgress the "right order 
of values", it also redefines a person's perception of the "right order 
of values". A dynamic is set up: "He not only assumes the basic laws 
that govern his love and his hatred, but he himself freely ratifies 
anew the right laws." (98) Thus, a person's choice of finite values is 
not merely a decision about things, it has an effect into the future 
because through them the person chooses him or herself: "In every 
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action he sets down a law of his whole activity and Life. He does not 
simply perform good or bad actions, he himself becomes good or bad." 
(99) 
Fbr Rahner, we choose ourselves through our actions. Hence our 
actions are not disparate, together they constitute the person that we 
have chosen to be. Rahner terms this "the order of love" { 100) which 
each person constructs for him/herself. It is only within the horizon 
of each person's own "order of love" that s/he can become aware of and 
respond to the "right order of love" of God. Hence if someone would 
freely respond to the right order of love of God then this is only 
possible through the way in which s/he responds to the finite order of 
values. This is the volitional equivalent to the necessity of the 
conversion to the phantasm in intellectual knowledge, and will provide 
the basis upon which Rahner will construct his faJOC>us dictum of "the 
unity of love of neighbour and the love of God": "The concrete way in 
which man knows God is from the start determined by the way man loves 
and values the things that come his way." ( 101) 
Rahner's analysis of freedom in Hearers remains determinative for 
his approach in his later writings. We see him display the same 
concern to escape the charge of rampant intellectualism and to seek to 
root human transcendence in life. The fundamental experience of human 
subjectivity, which Rahner focuses upon in Fbundations, is not a merely 
intellectual orientation. He refers to it as "transcendental 
experience" rather than 
transcendental orientation 
''transcendental knowledge". 
is responded to through the free 
This 
self-
determination of the human subject: "This transcendental experience of 
course, is not merely an experience of pure knowledge, but also of the 
will and of freedom". (102) 
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Again we hear Rahner dismiss as inadequate an understanding of 
freedom confined to a choice between acts: 
freedom is not originally the capacity of choosing any object 
whatsoever as the ability of adopting an individual attitude 
to this or that; it is rather the freedom of self-
understanding, the possibility of deciding for or against 
oneself. (103) 
This freedom of the human sUbject over against him/herself is dependent 
upon a prior orientation towards God: "the individual finite good can 
only be freely asserted to or rejected in the dynamism of a 110vernent 
towards the good simply speaking" (104). Since God is present 
unthemat ically in every act of freedom then all acts of human freedom 
have a theological character and not only explicitly religious acts 
( 105). In order to emphasise the theological context of human freedom, 
Rahner refers to the mystery which surrounds the person as "fbly 
Mystery" ( 106) • Further, the theological character of acts of human 
freedom extends beyond the fact that God is present as the distant 
horizon of free acts, to the fact the human person's creation of self 
in freedom actually constitutes a decision for or against God (107). 
Through the particular decisions that we take, we are making of our 
lives a 'yes' or 'no' towards God; this constitutes our "FUndamental 
Option". The radical extent of human freedom is evidenced by the fact 
that humans can reject God who is the horizon of their freedom. Whilst 
such a denial contradicts itself in that it depends upon a prior 
openness to God, it remains nevertheless a real possibility (108). The 
human person seeks to give expression to his/her fundamental option of 
and for self in the particular circumstances of life. Hence, the 
various free acts of an individual's life are not to be thought of as 
disparate and isolated, rather they refer to the individual's unified 
free attitude to self which is actualized throughout life. In this 
manner, human freedom is not directed towards an ongoing perpetuation 
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of free acts but is instead directed towards the finality of eternity: 
It is the capacity of a subject who by his freedom is to 
achieve his final and irrevocable self. In this sense and 
for this reason, freedom is the capacity for the eternal. 
(109) 
3. 6 '!he human person's free choice of self into eternity as the locus 
of soteriology. 
Rahner's understanding of freedom as the choice of self bears 
many similarities to the dynamic understanding of human freedom and 
evil which we thought necessary in Olapter Two. '!his could lead us to 
hope that, aware of the consequent 'dark side' of human freedom, Rahner 
would perceive the need for a liberating salvation. However, such 
hopes would be premature at this stage. He does indeed locate -'=\! 
salvation in terms of human freedom but he does so in terms of 
salvation being the eternalisation of the person's choice. This will 
open up for us the question of subjective versus objective atonement 
theories. In Chapter Two we claimed that salvation must be subjective 
in as much as it must be a real transformation of unique persons and 
situations. It must be a salvation that is really appropriated and not 
just granted. However we also claimed that salvation must be 
objective in as much as we are not able of ourselves simply to 
appropriate this salvation and work an instantaneous transformation. 
Salvation, we claimed, must be the making possible of the 
transformation that is necessary. We will find it necessary to ask in 
what way does Rahner secure the objective aspect of atonement. 
Rahner is concerned to distance himself from what he terms 
extrinsicist or mythological concepts of salvation which hold to an 
external transformation of a person's state of life in a way that bears 
no relation to the life that s/he had lived. Rather than salvation 
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being an exterior transformation by grace or a reward for a virtuous 
life, Rahner wishes to understand salvation as flowing from the heart 
of a person's life (110). This is a concern that we also have 
expressed in Chapter TWo. Rahner states that salvation must be 
understood as a subjective concept rather than as an objective concept 
( 111) • If by "subjective" Rahner intends that salvation language 
should not ignore a person's freely chosen evil acts but must rather 
involve a full redemption of the very depths of the person, then the 
door would be left open for the kind of objective liberation that we 
have called for in Chapter TWo. Ibwever, there are statements that 1 
suggest that Rahner ignores the need for an externally effected, 
objective liberation of the inner depths of the person. In contrast 
such statements suggest that Rahner views salvation merely as the 
radical finalisation into eternity of the person one has created 
oneself to be: 
It means rather the final and definitive validity of a 
person's true self-understanding and the true self-
realisation in freedom before God by the fact that he 
accepts his own self as it is disclosed and offered to him 
in the choice of transcendence as interpreted in freedom. 
. (112) 
Rahner avoids the charge of mythology by rooting salvation 
language in the very fabric of human life and he also emphasises the 
human subject's responsibility to determine his/her own salvation. But 1 
we have to ask at what cost does he achieve this? Thus far, Rahner • s 
notion of salvation as being the radical finalisation into eternity of 
the human subject's freely chosen self sounds ominously like the kind 
of philosophy of self-achievement which we consider to be so 
unacceptable, lacking as it does an appreciation of the radical nature 
of human evil from which humanity requires a healing liberation. 'ni:A;,tl. 
j 
Should we be forced to conclude that Rahner' s soteriology reduces to a 
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philosophy of self-achievement then we would have discovered a 
fundamental Yl_c_s>-~~ in his theology. His profound understanding ' 
of human freedom as being the creation of self into the future has a 
consequent dark underside. Just as through good acts we become good, 
so also through evil acts we become evil. (Rahner is aware of this 
darker side to human freedom as we shall see in the next chapter.) 
Therefore, evil acts cannot simply be forgotten but require a profound 
healing liberation. The human person is caught in a dynamic which 
seemingly the human person cannot reverse. The nomentum of previous 
personal, communal and structura 1 sins continue to affect act ions in 
the present and militate against a radical change in one 1 s fundamental 
orientation. In terms of traditional understanding, conversion requires 
grace. It would seem that Rahner can only ascribe a dynamic 
understanding to human evil, without falling into inconsistency, if he 
also holds to an objective healing liberation. 
~ must explore this point further. Firstly we shall expound 
Rahner 1 s understanding of the human subject as being apparently 
determined yet truly free. This will allow us to make the strongest 
case possible that Rahner 1 s soteriology reduces to an existentialist 
philosophy of self-achievement. Having made this case we can then 
examine it in order to determine quite what the subjective/objective 
-. 
balance is in Rahner 1 s soteriology. So secondly, we shall briefly 
...J 
consider the philosophical background to Rahner 1 s thought in order to 
explore the possibility of an objective subjectivity. Thirdly, we 
shall anticipate our fourth and fifth chapters in order to maintain 
that Rahner does take account of the radical dynamism to human evil 
(Chapter Fbur) and avoids inconsistency through his understanding of 
freedom as graced freedom (Chapter Five). 
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Firstly let us explore Rahner 's understanding of the human 
person's irreducible freedom to determine him/herself and to dispose of 
the given in his/her life. 
-l 
A philosophy of self-achievement would 
assume that the human person was free to choose him/herself over 
against all the determining conditions of life. It would thus preserve 
_, 
the notion of the human person standing in a neutral position between 
good and evil, free to choose either option, unaffected by past 
decisions. This is precisely what is suggested by Rahner 's analysis 
of human freedom as consisting in the questioning drive of 
subjectivity. He maintains that the person's ability to question all 
the constituent elements of his/her life reveals that the person must 
be mre than the sum of all these elements ( 113) • The person cannot be 
eXhaustively explained by any regional anthropology (114). The ~ 
awareness of being ~ than what is empirically given is the 
experience of subjectivity, it is the experience of knowing oneself to 
be the one who exists in relation to these given factors and who can 
dispose of the totality. Hence, it is the locus of freedom: "insofar 
as I experience myself as person and as subject, I also experience 
myself as free." (115) 
_J 
In this manner Rahner contrasts the phenomenal level to the 1 
noumenal level and develops an understanding of the human person as 
being apparently (phenomenally) determined by all the given in life yet 
as being ultimately free in him/herself (noumenally). This is very 
problematic as it seems to ignore the degree of limitation in human 
life. By limitation we refer not only to such things as environmental 
conditioning but also to the rore radical imprisonment of human freedom 
by prior evil deeds. The analysis of the dynamic aspect of human evil 
that we touched upon in Chapter Two has as its consequence that the 
human person is not free simply to repent of past evil deeds and to 
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__) 
engage upon an instantaneous conversion to the good. Rather we stand in 
need of a healing liberation. As we have noted approvingly, Rahner 
also develops such a dynamic understanding of human freedom. However, 
his understanding that there is a contrast between the person's 
apparent determination on the one hand and the person's ultimate 
freedom in him/herself on the other hand seems to dispense with the 
radical confinement of human freedom so aJ?Parent to those who know 
themselves to be enmeshed in the structures of connnunal and personal 
sin. 
It seems that it must either be the case that Rahner really does 
neglect to treat of the darker side of human freedom and so remains 
blind to the radical confinement of the human person by past ~l! acts. 
Or, on the other hand, his notion of the human person's ultimate 
freedom is nothing mor~ than the freedom to distance him/herself in 
attitude from actions which cannot in fact be avoided. That is, the 
person • s 'freedom' would not be the freedom to determine his/her life 
but would be limited to the 'freedom' of the prisoner who may distance 
him/herself in attitude from the forced labour which s/he must 
,.., l .... 
nevertheless perform. This latter possibility, that freedom for Rahner I 
is the freedom to distance oneself in attitude from acts which one is 
not free to determine, would seem to be insufficient to support 
Rahner's understanding of salvation. Salvation, for Rahner, seems to 
be the eternalisation not merely of the attitude that we have taken to 
the given in our lives but of What we have actually made of the given 
in our lives. This assumes a freedom of action and not merely a 
freedom of attitude. Hence, of the two possibilities outlined above it 
seems, at this stage, more likely that Rahner remains blind to the 
radical confinement of human freedom rather than that he consciously 
_, 
limits freedom to freedom of attitude. 
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Having ascended to the heights of a dynamic understanding of human 
freedom, has Rahner kicked away the ladder oblivious of the depths that 
have opened up beneath him? That this is so could be suggested by the 
rather cursory way in Which Rahner acknowledges Scripture's 
understanding of human freedom as being enslaved by the denonic powers 
of sin and the consequent need for liberation before moving on to 
vigorously maintain that human responsibility is not thereby destroyed: 
Yet it cannot be doubted that for scripture both the sinful 
and the justified man are responsible for the actions of 
their life and to this extent are also free and that freedom 
therefore, is a permanent constitutive of man's nature. (116) 
At this stage, therefore, it seems that in spite of Rahner's 
brilliant analysis of the dynamic nature of human freedom, he 
ultimately proposes a concept of salvation that is not just subjective 
in the sense that it refers to a saving of the very depths of the human 
person, but is rather a salvation that is simply the result of the 
person's free choice. If this is so then we would have to conclude 
that he displays a blindness to the depths of evil by overestimating 
the capacity of human freedom and by under estimating the need for the 
sustaining and healing activity of God's gracious presence. In effect, 
we are led to suspect Rahner of presenting an account of atonement 
lacking in redemption. 
However, before we launch into accusing Rahner of a thoroughgoing 
and unacceptable subjectivity it is necessary to reconsider more 
profouruily his understanding of human freedom. So far we have balked 
at Rahner's understanding of human freedom, claiming that it gives too 
much to the powers of self-determination of the human subject. Perhaps 
this is an inadequate interpretation of Rahner's understanding of human 
freed0m? It is possible that Rahner understands human freedom to be 
already held in being by the gracious presence of God, in Which case 
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the exercise of human freedom would not be merely a process of self-
achievement but would be the activity of God's grace in human freedom. 
In this manner Rahner would not be advocating a purely subjective 
soteriology of self-achievement but would rather be advocating a 
soteriology that was at once truly objective in that it was effected by 
the sustaining grace of God and truly subjective in that it flowed from 
the heart of the human subject. 
It will be helpful to explore Rahner's philosophical background on 
this point. His approach is unashamedly influenced by existentialism, 
but by Whose existentialism is an important distinction to make. If we 
were to conclude that Rahner's soteriology represented a philosophy of 
subjective self-achievement then we would align him with the atheistic 
existentialism of Sartre. In contrast to this stands the Christian 
existentialism of Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard's claim that truth is 
subjective is not to be understood in terms of Sartre 's thoroughgoing 
subjectivism. For Kierkegaard, truth is synonynous with God, and God 
is the objective reality against Whom all else is relative~ freedom can 
only be preserved through subjection to God (117). Hence When 
Kierkegaard proclaims truth to be subjective, he proclaims that the 
objective presence of God is given to the individual human subject in 
his/her uniqueness. r-brality, for Kierkegaard, becomes not so much 
self-achievement as for Sartre but rather the empowerment by, and 
response to, the presence of God within the human subject. Such 
objective subjectivity is perfectly consonant with our concern for an 
objectively given healing liberation in human life. 
Heidegger, Whom Rahner acknowledges as his major influence amongst 
the existentialists, sides with the objective subjectivity of 
Kierkegaard. He locates the objectively given in the human conscience. 
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This should cause us to suspect that Rahner also sides with the 
objective sUbjectivity of Kierkegaard and Heidegger. As we move 
through Chapters Fbur and Five we shall see that Rahner is aware of the 
darker side to human freedom (Chapter Fbur) and that through his notion 
of the supernatural existential he holds that human freedom is always 
graced freedom. However, this will cause us to further question 
whether Rahner falls foul of a formalism that whilst stating the 
presence of grace does not explain how grace is active in a dynamic 
manner bringing healing and liberation. The result is that against his 
own intentions grace seems to be ascribed to human life in a merely 
verbal manner and has the practical result of throwing the person back 
on his/her own inadequate resources. We will claim that in the final -, 
analysis Rahner proclaims the that of atonement without the how of 
redenption. Let us now turn our attention to the way in which Rahner 
seeks to reconcile soteriological concern with concern for this order. 
__J 
3. 7 The human person's soteriological concern as embracing concern for 
the human community: 
As we have seen, Rahner locates his theology in an a priori 
analysis of the individual sUbject. This gave us a picture of the 
human person as having an eternal destiny which is achieved or lost 
through the exercise of his/her freedom. Hence the question of the 
individual's exercise of freedom was seen to be a question of 
salvation. Rahner seeks to reconcile the individual's eternal destiny 
achieved through freedom with a concern for this world through his 
understanding of love of neighbour. As we noted earlier his principle 
of the unity of love of neighl?our and love of God performs the same 
function within his discussion of freedom as did the conversion to the 
phantasm within his discussion of knowledge. The person's pre-
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apprehension of God does not admit him/her to a direct knowledge of 
God. As finite spirit the human person can only know God through the 
conversion to the phantasm. So also the person has to externalise 
his/her fundamental option in the circumstances of his/her life ( 118). 
It is in and through the free acts of his/her Life that the person 
creates him/herself in freedom before God and determines his/her 
salvation: "The question of salvation cannot be answered by bypassing 
man • s historicity and his social nature." ( 119) Hence love of God, the 
rost basic act which alone can express the person completely (120), has 
to be mediated through the particular acts of a person • s life. We love 
God through loving our neighbour. "The original relationship to God is 
love of neighbour." (121) Rahner dismisses it as "too cheap and 
over facile" to regard love of neighbour merely as a roral consequence 
of loving God, a secondary commandment which must be fulfilled if we 
are to love God properly (122). He maintains that there is a radical 
identity between love of neighbour and love of God. our free decision 
to love (i.e. respect the true value of our ~eighbour) is only possible 
against the transcendental horizon of ultimate value, God. Hence 
Ralmer argues: 
all interhuman love, provided only that it has its own roral 
radicality, is also caritas, (i.e. love also of God), since 
it is orientated towards God, not indeed by an explicitly 
categorised motive but by its inescapably given 
transcendental horizon. (123) 
Fbr Rahner, love of neighbour really is love of God. Indeed, love of 
neighbour is the primary way of loving God (124). 
It is radically true... that whoever does not love the 
brother whom he • sees 1 , also cannot love God whom he does not 
see, and that one can love God whom one does not see only by 
loving one's visible brother. (125) 
In this manner, Rahner seeks to establish that soteriological 
concern does not turn one 1 s attention away from the interpersonal 
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realm, to value only the 'spiritual' love of God. One's relationship 
with God must be lived out through one's relationship with other 
humans. However, this raises the further question as to whether Rahner 
holds that concern for the interpersonal worldly realm is really 
important in its own right or whether it is only important in as much 
as it is a veiled means of responding to God. Is love of neighbour 
intrinsically important in that it constitutes human fulfilment and in 
this manner becomes the prima.ry means of the total response of the 
person to God? Or, is love of neighbour important only in as much as 
Rahner thinks of it as the pr ima.ry means of responding to God, as 
reception of the Blessed Sacrament might once have been so considered 
in an earlier day? In order to satisfy the dema.nd that Christian 
soteriologica 1 concern be consonant with this worldly concern, only the 
former possibility is adequate. If love of neighbour constitutes such 
a radical fulfilment of the human person that it is at once a love of 
God then we have a firm basis for perceiving our relationship with God 
as being lived out in a genuine relationship with the present order. 
However, if the neighbour is only loved as a means of loving God then 
the neighbour is not really loved at all. Rahner takes the former 
option. 
As we have seen, the human person's subjectivity in knowledge and 
freedom is only mediated through a relationship with another ( 126) • 
Fbr Rahner, the human person is essentially related to other persons. 
\'bere there is the human person, there is necessarily hl.llt1illl conununity 
(127): "Man lives in an environment, he is always a being referred to 
the other - to the other with which he associates, which he accepts, on 
which he depends." (128) Hence, human fulfilment is found in 
relationship to other people. IDve of neighbour comes to be seen as 
the basic act through which a person determines him/herself (129). In 
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this way, Rahner maintains that love of neighbour genuinely is a love 
of neighbour which fulfils the human person rather than being merely a 
veiled form of loving God: 
love for God 1 s sake - to be precise - does not mean love of 
God alone in the 'material' of our neighbour merely seen as 
an opportunity for pure love of God, but really means t.he 
love of our neighbour himself, a love empowered b¥ God to 
obtain its ultimate radicality and a love which really 
terminates and rests in our neighbour. (130) 
Should love of neighbour be thought of as too restricted a not ion 
to take account of the soteriological significance of structural evil 
in the world, Rahner stresses that it "must not be taken as confined to 
one's private circle" (131). On the contrary, it is a love that is 
"socially orientated" (132), it is a love "that carries with it a will 
to just ice and today at least, has also socio-political tasks" ( 133). 
Hence it is that Rahner claims that Christianity proclaims the human 
person to have an earthly task which is of real significance for 
his/her eternal salvation (134). 
That Rahner understands the material interrelatedness of human 
life to be of essential significance, rather than merely being a means 
of responding to God, is shown b¥ the emphasis that he places upon its 
permanent eschatological fulfilment: "If eschatology were to fail to 
take account of man's physical, spatio-temporal bodily existence then 
it would become mythology." (135) The whole person (and hence also 
his/her corporeality) "will be saved" (136). That our perfect 
conununion with God consists in a totality of our being, ~ and soul, 
is witnessed to b¥ the bodily resurrection of Christ (137). Christ's 
humanity is of eternal significance to the believer for it is through 
his humanity that we are able to approach God (138), and what is true 
of Christ will be true of us also. In treating of the final 
eschatological fulfilment of the person's bodily aspect, Rahner does 
129 
not neglect to treat of a consummation of the interpersonal realm: "The 
eschatology of the concrete, individual person can be complete only if 
we also develop a collective eschatology." ( 139) 
Indeed, it is the conununal aspect of eschatology which has 
precedence in Christian theology through such notions as "the Kingdom 
of God, the external covenant, the triumphant Church, the new heaven 
and the new earth" (140). Fbr Rahner, the Christian hope in the future 
consummation of the interpersonal order should not give rise to a 
passive awaiting of this future consummation but should rather occasion 
a permanently revolutionary attitude to the existing structures (141). 
"The eschatological hope has itself to impose its own stamp upon the 
frame\\Ork of the vita saecularis." (142) Hence it is that the 
interpersonal aspect of human life is not merely a means of attaining 
to salvation, but is itself fulfilled in the eschatological 
consummation of salvation. 
3 .a The inadequacy of Rahner • s starting point: 
In the present chapter we have followed Rahner as he sought to 
counter the charge of the meaninglessness of soteriological discourse 
through grounding sal vat ion language in the human person • s fundamental 
and inescapable openness to God. Salvation is the final consummation 
of the person • s transcendental openness to God, chosen through his/her 
freely willed disposition of self before God. Again, we have observed 
how he seeks to reconcile the Christian salvation schema with concern 
for this world through his understanding of the love of neighbour. 
I.Dve of neighbour is not merely a mral consequence of loving God, 
rather it is love of God. Nor is the neighbour loved merely as a means 
of loving God, love of neighbour is essential to personal fulfilment. 
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Such love of neighbour extends beyond the confines of one's irmnediate 
relationships throughout the socio-political sphere, and finds 
consurmnat ion in the eschatological fulfilment. However, we now have 
cause to raise two concerns as to the adequacy of Rahner's starting 
point, his transcendental analysis of the structures of the knowing, 
willing, individual human subject. Firstly we must ask whether such a 
starting point will not inevitably lead to a priori generalisations and~ J;~ ,,o'· ,J 
\...;,\ ,j..,,J,.,.\\-'.o..'1\!l 
secondly whether it will not inevitably lead to an over concern with \"-, a..,L "~ ''" 
. " ~lil ... ..,..,.. u.. \~"-~ (J~i \ 
the individual. 
As we have discussed in Chapters One and Two, the 'classic' 
approach in theology was unashamedly theocentric and assumed the 
uni vocacy of theology with the human endeavour. Human 1 i fe was 
comm:::>nly held to be, and experienced as, life within the 'praise of 
God' ( 143) • Theological reflect ion could assume this context ( 144) • 
Ibwever, the axial rotation in world view and dislocation in ht.nnan 
understanding represented by the Enlightenment ( 145) make such 
assumptions quite inappropriate to the modern and post-modern climate 
of the twentieth century (146). The inherited tradition, which was 
born from reflection on human life as rooted within God and which spoke 
powerfully to the pre-modern era, now seems like an imposition of an 
a priori assumption onto human life (147). Given the vastly changed 
milieu of the twentieth century, we claimed that the central question 
in contemporary theology is: How are we to continue to speak of the l 
theological dignity of human life in a way that respects the lived <J\; 
I --··~ f ~~.; ff\1 \" f , 
experience of human life rather than imposing a priori assumptions onto 
this experience (148)? How is it possible to articulate a theology 
univocal with human life when the central presupposition of the 
classical tradition, that life is rooted in the praise of God, is so 
profoundly disputed? In Chapters One and Two we argued that the onus 
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was upon theology to creatively establish, rather than assume, the 
uni vocacy of theology with Life. 
As we have seen, Rahner makes a significant contribution to the 
attempted resolution of this dilermna. Rather than assume the validity 
of a theocentric vision and soteriological language, as may have been 
possible in the pre-modern era, Rahner recognises that this must be 
established. He recognises that theological language must be relocated 
within human 1 i fe. He seeks to do this, as we have seen, through 
following Kant in a transcendental analysis of the knowing and willing 
human subject. That is, he seeks to reclaim the validity of a 
theocentric vision of human life through an anthropocentric starting 
point. 
In this manner he situates 'salvation' in the fulfilment of the 
human person's transcendental openness to God. However, whilst we 
approve wholeheartedly of the anthropological shift in theology which 
Rahner advocates, it remains questionable whether he has gone far 
enough. He gives more the impression of seeking to justify a 
theocentric vision in a general way which he then relates to the 
particularity of human life than he does of seeking to reformulate a 
theology that is genuinely univocal with human life in its 
particularity. Rahner's soteriology is focused on an understanding of 1 
salvation as the fulfilment of the person's transcendental (i.e ~ 
priori and universal) openness to God. He then relates this 
understanding of salvation to the particular situations of human Life, 
seeking to show how we live out our response to God in our daily lives. 
-1 
This is a long way short of starting with particular human situations 
which cry out for a liberating redemption and then seeking to locate -=--""'''"',•'i ;),o 
the meaning of salvation language in such contexts. In Chapter Two we \l'<\~ \''"-·~o).~o 
N-v, \)-''""'' \, 
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claimed that just as the quest for salvation stems from particular 
situations so also salvation language must be rooted in and capable of 
speaking to, particular situations. Only in this way, we claimed, can 
salvation language be meaningful. ~ share O'Leary's concern: 
As long as a preacher thinks that the essential gospel is a 
set of principles, and the rest its metaphysical clothing, 
then God remains a concept to be applied rather than one 
whose cause, will, kingdom, or presence is to be found 
concretely inscribed in the texture of our lives and 
struggles." (149) 
~ believel~~ that Rahner • s apparent inability to root -y salvation 
language in particular human situations can be traced back to his 
starting point. AI. though Ralmer makes the anthropological turn and 
seeks to establish the univocacy of theology with human life, he does 
not turn to study human life in its particularity. Rather, he begins 
with what has the form of an a priori, transcendental analysis of what 
he takes to be the uni versall~'1 ~i ven structures of the human subject. 
_J 
Whilst we accept that Rahner's reflections are a posteriori 
\1 "i\ ;..,.,u to.. f~io .... 
particular in as much as they are grounded in his own experience of the··"· 1,,.," ·;''''···,.·, 7• 
~llu \"U'<--<' 'hJ \n~"'~ "-"'0 
way that the world is, it is insufficient for him to assume that his 1 '16 '" ""''~'' 
own experience is universally valid without pursuing a wide ranging 
reflection on human experience and painstakingly building up an 
a posteriori basis for a transcendental analysis. When Rahner does 
turn his attention to lived human experience in order to give examples 
of the transcendent dimension of human life he gives more the 
impression of seeking to justify an a priori conclusion that he has 
already arrived at, concerning the univocacy of human life with a 
theocentric vision, than he does of engaging upon a genuinely 
a posteriori analysis of human life. Nor is it sufficient, we believe, 
to argue that this is an accidental result of Rahner's order of 
presentation. Rather, we would claim that it betrays Rahner •s ultimate 
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concern. If Rahner had perceived that it was necessary not only to 
establish that theology is univocal with life but to relocate a 
theocentric vision of human life in accordance with an a posteriori 
analysis of life in its particularity then surely his methodology would 
have reflected this concern? 
The present criticism of the use that Rahner makes of the 
transcendental method should not be taken as being an outright 
rejection of the transcendental noment in theology per se. ~ have 
already noted our agreement with n:tvid Tracy that analysis of collliiDn 
human experience requires both a phenomenological noment and a 
transcendental noment. Hence, we would distinguish our position from 
such as o•teary who is suspicious of any transcendental, metaphysical 
reflection whatsoever on the grounds that: "Transcendental theorizing 
is possible only at the cost of an extreme simplification and 
stylization of that about which one wishes to theorize." (150) 
However, as we maintained in the previous chapter, we believe that the 
moment of transcendental reflection must follow on the noment of 
phenomenological (~Tracy) or semiotic inquiry. Unless this is the 
case then the inevitable result seems to be abstract generalisations 
which seek secondary affirmation through a selective use of data. It 
is this moment of a posteriori analysis that we find to be missing in 
Rahner•s approach. Whilst Rahner does turn his attention to the data 
of COIIliiDn human experience, this is a secondary pursuit which comes 
after the prior transcendental analysis. o•teary states: "the 
phenomenological fleshing out of the transcendental deduction in Rahner 
always comes after the speculative fact." (151) o•teary distinguishes 
the general concepts which Rahner uses from the poetic language used 
by Heidegger (152). In the very act of using Heidegger•s 
phenomenological data it becomes subverted by the generalising tendency 
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of Rahner's a priori starting point. Fbr O'Leary the very fact that 
Rahner derives his phenomenological data from the work of another 
thinker suggests that Rahner has not focused on these originary 
experiences himself (153). He claims that Rahner takes over 
Heidegger's phenomenological data as an attempt to ground and verify 
his metaphysical anthropology. Ultimately, O'Leary claims that whilst 
Heidegger uses phenomenology to overcome metaphysics and to point a way 
beyond it, Rahner uses it as a way back into metaphysics. He quotes 
Kerr approvingly: "to go on saying the kind of thing outlined above, 
after having studied with Heidegger, shows very considerable powers of 
resistance to the master's main thoughts." (154) 
Hence, whilst Rahner seeks to reconcile concern for 
anthropocentricity and theocentricity through reformulating theology in 
terms of the essential structures of the human subject, his 
transcendental starting point can be seen to militate against a genuine 
concern for human life in its particularity. Certainly, Rahner 
represents a creative reformulation of the classic approach through his 
transcendental analysis which seeks to locate salvation language in the 
transcendental structures of the human person. Rather than assume the 
univocacy of theology with life, Rahner seeks to establish this through 
his transcendental approach. In developing the transcendental method 
of Marechal, Rahner has bequeathed to theology a powerful and creative 
tool for reflecting upon the data of comnnn human experience and 
rediscovering the locus of ~he transcendent God immanent within human 
life. However, the adequacy of the way in which Rahner enployed this 
method is limited by the fact that his starting point is transcendental 
analysis rather than common human experience. 
We will now turn our attention to the second of our concerns 
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regarding Rahner's starting point, that is as to whether it displays an 
excessive concern with the individual's relationship with God. As we 
have seen, Rahner builds his theology upon a transcendental analysis of 
the knowing and willing individual human subject. Salvation is thought 
of as the eternalisation of the person's option for God, or the 
consununation of the person's openness for God. Rahner equates response 
to God with love of neighbour. Hence relationships in this order, even 
political relationships, have a radical significance about them. 
Ibwever, thus far it seems that Rahner • s soteriological concern 
remains entirely centred upon the individual's salvation and 
responsibility. Socio-political realities are only included in the 
sphere of soteriological import in as much as they reflect the concern 
of the individual to love his/her neighbour with the demands of 
political love. Whilst such situations might be a real response to _J 
neighbour, a real response to God and a real fulfilment of the person, 
the implicit soteriological concern is not for the salvation of 
interpersonal human situations but rather for the fulfilment of the 
individual's eternal destiny. The main soteriological question in 
Rahner 's schema inevitably becomes: How can I live out my eternal 
destiny in this world ? Rather than: How can we hope for a healing 
liberation of this situation? ~ilst we accept that this is a 
legitimate and highly important soteriological concern, it is not the 
only soteriological concern in human life. Exclusive focusing upon the 
eternal destiny of the individuaL leaves unaffected structural and 
ecological questions. Further, as we have claimed in Chapter Two, the 
salvation of the individual cannot be pursued in isolation from the 
liberation and salvation of the socio-political realities in which the 
individual finds him/herself. ~ agree with Metz: 
any existential and personal theology that claims to 
1.36 
understand human existence, but not as a political problem in 
the widest sense, is an abstract theology with regard to the 
existential situation of the individual. (155) 
It might be claimed that we are quibbling over nothing: After 
all, does not Rahner show great concern that individual salvation and 
political involvement should not be divorced, and does he not go a long 
way towards ensuring this? In reply we would accept that Rahner is 
genuinely concerned to overcome the widespread emphasis upon other-
worldly individualism (156). He wants theology to be developed with· a 
view to its significance for: 
social politics and the shaping of history, and thereby the 
exaggeratedly narrow and individualist view of revelation as 
pertaining . to the salvation of the individual in isolation 
would have to be overcome. (157) 
Yet having accepted this, we would continue to claim that we are not 
splitting hairs but rather pointing to a fundamental inadequacy in 
Rahner 's approach to soteriology. If Rahner 's soteriology reflects a 1 
concern as to how the individual's eternal destiny might be lived out 
in the present world rather than a concern for the redemption of 
interpersonal situations then it can be seen to stand within the 
western cult of, and obsession with, personal fulfilment and authentic 
existence. Adorno disparagingly refers to this aura as The Jargon of 
Authenticity. (158). In this jargon the profound alienation of the 
human conununity and . consequent need of a liberation extending 
throughout ·the structures of human life is packaged into a manageable 
quest for personal authentiCity: 11the jargon bars the message from the 
experience Which is to ensoul it." (159) SUch a quest can only be a 
_j 
problem ·for a person with enough leisure, education and security to 
worry over such things. In short it reflects the concerns of the 
comfortable in the western world and is entirely irrelevant to people 
Whose only question is as to Whether life might become bearable, 
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whether they might be freed from the crushing evil (persona 1 and 
structural) in human life. In such situations, salvation schemas of 
self-realisation are irrelevant in that they appear to raise to the 
level of ut110st importance what is only of peripheral concern. In 
contrast we seek the redeeming presence of God within the interpersonal 
dimensions of life. we do not just cry out for a personal Liberation 
and hope that this can be reconciled with a positive attitude towards 
the world rather we experience the way in which human life is lived as l\]""''"'""'J..I·l 
• -''.rt:1 l__<h-v'f ~~ ... ~-\..-_ 
unbearable and we ask whether there are grounds for hope. Wh1lst -1;~,, •.. 
1 
'"·'"··-
Rahner clearly intends to reconcile soteriological concern and concern "]"''~·...,,';,,.. ,,..J 
for this world, his emphasis upon the eternal destiny of the individual •nJ '1 
in relation to God militates against this concern. As Metz says: 
does not such a transcendental-existential approach ••• 
concentrate the necessarily historically realized salvation 
of man too much as the question of whether the individual 
freely accepts or rejects this constitution of his being? 
(160) 
we may compare this with Timothy Gorringe's summary of the Augustinian 
view of history: 
The important thing in history is not the process but each 
individual's meeting with God which is as available to a life 
'measured out in coffee spoons' as it is to a life lived in 
sound and fury. It asserts therefore the eternal 
significance of each individual's life, and on this ground 
relegates the process to an entirely secondary importance. 
(161) 
Such a focus upon the individual is well nigh inevitable due to 
Rahner's metaphysics which, in line with the dominant strand in western 
philosophy, is a metaphysics of the autoTlOilDus subject. Fbr Rahner, 
being is fundamentally being with self. Whilst Rahner acknowledges 
that we are only ourselves through being with others, this is simply 
due to our finite nature which already finds us given over into the 
other of matter. In contrast to us, God who is perfect being has no 
need to be with God's other. In itself this metaphysics of the 
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autonomous sUbject is a very questionable position to hold. Various 
strands of thought from the fields of psychology, the dialogical 
philosophers, liberation theologians and process thinkers cohere in 
their repudiation of the not ion of the autonomous human sUbject ( 162) • 
In contrast they would maintain that being is essentially being with 
others, that human life is marked by an essentially interpersonal and 
conununitarian nature. In the second chapter of the present work we 
outlined our support for this posit ion ( 163) • 
Kerr also points to the inadequacy of Rahner' s concern with the 
individual human sUbject (164) but from a different angle. Whereas we 
have criticised Rahner's ontology of the autonomous nature of Being, 
Kerr applies the Wittgensteinian critique of private languages to 
Rahner 's starting point: Rahner 's transcendental analysis of knowledge 
is based upon the claim that prior to any thematic, conceptualised 
knowledge, there is an unthematic, pre-conceptual pre-apprehension of 
the sUbjective pole of self-consciousness. Fbr Kerr, such talk of a 
"sUbjective consciousness of the knower" going on ''behind the back of 
the knower" (165) is to be equated with the private language so 
disdained by Wittgenstein. With Wittgenstein, Kerr argues that such 
private language 'hijacks' the essentially corporate nature of language 
as a means of social communication and seeks rather to establish the 
roots of language in the mind of the autonomous knowing sUbject ( 166) • 
Hence, whilst Rahner believes that the turn to the sUbject in nodern 
philosophy provides the basis for a firm establishment of Christian 
soteriology through a transcendental analysis which shows man to be 
fundamentally open to God, in contrast Kerr concurs with Wittgenstein 
that the turn to the individual human sUbject is an inadmissible 
starting point for philosophy. 
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\\e believe that Rahner • s transcendental methodology provides a 
rich and creative resource for modern theology. However, we believe 
that there are two fundamental weaknesses in this methodology as it is 
developed by Rahner. Firstly, the fact that he starts with a 
transcendental analysis rather than with a phenomenological/semiotic 
analysis of coll11'10n human experience seriously limits his ability to 
engage in genuine dialogue with the particularity of human life. 
Secondly, his focus upon the individual human subject results in an 
over concern with a soteriology of individual/personal salvation. In 
short his soteriology can only be applied to human life in its 
particularity and cormnunality in a secondary manner and it thus 
perpetuates the least helpful elements that have crept into Christian 
soteriology. Mindful of the limitations of Rahner 's starting point, we 
will turn in the following chapters to continue our examination of his 
., 
soteriological schema. \\e should not be surprised if we find that his., 
a priori perspective causes him to have a formalistic approach to grace 
Which is far too ready to state that human life is graced without 
saying how it is graced unto liberation. Nor should we be surprised to 
find that he can only conceive of God's activity in the world in a 
generalised manner. Before we turn in Chapter Five to consider his 11 
understanding of freedom as graced freedom we shall examine in Chapter 
Fbur his understanding of the dark of side of human freedom. 
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CHAPTER FDUR: SIN AND GUILT AS RADICAL DEI'ERMINAm'S OF HUMAN LIFE. 
In the last chapter we discussed Rahner 1 s profound understanding 
of the dynamic nature of human freedom and its consequent dark side. 
~ pondered whether Rahner, carried away on the wings of en lighterunent 
optimism, had remained blind to this dark side. we asked whether 
Rahner 1 s understanding of salvation is thoroughly subjective or whether 
it is an objectively given healing liberation which is appropriated 
subjectively. In the present chapter we shall see that Rahner doeS 
indeed provide an account of human evil as profound as his account of 
human freedom. Rahner frees us from fear of a wrathful God only to 
remind us that our own capacities for radical and final evil should 
strike fear and humility into our hearts. '!he present chapter will 
provide the backdrop for Chapter Five. '!here we shall turn to focus on 
the place of the sgeernatural existential in Rahner 1 s soteriology. It 
is through the supernatural existential that Rahner seeks to secure an 
objective salvation that is appropriated subjectively. 
Rahner uses the terms sin and guilt (Schuld) seemingly 
interchangeably to refer to freely determined acts which constitute a 
• no 1 to God. '!he German word Schuld has a broader meaning than the 
English word guilt. Whereas guilt is normally taken as referring to 
the 110ral state of having sinned and the consequences which that brings 
with it, the German word encompasses this meaning whilst referring 
primarily to the sinful act. One is not only guilty in the legal sense 
of having committed a wrong act, nor is one merely guilty in the 
psychological sense of feeling guilty. Guilt refers primarily to that 
existential state of freely choosing to alienate oneself from one 1 s 
true being. When we refer to guilt in the present chapter it should be 
taken in this broader sense unless otherwise indicated. 
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Tb recapitulate on Rahner's understanding of freedom, freedom is 
not so much the choice between various disparate acts but rather the 
subject's choice of self ( 1). Through his/her various free acts the 
human subject creates him/herself into the person he/she wishes to be 
(2). Hence, freedom is not to be seen as a neutral capa~ity. A 
person's future freedom is circumscribed by previous acts of free 
disposition {3). 
Rahner 's understanding of sin and guilt are consonant with his 
understanding of freedom. Acts of sin and guilt are not just disparate 
and superficial without any lasting effect into the future: "Sin is 
not a contingent act which I performed in the past and whose effect is 
no longer with me." (4) Rather, the particular sinful and guilty deeds 
of a person's life form a radical determination of the person, s/he 
actually becomes sinful: 
Sin determines man in a definite way: He has not only sinned, 
but he himself is a sinner. He is a sinner not only by a 
formal, juridical, imputation of a former act, but also in an 
existential way, so that in looking back on our past 
actions, we always find ourselves to be sinners. {5) 
Hence past sins form the person in the present and influence future 
acts. Whilst sin and guilt do refer to particular acts in which the 
person rejects God, their primary reference is to the final state of 
enduring opposition to God which we form ourselves into through these 
particular acts: "guilt regarded theologically is primarily and in its 
most proper essential ground the total and definitive decision of man 
against God." {6) 
Because the horizon of all freedom is God, sin is an act of self-
contradiction, indeed Rahner refers to it as "theological and 
metaphysical suicide." (7) Sin and guilt represent real possibilities 
that are open before the human person and which threaten his/her 
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existence (8). The radical depth of sin for Rahner is to be seen in 
three ways: firstly in that sin inevitably produces punitive suffering 
in the sinner; secondly in that the effects of sin last into the future 
and so rule out the practical possibility of instantaneous conversions 
and thirdly in that the person can close him/herself off to God in a 
radical 'no' and so choose eternal damnation. '\\e will turn our 
attention to each of these points in the order in Which we have 
outlined them. 
Rahner insists that Whatever the phrase punishment of sins may be 
taken to mean it is not to be thought of as equivalent to the 
punishment Which one incurs for breaking the stipulations of the civil 
law (9). Indeed he explicitly berates the view Which would hold the 
punishment of sins to be "something Which is extrinsically imposed on 
man by the justice of God, conceived merely as something vindictive" 
(10). In contrast, Rahner understands the punishment due to sin as 
being due to the intrinsic make-up of the created order. "In other 
words, can we not say that man and the world (including the realities 
beyond), have been constituted by God in such a way that sin punishes 
itself?" (11) How is it that nature is so constituted that sin 
punishes itself? As we have seen in Chapter Three, Rahner understands 
the person to be spirit in matter. When the spiritual person 
determines him/herself in freedom the spiritual act of freedom embodies 
itself in the exterior of the being (12). However, the person's 
exterior being, materiality or nature, is different from his/her 
personal core. His/her nature has certain a priori structures given it 
by God and orienting it towards God. In as much as a sinful act of 
personal freedom contradicts the person's basic orientation towards God 
the sinful act embodies itself in his/her exterior being in a way Which 
contradicts the fundamental structures of his/her exterior being. This 
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gives rise to a tension: 
When the seminal, personal act is formed into his medium in 
a manner contradicting its a priori structures, it 
experiences the resistance offered by these structures as a 
conflict and hence as suffering. (13) 
This tension in the exterior being of the person necessarily causes 
pain: "It is the painful protest of the reality which God has fashioned 
against the false decision of man." (14) The person who has caused 
this tension to arise, due to the exteriorization of his/her own sin, 
experiences the pain and suffering as punishment for his/her sin (15). 
Rahner stresses that punishment is intrinsic to sin, "sin punishes 
itself" (16), rather than being vindictively given by God: 
all divine punishment is a connatural consequence of guilt 
flowing from the proper nature of guilt and need not be 
specially added by God: and that therefore God is the 
punisher of sin by having created the objective structures 
of man and the world. ( 17) 
In this manner, Rahner distances himself from the disobedience 
model of sin that we rejected in articulating our criteria in Chapter 
Two. The suffering that is consequent upon sin is not thought of here 
as an external punishment imposed by God for having broken divine 
commands. Rather Rahner understands suffering to be an inevitable and 
intrinsic consequence of sin. Rahner further claims that the person's 
free decision takes real effect in his/her being, and continues to take 
effect even when the person changes his/her free decision ( 18): 
Such incarnations of man • s personal decision of freedom in 
the exterior of the person (and, beyond this, in his 
surroundings) are not simply cancelled out again, once they 
have taken place, by a change of disposition in the spiritual 
nucleus of the person through contrition etc." (19) 
Hence the punishment due to sin continues on long after the sinner has 
distanced himself from his sinful act. In maintaining the lasting 
effects of sin, Rahner is consistent with his theology of freedom (20). 
He pursues the dark side of his anthropology and understands the 
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implications in terms of the rondage that past sinful acts bring in 
their wake. On this understanding of freedom and sin, conversion 
becomes problematic in the extreme. Past acts cannot simply be 
forgotten about for they form a person's present (21). Nor can they 
easily be overcome for they cause deeply ingrained attitudes, and 
aftereffects in the person (22}. Rahner states: 
it is - let us note - not very easy to explain how this 
person, who has not only done a guilty act but also has 
become guilty as a result of this act, can still be capable 
of such a fundamental trans format ion of the whole nucleus of 
the person. (23) 
Rahner believes that the grace of conversion does not consist merely in 
an instantaneous re-orientation of the person towards God but should 
rather gradually integrate the entire person, spirit and matter, 
towards sanctification (24). In perceiving the radical depth of sin 
and evil in human life, Rahner perceives the need for a healing, 
liberating dynamic that overcomes the effects of sin and evil in human 
life. Rahner seeks to address the concern that lay behind our third 
criterion of adequacy for soteriology. 
Rahner seeks to harnonise his understanding of the lasting effects 
of sinful acts and his recognition of the need for a healing, 
integrating dynamic with the Church's teaching on indulgences. He 
offers a reformulated understanding of the payment due to sin whiCh 
complements his understanding of the puniShment due to sin. He 
conceives of the payment for sin as a maturing process which re-
integrates all that has been frustrated in the person through sin ( 25) • 
Hence an indulgence cannot be thought of as a financial payment in 
order to pay off a financial debt, rather it must be thought of as the 
effective prayer of the ChurCh joining with the prayer of the sinner 
for his/her integration. In this manner: 
the process of painful integration of the whole of man's 
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stratified being into the definitive decision about his 
life, taken under the grace of God, happens nnre quickly and 
intensively and therefore also less painfully. (26) 
Thirdly we turn our attention to the radical nature of sin as 
displayed by the possibility of self-chosen eternal damnation. As we 
observed in Chapter Three, Rahner understands human freedom to be 
geared towards eternity (27). Fbr this reason, it is possible for the 
human person to enter into eternity having made of his/her life a 
radical and definitive no to God and so to enter into eternal 
damnation. Christianity can say nothing about how many people, which 
people, or indeed whether any at all will enter into the final 
damnation of Hell, but it can and must proclaim that it is a real 
possibility for each and everyone of us (28). The scriptural accounts, 
in line with Rahner•s hermeneutics of eschatological statements (29), 
are not to be read as eye witness accounts of what shall be but rather 
as pictorial representation of the possibilities of human life ( 30). 
They show the human person to have the capacity of deciding against God 
for ever (31). "Man's freedom might suffer absolute loss in its final 
and definitive state, that is, the possibility of hell." (32) In this 
sense, the Christian teaching about freedom, sin and hell is invested 
with an absolute seriousness. 
It says to each one of us, not to someone else, but to me 
personally: in and through yourself, in and through what you 
in your innermost depths are and definitively want to be, 
you can be a person who discloses himself into the absolute, 
deadly and final loneliness of saying ~ to God. ( 33) 
We have noted that Rahner roots his discussion of sin and evil in 
common human experience in terms of that which destroys and 
disintegrates human life. When in Chapter Two we formulated our first 
criterion of adequacy for soteriology, we argued that whilst 
soteriological language must be rooted within common human experience 
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it must not be collapsed into a representation of the most superficial 
level of understanding human experience. we claimed that the 
traditional reference of sin must be respected. That being that sin 
can only finally be understood to be a free personal self-determination 
vis~-vis the very ground of reality itself, God. We have seen that 
Rahner holds these two concerns in intimate relationship. He 
understands the human relationship with God to pervade all aspects of 
human life. Hence, for Rahner, sin is not simply a symbolically loaded 
reference to that Which frustrates human life within a finite context. 
Sin refers to that Which frustrates human life Which moves within the 
context of God. In this sense, sin is a refusal of God. 
Rahner develops his theology of sin further. Not only do we have 
the horrific possibility of our freely willed and final evil to contend 
with, we also find ourselves to be in a situation already determined by 
other people's evil. Other people's evil, and the very situation in 
Which we are located, in turn influences our own actions. Further, we 
find a basic disintegration of our personality Which prevents us from 
acting in the way that we desire. Rahner treats of these aspects of 
human life in his thoughts on original sin and concupiscence. 
Concupiscence, as it is experienced in the concrete is the practical 
manifestation of the effects of original sin. Hence, we shall turn our 
attention first to original sin. 
The human person lives out his/her freedom in the world, that is 
in a pre-existing, given situation (34). This pre-existing situation 
in Which the person actualizes him/herself is always determined by 
other people's free acts (35). Hence a person's free self-
determination is always limited by, and influenced by, the situation in 
Which it is exercised (36). There is nowhere a person can turn to 
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escape this influence which reaches to every part of the person (37). 
Hence Rahner states that one person • s earthly history "inevitably 
bears the stamp of the history of the freedom of all other men. 11 ( 38) 
This history is a history marked by guilt, hence the situation in which 
the individual must achieve his/!'ler freedom is a situation pre-
determined by guilt (39). This situation, determined as it is by guilt 
influences the individual•s free disposition of self: 
All of man • s experience points in the direct ion that there 
are in fact objectifications of personal guilt in the world 
which, as the material for the free decisions of other 
persons, threaten these decisions, have a seductive effect 
upon them, and make free decisions painful. (40) 
Even a good free decision does not succeed in transforming the 
material determined by evil, entirely and so remains ambiguous (41). 
Christianity claims that this cotermination of the situation of every 
person by the guilt of others is something "universal, permanent, and 
therefore also original." (42) There is no place which has not in some 
way been marred by the guilt of others ( 43) • For Rahner, the 
universality of guilt in the single history of humanity suggests that 
the determination of the human situation by guilt goes back to the 
origins of human life. That is, it implies an "original sin" (44). 
Rahner maintains that the biblical account of the fall should not be 
understood as an historical, eye witness report. It should rather be 
seen as an aetiological account which works back from "the experience 
of man •s existentiell situation in the history of salvation to what 
must have happened at the beginning if the present situation of freedom 
actually is the way it is experienced and if it is accepted as it is. 11 
(45) 
However, Rahner is at pains to emphasise that the doctrine of 
original sin does not mean that later generations can be held norally 
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culpable for Adam's sin, whether through juridical imputation or 
through biological heredity ( 46) • 'lb maintain such noral culpability 
on the part of later generations would be to contradict Rahner 's 
understanding of freedom. For Rahner, freedom is where a _person is 
unique, where no one can take one's place, and where no one else can be 
held resp:>nsible for one's own actions. Freedom is the place "where he 
cannot be analysed away, as it were, either forwards or backwards or 
into his environment, and in this way esca_pe responsibility for 
himself." (47) Hence the _personal guilt from the original act of 
disobedient freedom cannot be transmitted. Rahner develops this line 
of thought in his essay, "The Sin Of Adam" (48). In that the human 
_person does not inherit the mral culpability for Adam's sin, Rahner 
insists that sin and sinfulness as applied on the one hand to the 
condition which man owes to his descent from Adam and on the other hand 
to the condition which is the outcome of his own _personal decision to 
go against God are to be understood in a merely analogous sense. 
'Ebwever, whilst original sin is not to be confused with _personal, 
voluntary sin, it does place every individual human being in a 
situation of inward alienation from God. The entire person is wounded 
by the consequences of origina 1 sin and weakened in his/her natural 
powers. The effects of original sin are seen mst clearly in the 
presence of concupiscence in human life and it is to this that we shall 
now turn our attention. 
Rahner begins his essay on "'lhe Theological Concept Of 
Concupiscentia" (49) by asking whether it is a force weighing down on 
the _person through original sin which irresistibly inclines the _person 
towards sin (as classical Protestantism would maintain) or whether it 
is a natural facet of human life present even in the pre-fall state (as 
classical Roman catholicism had maintained). In effect Rahner takes a 
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mediating position. He claims that whilst concupiscence was naturally 
present in the pre-fall state, it takes on a greater significance in 
the post fall state. He holds that these can be considered as two 
distinct elements within the concept of concupiscence (quite how they 
are distinct is a little less clear). 
From the first, two entirely distinct elements are given in 
our empirical concupiscentia: One an element which belongs 
essentially to every man so long as he forms a part of this 
cosmic epoch, and another which is a consequence of the loss 
of integrity of paradise due to the prinordial sin. (SO) 
By concupiscence in the theological sense Rahner refers to the post 
fall state where concupiscence is experienced as debilitating. Rahner 
locates his understanding of concupiscence in the difference between 
acts due to a person's natural, spontaneous dynamisms on the one hand 
(actus indeliberatus) and their acts of personal freedom on the other 
(actus deliberatus) (51). Whereas the spontaneous natural desires, 
which have both a sensitive and a spiritual aspect, are orientated 
towards a finite good, the acts of personal freedom are always 
orientated towards the ultimate good and seek to achieve a fully 
integrated disposition of the whole person before the ultimate good, 
i.e. God. Hence it means that a person's cognitive and appetitive 
powers take part in a natural inclination which precedes man's personal 
free decision. This is what Rahner means by concupiscence in the 
natural sense (52), understood in this manner concupiscence would have 
been an element in human life even in a pure-humanity. However as we 
experience concupiscence in the concrete, the spontaneous natural 
desires do not only precede our personal free decisions but they 
precondition them and influence them and prevent us from ever achieving 
a full personal disposition of our nature. This is what Rahner means 
by concupiscence in the theological sense (53). We may compare: 
Concupiscence, rightly understood, implies an interior 
pluralism within man at all levels of his being and in all 
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his impulses, and that too a pluralism of such a kind that it 
can never be totally or radically integrated into the single 
decision of freedom. {54) 
This resistance that man finds in himself prior to his free decision 
and going against his attempt to dispose of himself totally has its 
metaphysical roots in the dual ism in the human person as being composed 
of both matter and form. "The form can never fully manifest itself in 
the other of matter." (55) Rahner accepts that even in a pre-fall 
state there would be natural desires which preceded personal acts of 
freedom and that there would be a duality between matter and form. 
However, he maintains that they would not be experienced in the same 
way. Men and women in their natural state should be thought of as 
having an integrity now lacking to us, an integrity which would 
overcome the debilitating effects of the natural desires and of the 
dualism between matter and form. In this manner, concupiscence can be 
thought of as the practical manifestation of original sin: 
Man of himself should be in a state of integrity free from 
concupiscence. What we mean is this: As we now know the 
constitution of man, he finds himself unable to integrate 
fully and clearly the whole reality of his existence, in all 
its dimensions, into the decision of his freedom ••• This 
experience of concupiscence and passibility is a form of 
manifestation of sin {though the expression manifestation of 
sin is not to be confused with sin itself). (56) 
Hence, for Rahner, in addition to sin having a dynamic and radical 
depth about it which confronts the human person with the awful 
possibility of his/her own self-chosen damnation, the human person also 
finds him/herself to be in a situation that is always predetermined b¥ 
other people's guilt. Further, we find a fundamental lack of integrity 
in ourselves that prevents us fully achieving the good that we desire. 
However, the effects of concupiscence are not wholly negative. It is 
not only our good decisions that encounter concupiscence but also our 
bad one's. ~ are not able to determine ourselves fully in an evil 
manner (57). He conunents wryly: 
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This inner division of man is often indeed the occasion of 
his ruin, but - who knows - perhaps still JIDre often the 
occasion of his salvation, because it also prevents him from 
being utterly evil. (58) 
Rahner presents us with a profound understanding of the depth and 
radical nature of evil in hi..U11an life, of the determination of the hi..U11an 
situation by guilt and of our personal disintegration as a consequence 
of original sin. At this stage then it would be surprising if Rahner 
was to proiTDte the sort of superficial ethic of self-achievement that 
we earlier criticised. Rahner is only too well aware of this. He 
raises the question as to how the person who has actually become guilty 
can still be capable of a "fundamental transformation of the whole 
nucleus of the person." (59) Faced with the dark side of human freedom 
we may well be left with a promethean fear rather than a facile 
optimism (60). Rahner states that: 
any introduction to the idea of Christianity would be 
deficient if it did not discuss man's guilt and forlorness, 
the necessity of deliverance from radical evil, redemption 
and the need for redemption. (61) 
Having discussed in the present chapter Rahner's understanding of 
the human person's guilt and forlorness, we shall turn our attention in 
the next chapter to his concept of the sgeernatural existential as the 
means by which he seeks to establish the objective subjectivity of 
Christian salvation in terms of graced freedom. Whilst Rahner 
perceives the need for an objectively granted salvation (which he seeks 
to secure through his understanding of human freedom as always being 
graced freedom), we shall have cause to quest ion whether his account of 
grace suffers from a formalism which simply states the that of grace 
without exploring the how. In this manner we shall claim that Rahner's 
account of grace ultimately condemns the human person to his/her own 
inadequate resources. 
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l. cf. "in reality freedom is first of all the subject's being 
responsible for himself, so that freedom in its fundamental nature 
has to do with the subject as such and as a whole. " K. Rahner, 
~. pp. 94. 
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with the capacity itself remaining neutral, so that the results of 
these individual acts would then be added together subsequently." 
ibid. 
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6. id., "Guilt - Responsibility - Punishment Within The View Of 
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particular point of existence in space and time, the absolute 
definitive no of the whole of existence towards God takes place 
for reflex consciousness in perfectly determined, concrete acts of 
life." ibid., pp. 211. 
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8. ibid. 
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therefore ineradicable, and which are prior to this decision which 
man takes of his freedom. There is contradiction between that in 
him which is free and that which, from the point of view of God, 
he is intended to be and which, IIDreover, he inalienably is: a 
contradiction which arises from the condition of man following 
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Concupiscentia", T.I. Vol.!, pp. 362. 
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CHAI?I'ER FIVE: THE SI!!LF-<X>MMUNICATION OF OOD AS THE ABSOLUI'E CUJSENESS 
OF FURGIVING l.DVE. 
5.1 God - the radical closeness of the absolute horizon of human life. 
In Chapter Three, we discussed Rahner's understanding of God as 
the mysterious horizon (woraufhin) of human transcendence. Fbr Rahner 
the human person is always orientated towards God as the infinite 
horizon of mystery ( 1) • Rahner refers to the widespread religious 
consciousness resulting from this orientation as natural religion which 
expresses itself in a "Devotion to the W:>rld" (2). fbwever, humanity's 
hunger is not satisfied by this natural religion. In seeking to 
explain the dynamism of the human person, philosophical analysis 
brings us to threshold of a further question: 
Is there the possibility of an immediacy to God in which, 
without him ceasing to be really himself by being made a 
categorical object, he no longer appears merely as the ever 
distant condition of possibility for a sUbject's activity in 
the world, but actually gives himself, and this in such a way 
that this self-communication can be received. (3) 
Has humanity only to do with God as the infinite and mysterious horizon 
of human existence or will God really enter into relationship with men 
and women and communicate Godself to them? Whilst philosophical 
analysis of the transcendental structures of knowledge and freedom 
causes this question to be raised, it cannot of itself establish the 
possibility of such supernatural religion (4). 'Ib answer this question 
revelation is required, and revelation is not something given along 
with the hwnan person's spiritual transcendence. "It has the character 
of an event" ( 5) in which God makes something known that would 
otherwise remain unknown (6). 
Fbr Rahner, the heart of the Christian message is precisely the 
proclamation of God's yes to this question (7). It is the announcement 
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that "God conununicates himself in his own person to the created, as 
absolute proximity and as the absolute holy mystery." (8) God gives1 
himself in absolute and forgiving closeness to the human person (9). 
Hence, Rahner can say: "Man is the event of a free, unmerited and 
forgiving, and absolute self-conununication of God." (10) Indeed, Rahner 
claims that the three central mysteries of Christian faith (that is, 
the Trinity, the Incarnation and Grace) all reduce to this one central 
mystery, that God is not just the distant horizon but conununicates 
Godself to human beings ( 11). However, the message that Christianity 
l proclaims is not an obvious fact. It can only be known through what God 
has revealed of himself in salvation history: 
That God loves us, that he is 'dear God', is not a 
metaPhysical matter of course, but the inconceivable marvel 
that the New Testament must proclaim, belief in which never 
ceases to demand the utmost effort of man's power of faith. 
(12) 
_\ 
_J 
Rahner's understanding of grace as the self-communication of God 
is a (if not the) fundamental concept in his theology. Indeed, 
Shepherd has argued that Rahner 's entire theology is to be understood 
as a theology of grace (13). It is through his theology of grace that -·, 
Rahner claims that salvation is not only the choice of self before the 
distant horizon of God but is the acceptance of God's personal self-
communication. Salvation, for Rahner, is the acceptance of God as the 
innermost constitutive element of our being. Fbr this reason it will 
profit us to examine further his understanding of grace as God's self-
conununication. 
Primarily, Rahner employs the notion of self-communication in 
order to emphasise that God does not conununicate something about God 
but really communicates Godself: "The term self-communication is really 
intended to signify that God in his own most proper reality makes 
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himself the innerroc>st constitutive element of man." (14) Hence he 
refers to it as the "ontological self communication of God" (15). 
Rahner reminds us that in the economy of sal vat ion, God has revealed 
himself as three fold, Father Son and Spirit (16). He argues that if 
this is to be a real self-communication of Godself then there must be 
an identity between the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity: "The 
Trinity of the economy of salvation is the inunanent Trinity and vice 
versa." (17) Hence, Rahner argues that if grace really is the self-
communication of God then it too must bear this three fold, trinitarian 
character. He states: 
The countenance of God which turns towards us in this self-
communication is, in the trinitarian nature of this 
encounter, the very being of God as he is in himself, and 
must be if indeed the divine self-communication in grace and 
in glory really is the communication of God in his own self 
to us, {18) 
Viewed in this manner, grace is seen to be a sharing in the intimate 
life of the Trinity. He states: 
God does not simply grant some kind of salutary love and 
intimacy, such as is necessarlly implied in the abstract 
concept of a relationship between the Creator and his still 
innocent creature, but allows him to participate in the 
divine nature itself to be joint heir with the son, called 
to eternal life face to face with God in the intuitive 
beatific vision of God, that is of God's own life {in *doxa). 
---u-9) 
Scholastic theology distinguished between uncreated grace and created 
grace: uncreated grace being God's gift of Godself whereas created 
grace is the transformation of human nature which either precedes or 
accompanies this gift {20). Rahner maintains that whilst there is no 
agreement in catholic theology on how exactly the relation between 
created and uncreated grace is to be determined, the dominant view 
since Trent has been that "uncreated grace is to be regarded as nnre or 
less merely the consequence of created grace" {21). Rahner finds this 
_position to be inadequate to the trend of the later thought of Aquinas 
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(22). In contrast, Hahner maintains that it is uncreated grace that is 
primary ( 23) • Fbr Rahner, grace does not mean God's gift of some 
created reality, in grace God really gives Godself (24). His 
lengthiest discussion of this is to be found in his essay "Some 
Implications Of The Scholastic Concept Of Uncreated Grace" (25) On the 
premise of the identity of knowing and being, Rahner argues that the 
beatific vision as perfect knowledge of God can only be possible 
through the knower sharing the being of God. Grace is held to be "the 
ontological presupposition" and ''honogeneous conunencement" of the 
beatific vision. Hence, Rahner argues that grace must also be a 
sharing in the life of God i.e. uncreated (26). Rahner repeats this 
argument elseWhere (27). 
Rahner struggles to explain further the how of God's action in the 
bestowal of God's self in grace. Scholastic theology held that created 
grace was given through efficient causality (i.e. the creation of 
something different from the cause). Hence, efficient causality is 
insufficient to account for God's action in uncreated grace where God 
gives God's self: "the cause becomes an intrinsic, constitutive 
principle of the effect itself" (28). Rahner proposes the JOOdel of 
~si-formal causality (29). He states: 
God does not merely give his creature a share in himself 
(indirectly) by creating and donating fmite realities 
through his all-powerful efficient causality: but he gives 
himself, really and in the strictest sense of the word, a 
quasi-formal causality. (30) 
This notion of ~si-formal causality is of great importance in 
Rahner' s theology. With the help of this not ion, Rahner seeks to 
explain how God Who is infinite mystery, who transcends all categorical 
reality, can really be present and active within the categorical realm. 
Should the notion of ~si-formal causality be incoherent, or a mere 
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verbal formula empty of content, then Rahner 's understanding of God • s 
presence within the historical realm would be called into serious 
question. (Which in turn would call the adequacy of his soteriology 
into question.) Rahner believes the hypostatic union to be the 
revealed statement of God's ~si-formal causality (31). Fbr this 
reason, we wi 11 be unable to give final judgement upon the adequacy of 
Rahner's solution until we have treated of his Christology in the next 
chapter. Fbr the present, it is sufficient to observe that Bahner 
shares the concern that God must be thought of as present and active 
within the historical order. He believes that his understanding of 
grace as God's self-communication flounders unless it can be thought of 
as being given "in such a way that this self-communication can be 
received" (32). That is, for grace to be really communicated then, it 
must reach the human person where s/he is ( 33) • As have seen in 
Chapter 'lhree, Rahner argues that the human person is spirit in the 
material order (34). Further, due to the essential historicity of 
matter (35), it means that the person's spiritual transcendence can 
only be lived out in the historical order (36). Hence, if God's self-
connnunicat ion in grace is really to reach the human person where s/he 
is then it must be given in the historical order (37). Thus the terms 
of Rahner 's own transcendental analysis of the human person requires 
that God Who is infinite mystery must be able to present within the 
historical order if self-communication is really to be possible. 
Fbwever, it is by no means certain that Bahner has established how God 
might be thought of as present and active within the historical order. 
Rahner emphasises that even in God's self-communication, the 
mysteriousness of God remains absolute. Rahner maintains that God's 
presence within historical reality must not in any way reduce God to 
the level of one created reality anongst many. On the one hand, Rahner 
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wishes to maintain that God's self-conununication in grace grants to the 
recipient an immediacy to God which "no longer comes through objects 
and categories derived from created things." (38) This is in contrast 
to our mediated philosophical knowledge of God as the \\Oraufhin of 
human transcendence. fbwever, on the other hand, he wishes to maintain 
that such immediacy does not eliminate the "transcendental necessity 
whereby God is essentially the holy mystery." (39) He seeks to hold 
these two statements together through his redefinition of mystery that 
we mentioned in Chapter Three. Rather than seeing mystery as a 
temporary limitation of knowledge due to the finitude of the human 
ratio, Rahner views it as that which is permanent, it is the being of 
God. Hence in self-conununication, God conununicates Godself as mystery: 
"Grace is therefore the grace of the nearness of the abiding mystery: 
it makes God accessible in the form of the holy mystery and presents 
him thus as the incomprehensible." (40) Hence, the contrast is not 
between an imperfect and vague knowledge of God on the one hand, and a 
perfect and transparent knowledge of God in grace on the other ( 41) • 
Rather: "The contrast in between immediate sight of the mystery itself 
and the merely indirect presence of the mystery after the manner of the 
distant and aloof." (42) Grace does not dissolve the mystery, but 
rather brings it into "absolute proximity." (43) One might be forgiven 
for asking whether Rahner gives the presence of God in the historical 
order with one hand only to immediately snatch it back with the other 
in maintaining God's absolute transcendent aloofness. This is a 
question to which we shall shortly address ourselves. First, let us 
explore the soteriological implications of Rahner's understanding of 
grace as the uncreated self-conununication of the trinitarian God which 
draws the recipient into God's own intimate trinitarian life. 
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5.2 Salvation as sharing in the trinitarian life of G<rl: 
As we have seen, God's self-communication in grace transforms the 
human person's standing before God. God is not only known as the 
transcendent horizon of all. human knowledge, but is also known in 
absolute closeness. Human freedom is not only related to God as the 
distant horizon and ultimate ground of aU freedom, human freedom is a 
' freedom directed immediately vis-a-vis God: 
In other words, God in the concrete is not present merely as 
the horizon of our transcendence, one which always withdraws 
itself and refuses to give itself: rather, understood as this 
horizon, he offers himself to be directly possessed in what 
we call divinising grace. Given all this, the freedom in 
transcendence and in the yes and no towards the ground of 
this transcendence is given a directness towards God b¥ 
which it becomes mst radically capable of saying yes and no 
to God as such. (44) 
The distant horizon and ultimate ground of freedom itself becomes the 
object of freedom ( 45) • In this light, mra l acts are seen to be 
directed immediately to God (46), and love of neighbour becomes a 
radical love of God (47). Rahner claims that the transcendent 
orientation of the human person is fulfilled b¥ this self-communication 
of God which brings the transcendent horizon and ground of human 
knowledge and freedom into radical proximity to the human person. "In 
this forgiving closeness God gives himself as the inner fulfilment of 
unlimited transcendentality. The absolutely unlimited question is 
fulfilled and answered b¥ God himself as the absolute answer." (48) The 
human person knows him/herself to be orientated towards God's infinity 
as the transcendent horizon of all knowledge and freedom. Left to 
his/her own devices the human person would know him/herself to be 
incapable of absolute fulfilment by anything less than God on the one 
hand and yet incapable of attaining to God on the other. This dilemma 
is resolved by God's self-conununication: "The goal which man cannot 
reach can become the real point of departure for man's fulfilment and 
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self-realization." (49) In short, God's self-conununication is not only 
the radical closeness of that Which would always otherwise remain 
distant, it is the "highest sununit" of human life (SO). It is: 
The final fulfilment of life because that towards which life 
is opened now becomes also its innernnst ground and nnst 
interior possession, since the word of life becomes the life 
of life itself: vita aeterna, (51) 
It is for this reason that Rahner refers to God's self-communication 
as the human person's salvation: 
God's offer of himself, to Which God communicates himself 
absolutely to the Whole of mankind, is by definition man's 
salvation. Fbr it is the fulfilment of man's transcendence 
in which he transcends towards the absolute God himself. (52) 
As we have seen, God's self-communication makes the recipient a sharer 
in the intimate trinitarian life of God: 
In grace, that is, in the communication of God's Holy Spirit, 
the event of inunediacy to God as man's fulfilment is prepared 
for in such a way that we must say of man here and now that 
he participates in God • s being; that he has been given the 
divine spirit who fathoms the depths of God; that he is 
already God's son here and now, and What he already is must 
only become manifest. (53) 
we have discussed above how Rahner understands God's self-
communication to fulfil the transcendent orientation of the human 
person. It brings human life to fulfilment and as such constitutes 
salvation. Oombining this with Rahner's understanding of God's self-
communication as being the initiation into the trinitarian life we may 
now state that for Rahner salvation does not consist simply in the 
choice of self before God, as we earlier supposed. For Rahner, 
salvation consists in the acceptance of God's self-oammunication as the 
innernnst canst i tut i ve element of human life, drawing the human person 
into the intimate life of the Trinity: 
Salvation is not to be found in the finality of the free 
decision of man, if this is taken to mean that man simply 
creates this salvation himself by his free decision. 
Salvation is God communicating himself. (54) 
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Further, Rahner does not isolate salvation in an other-worldly, future 
realm (55). Whilst allowing for a future consummation, Rahner 
maintains that salvation is already really present. He argues for an 
intrinsic and sUbstantial connection between grace as the presence of 
salvation and the eschatological consummation of that in the life of 
glory: 
Since this grace is basically God communicating himself to 
man, it is not merely something provisional, nor is it merely 
a means to salvation nor a sUbstitute for salvation. Grace 
is really this salvation itself, for it is God himself in his 
forgiving and divinizing love. (56) 
The future Life of glory will be the radical manifestation of the 
divine sonship already present in grace. (57) 
Whilst Rahner considers salvation to consist ultimately in God's 
self-communication rather than in the person's creation of self in 
freedom, he does not intend to renege on the high place that he has 
given to human freedom. The human person has the choice of whether to 
accept God's self-communication in "faith, hope and love" (58) or 
whether to reject it. Nor can this act of free acceptance be an 
"esoterically confined happening in the life of man" {59) for freedom 
is always exercised through the totality of a person's life (60) and 
not in a special realm: 
Hence the freedom of acceptance or refusal of sal vat ion 
occurs in all the dimensions of human existence... and not 
merely in the confined sector of the sacred or worship and 
'religion' in the narrow sense:... man works out his 
salvation or damnation in everything he does and in 
everything which impels him. Everything in the history of 
the world is pregnant with eternity and eternal life or with 
eternal ruin. (61) 
Rahner wants to say that our salvation does not consist simply in 
eternally living as the persons we have chosen to be but rather 
consists in sharing God's gift of Godself. fbwever, he also wants to 
say that our acceptance of God's offer cannot be thought of as being 
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extrinsic and superficial to the persons we have created ourselves to 
be. He claims that our acceptance of God's offer of God's self 
consists in Whether through our free creation of ourselves, we have 
made of our lives a fundamental yes or no to God's self-communication. 
Hence we can see that Rahner's understanding of salvation as ultimately 
consisting in God's self-communication complements and fulfils the high 
place he wishes to give to human freedom rather than dissolving it. 
Rahner is concerned to maintain a concept of salvation that he believes 
to be a consummation of the totality of a person's being Which must be 
accepted by the totality of a person's being. 
Rahner's emphasis on the person's freedom to accept or reject 
God's self-communication creates a problem. If the human person has 
the last word on Whether or not s/he accepts salvation then s/he would 
determine his/her own salvation and Rahner could be accused of 
Pelagianism. More specifically, if the act of acceptance is entirely 
due to the person's natural resources then that Which is accepted is 
reduced to the level of created reality. Hence, to preserve the 
uncreated reality of God's self-communication, the act of acceptance 
must itself be borne by God Who is communicating God's self. In IOC>re 
traditional language, there is the need for prevenient grace. Rahner 
is aware of this problem: 
The acceptance of grace needs to be sustained by God just as 
the gift of grace is, lest finite man... reduce the divine 
self-communication to the level of an event Which remains 
merely something Which is of the finite order, thus 
eliminating God's self-communication as such. (62) 
Rahner seeks to give answer to this by claiming that there is a 
parallel between human knowledge and freedom, on the one hand, and 
grace on the other. He recalls the fact that human knowledge and 
ndf . '-. freedom are not only knowledge a reedom v1s-a-v1s God, but are 
actually possible due to a prior apprehension of God. He extends this 
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relationship to grace (63) and claims that the free acceptance of grace 
is made possible by grace. It is an event of grace itself: "The self-
communication as such effects its own acceptance, so that the actual 
and proximate ability to accept it is the sheerest grace." (64) 
we are now in a position to make a preliminary answer to the 
question that we raised in Chapter Three as to whether Rahner • s system 
is ultimately Pelagian due to the high place that he gives to human 
freedom. We asked whether Rahner was advocating a purely subjective 
soteriology of self-achievement by using the concept salvation to refer 
to the final state that each person created for themselves through 
their own unaided free action. At that stage we acknowledged the 
possibility that Rahner wishes to advocate a soteriology that is at 
once truly objective in that it is effected by the sustaining grace of 
God and truly subjective in that it flows from the heart of the human 
subject. We are now in a better position to see that Rahner does 
indeed seek to guard against the sort of subjective soteriology of 
self-achievement that we have reacted against. Despite his concern to 
expunge all notions of salvation as an extrinsic moral reward and to 
maintain the importance of the person's free choice of self, Rahner 
nmifies his notion of salvation in the two important ways that we have 
mentioned: Firstly, salvation is ultimately God's self-communication 
which we accept through our freely chosen self rather than salvation 
merely being the eternalisation of our freely chosen self: Secondly, 
freedom itself is already borne by grace, thus he seeks to close the 
door to the charge of Pelagianism. 
However, this does not, as yet, answer our other question about 
Rahner • s understanding of human freedom. Rahner maintains a dynamic 
quality to human freedom, the person becomes that which s/he does. 
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Hence evil acts do not remain at a superficial level but determine the 
very being of the human person and have an effect into the future. 
Given this dynamism of human freedom, a person finds their freedom to 
be determined and constrained by their own freely chosen evil 
orientations and by the prior evil determinations of other people that 
necessarily affect the situation in which the person finds him/herself. 
Therefore, human freedom itself stands in need of healing and 
liberation. If this be so, as we believe it is, then the need for 
grace is not merely a concern to verbally acknowledge God's primacy and 
so to avoid noetic Pelagianism. Rather it reflects the concern to 
offer a real healing to the human person and so to avoid an 
existential Pelagianism which would face the human person with the 
dilenuna of being condemned to their own inadequate resources. ~ will 
return to this question later in the present chapter and will argue 
that Rahner's understanding of the supernatural existential threatens 
to make of grace a vacuous concept. 
5.3 The universality of God's offer of salvation: 
Rahner maintains the universality of God's salvific wilL (65) 
which he claims is disclosed by God's self-communication in revelation 
(66). "The event of free grace and of God's self-communication is 
already given to all times." (67) Indeed, for Rahner, the entire 
created order "has always been embedded in a supernatura 1 context" 
(68): "The \«>rld as a whole is ordered to the personal, Trinitarian 
God beyond the \«>rld." (69) It is within this context that he claims 
that divinizing grace is offered to all people at all times. He 
dismisses the contrary opinion as being due to "an unavowed supposition 
that grace \«>Uld be no longer grace if it were too generously 
distributed by the love of God." (70) Just as grace is communicated 
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universally, so also Rahner claims that it is responded to universally, 
to some degree: 
Anyone who does not close himself to God in an ultimate act 
of his life and his freedom through free and personal sin for 
which he is really and subjectively guilty and for which he 
cannot shirk responsibility, this person finds his 
salvation. (71) 
\merever a person follows his/her conscience, or fulfils the absolute 
demand of love even when it is not rewarding to do so, or endures 
darkness and suffering in hope, there God is responded to and salvation 
achieved (72). It is this understanding that leads Rahner to develop 
his concept of anonynous Christianity which we shall mention in our 
next chapter. 
Rahner describes the human person's universal orientation to the 
salvific will of God in terms of the human person being open to the 
"Absolute Future" of God, when God will be all in all. The person 
responds to his/her call to salvation by maintaining an openness to God 
as the absolute future rather than settling for any finite reality as 
his/her future: 
The doctrine about this grace and its fulfillment, therefore, 
bids us keep ourselves radically open in faith, hope and love 
for the ineffable, unimaginable and nameless absolute future 
of God which is coming, and bids us never close ourselves 
before there is nothing nnre to close, because nothing will 
be left outside of God, since we shall be wholly in God and 
he shall be wholly in us. (73) 
Through his concept of God as the absolute future, Rahner maintains 
that God's salvific will does not merely extend to the totality of 
humanity viewed as individuals but rather extends to the entirety of 
human history (74). He stresses that because the absolute future of 
humanity is God, it can never be identified with, or substituted by, a 
merely finite future state of affairs: 
It follows from the very nature of the totality of the 
absolute future that this totality cannot really become the 
object of a proper classification or of a technical 
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nanipulation, but renains the unspeakable mystery which 
precedes and surpasses all individual cognition and each 
individual action on the world. (75) 
Hence, the Christian who recognises God to be the absolute future of 
hunani ty must rena in always open to the future, always prepared to 
transcend and to radically criticise the present order in hope, without 
ever resting content in a hope for a coming Utopia (76). Nor is this 
to be taken as justification for Christians passively awaiting God's 
absolute future, they have a duty to engage in transforming the world 
and to prepare the way for God's absolute future: "The Kingdom of God 
only comes to those who build the coming earthly Kingdom" ( 77) • Again: 
"As the religion of the absolute future, Christianity is and must be 
the religion which sends nan into the w:>rld to act." (78) 
W9 have already noted that Rahner claims that the human person's 
acceptance of grace is itself a nnment within grace. So now Rahner 
stresses that the movement of human history towards the absolute future 
of God is itself an inner moment within the absolute future of God: 
It is already moving within it, for, this becoming is so 
truly distinguished from its yet-to-come future and 
fulfillment... that the infinite reality of this future is 
nevertheless already active within it and supports it as an 
inner constitutive element of this, even though it is 
independent of this becoming itself. (79) 
In this manner, Rahner seeks to exclude the notion of a primitive deism 
and to preserve what he perceives to be the truth in pantheism (80). 
'!hat truth is that God does not stand over against the world in utterly 
transcendent detachment, but rather: 
He has inserted himself into the world as its innermst 
entelecheia and he impels the whole of this w:>rld and its 
history towards that point at which God himself will be the 
innermost and immediately present fulfilment of our existence 
in the face-to-face presence of eternal beatitude. (81) 
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5.4 Rahner's disagreement with the scholastic teaching on nature and 
grace: 
In maintaining his thesis that God's salvific grace is granted to 
all people at all times, rather than being confined to special sacral 
realms, Rahner has nnved well beyond the bounds of the scholastic 
teaching on the relationship between nature and grace (82). As we have 
seen, the dominant view since Trent has been that uncreated grace could 
only be given on condition of the human person's prior sUbstantial 
elevation by created grace. '!hat is, scholastics sought to maintain 
the supernatural character of grace by positing a fundamentally 
irreconcilable gulf between uncreated grace and nature as it is 
experienced in the concrete. This gulf, it was maintained could only 
be bridged through the absolute elevation of nature by created grace. 
Indeed, the orientation of nature to grace was "conceived in as 
negative a way as possible" (83). Nature's obediential potency for 
grace was thought of merely as a non-repugnance for nature's elevation 
by created grace (84). Nature was thought of as being fulfilled 
without grace: 
Of itself, nature would find its perfection just as readily 
and harooniously in its own proper realm, in a purely natural 
end, without an immediate intuition of God in the beatific 
vision. (85) 
Further, the nature for which grace was thought dispensable was 
identified with all that the human person knew of him/herself from 
everyday experience (86). As a consequence, the world of everyday 
experience came to be seen as entirely lacking in grace. Nature as it 
was experienced in the concrete was thought of as almst identical to 
pure nature (87), (i.e. human nature before the potential for sharing 
in God • s life was granted to human beings) • The supernatural came to 
be seen as an extrinsic superstructure imposed from without on a 
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largely indifferent nature (88): "Supernatural grace then can only be 
the superstructure lying beyond the range of experience imposed upon a 
human nature which even in the present economy turns in its own 
orbito" (89} In terms of practical living there is fX>Sed a near to 
absolute divide between the sacred and the profane, holiness and 
humanity, God and the world: 
In a word, the relationship between nature and grace is 
conceived in such a way that they appear as two layers so 
carefully placed that they penetrate each other as little as 
fX>SSible. (90} 
This tension puts the believer in a peculiar fX)Sition. On the one hand 
faith teaches that grace "is acknowledged to be the IIOst sublime and 
divine element, his only solitary fX>SSession" (91}. Yet on the other 
hand it is a superstructure lying beyond the conscious realm (92}: 
"The space where he comes to himself, experiences himself and lives, 
is, as regards the data of consciousness, not filled by this grace." 
(93} This puts the human person in a situation of unbearable 
contradiction. Wlat is of ultimate importance is said to be beyond 
experience and what is experienced is of little value. There is a 
fundamentally irreconcilable tension between religion and life. Either 
one must live constantly distancing oneself from the world and seeking 
to escape into the sacred sphere, or one must settle for living human 
life and condemning religion as irrelevant. In contrast to the claim 
that the sacred makes to be of absolute importance, humanity finds at 
an experiential level that the immediate concerns of human life are 
those which demand attention. Whilst we may have a choice about 
whether or not to take the supernatural superstructure seriously, we 
have no such choice about whether or not to take human life seriously 
(94}. Under such a divide between nature and grace, the vast majority 
of people will confine their concern to the natural level. Even if 
they manage to preserve special religious moments, excursions into the 
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supernatural, their lives will be essentially lived in a proclanation 
of the irrelevance of grace: 
It is not surprising - though not of course justifiable -
that man should take very little interest in this mysterious 
superstructure of his being. After all, he does not find 
grace Where he finds himself, in the immediate activation of 
his spiritual being. (95) 
It is for reasons such as these that Rahner considers it to be a 
"genuine concern of theology to put an end to such extrinsicism" (96). 
W:! share this view Wholeheartedly. As we have said in Chapter 'I\«:>, any 
notion of religion Which does not acknowledge God as present to 
humanity Where humanity finds itself to be must be considered 
irrelevant as we cannot be present anyWhere else. Rahner's attempted 
redefinition of the relationship between nature and grace is highly 
creative and has been extremely influential in catholic theology. 
It is to this that we now turn our attention. 
5.5 Rahner's approach to the relationship between nature and grace: 
In keeping with the transcendental starting point that he had 
borrowed from M:irechal, and in distinction to the scholastic teaching, 
Rahner develops his understanding of the nature-grace relationship in 
terms of the human person • s fundamental orientation to God ( 97) • He 
conducts this analysis in his two essays, "Concerning The Relationship 
Between Nature And Grace" (98), and "Nature And Grace" (99). He seeks 
to establish a unified view ( 100) Which does not separate them into the 
disparate elements of nature and supernature but rather takes a 
Christocentric (101) view of the Whole created order. 
In essence, Rahner' s approach is to say that the human person's 
orientation to God as the infinite horizon, which is an existential of 
human life, is always also an orientation to the immediacy of God's 
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self-communication: "The capacity for the God of self-bestowing 
personal love is the central and abiding existential of man as he 
really is." ( 102) In order to preserve the gratuity of God's self-
communication, Rahner maintains that the existential which orientates 
the person to the immediacy of God is itself supernatural. He refers 
to it as the "supernatural existential" (103). Although it is 
supernatural, it is always given to the human person as s/he 
experiences him/herself in the concrete. It is of a person's nature to 
be open to grace: "Man is only really known in his indefinable essence 
When he is understood as potentia oboedientialis for the divine life 
and when this is his nature." (104) Hence, nature as it is 
experienced in the concrete is always graced nature: 
In the concrete order which we encounter in our 
transcendental experience and as interpreted py Christian 
revelation, the spiritual creature is constituted to begin 
with as the possible addressee of such a divine self-
communication. (105) 
For Rahner the human person only knows him/herself as graced and 
cannot treat him/herself as though s/he were pure nature: 
Man can experiment with himself only in the region of God's 
supernatural loving will, he can never find the nature he 
wants in a chemically pure state separated from its 
supernatural existential. {106) 
Again: 
OUr actual nature is never pure nature. It is nature 
installed in a supernatural order Which man can never leave, 
even as sinner and unbeliever. It is a nature Which is 
continually being determined (Which does not mean justified) 
py the supernatural grace of salvation offered to it. (107) 
Nature becomes a remainder concept, which is not experienced in the 
concrete, and Which we can only arrive at through subtracting the 
supernatural existential from the concrete quiddity (108). Indeed, we 
can only arrive at the concept of nature after revelation has shown us 
What in the concrete order is due to grace (109). 
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In contrast to the scholastic teaching which viewed the person's 
openness, (or potentia oboedientialis), for grace as a mere non-
repugnance, Rahner holds that it is an active striving for God (110). 
Grace and nature quite simply cannot be viewed as two separate, 
unconnected realms, indeed it is only grace that can be the absolute 
fulfilment of nature: 
Grace simply means giving radical form to man's being. It is 
not a new, additional storey planted on top of what is really 
a self-contained sub-structure known as the nature of man. 
( 111) 
Nature is so constituted that it can only reach its absolute 
fulfilment (112) in grace because God has always willed to communicate 
Godself to the human person: "'Ihe spiritual essence of man is 
established by God in creation from the outset because God wants to 
communicate himself." {113) Indeed, God has only embarked upon the 
creative endeavour bec~use God intended to communicate Godself to 
creation: "God has created the servant only in order to make him his 
child." (114) Nature can be seen to be an "inner noment" in the 
communication of grace { 115) • In describing nature as an inner noment 
within grace, Rahner does not intend to refer only to the intended 
fulfilment of nature in grace, but also to the very act of creation 
which he considers to be a deficient node of God's · self-communicating 
activity ( 116). 
In Chapter 'Ihree we posed the quest ion as to whether Rahner held a 
purely subjective account of human freedom, such that his soter iology 
reduced to an ethic of self-achievement, or whether he maintained an 
objective subjectivity such as we might find in Kierkegaard and 
Heidegger. We should now be able to see that through his concept of 
the supernatural existential, Rahner sides decisively with the latter 
of these two opt ions. Fbr Rahner, freedom is always graced freedom, it 
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is always given, sustained and made possible through grace. Freedom 
and grace do not stand as contradictory. Rather than compromising 
freedom, grace establishes freedom ( 117) • Whereas Heidegger had 
located the given objectivity of the person •s free self-disposition in 
the human conscience, Rahner locates it in the supernatural 
existential. Hbwever, we have yet to ask Whether the objectively given 
grace actually makes any difference to human Life or is it simply 
stated as being always present? That is we must examine Whether 
Rahner•s concept of the supernatural existential is merely an a priori, 
formal statement WhiCh neglects to account for the dynamic, 
transforming liberation that is required of grace. If this is found to 
be so then the practical effects of Rahner•s teaching on grace, despite 
his intentions, wi 11 be to condemn the human person to reliance upon 
their own inadequate resources. We will return to this question in 
some detail towards the end of the present chapter. 
5.6 The historical thematic mediation of the supernatural existential: 
Against the extrinsicist interpreters of Aquinas, Rahner maintains 
that grace cannot be thought of as merely an objective state beyond the 
realm of human consciousness (118). Rahner claims that grace cannot be 
thought of as granting a new proper object to the human subject. 
However, he further claims that it must be thought of as elevating the 
subject to a new forma.l object of consciousness ( 119). That is, 
Whereas the natural spiritual dynamism of the human subject is 
orientated towards God as the distant horizon, the supernatural 
spiritual dynamism is orientated towards the God of absolute immediacy 
(120). This orientation towards the immediacy of God•s self-
cononunication may rema.in at the preconceptual, unthematic level but it 
is still an element within the consciousness of the human person (121). 
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Fbr ~1is reason, Rahner maintains that the conscious orientation to the 
immediacy of God has the character of an unobjectified revelation given 
to a 11 men and women: 
The supernaturally elevated, unreflexive but really present, 
and transcendental experience of man's rrovement and 
orientation towards immediacy and closeness of God ••• must be 
characterized as real revelation throughout the whole_history 
of religion and of the human spirit. (122) 
Rahner argues that just as the human person's transcendentality in 
knowledge and freedom is mediated to itself by the material of 
a posteriori experience, so also the person's supernaturally 
elevated transcendentality is mediated through the historical realm 
(123). Hence, he claims that corresponding to the pre-conceptual, 
transcendental revelation there must be a conceptualised, thematic 
history of revelation: 
If, then, history exists in this way as the necessary and 
objectifying self-interpretation of transcendental 
experience, then there is a revelatory history of 
transcendental revelation as the necessary and historical 
self-interpretation of that original, transcendental 
experience Which is constituted by God's self-oommunication. 
(124) 
This general, conceptual history of revelation corresponds to the 
objectification of humanity's supernatural orientation in explicit 
expressions of religion (125). Such explicit expressions of religion 
represent the protest of the human spirit against any attempts to 
enclose humanity within the merely natural realm ( 126). Fbwever, it is 
only when the preconceptual general revelation is mediated in an 
objective and reflexive manner that it can become the "principle of 
concrete action" in human life that it is intended to be (127). The 
drive towards historical objectification of humanity's supernatural 
existential is not due only to a dynamism on behalf of humanity but is 
due also to the self-conununication of God which "has a dynamism towards 
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its own objectification." (128) All religion represents both 
humanity's attempt "to mediate the original, unreflexive and non-
objective revelation historically, to make it reflexive and to 
interpret it in propositions" (129) and also God's objective self-
interpretation and self-expression of God's self-conununication. All 
religions include ooments when the two have coincided, nnments when 
humanity's attempt at thematisation has been carried by God's self-
interpretation. Rahner states that at such times: "The supernatural 
transcendental relationship of man to God through God's self-
COimllunication becomes self-reflexive." (130) 
Ibwever, humanity's sin and guilt which "has its darkening and 
depraving effect on all of man's collective and social dimensions" 
(131) also has its effect on the history of humanity's objectifying 
self-interpretation of general revelation. Hence it is only partially 
successful, the history of general revelation is a history of truth 
mixed with error. It is a history "which is still seeking itself." 
(132) 
In order to distinguish between truth and falsity in the general 
history of revelation there is the need for a "categorical particular 
and official history of salvation," (133) which will interpret the 
history of general revelation (134). The special revelation history is 
established through people who are singled out as prophets, in such 
cases God himself directs the objectification of the divine self-
COimllunication in such a way that its purity is maintained. This is 
witnessed to by attendant signs (135). Wlen this happens we have what 
we normally refer to as revelation in the absolute sense (136). Hence 
special revelation cannot be thought of as the primary form of 
revelation (137). Nbr can it be thought of coextensive with the 
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general history of revelation ( 138): "It has a special history within 
uni versa! history and with the uni versa 1 history of religion." ( 139) 
However, in that the special history of revelation represents the self-
illumination of the general history of revelation it can be thought of 
as recapitulating it (140). 
The universal, general history of salvation can only take place 
through particular and unique historical incidents. Hence, the 
dynamism towards greater purity and the achievement of a legitimate 
self-interpretation of God's self-comm~~ication in salvation history is 
seen to be a dynamism towards a historical climax (141). Fbr Rahner, 
this insurpassable historical climax of salvation hi_story is to be 
found in Olrist: 
The history of revelation has its absolute climax when God's 
self-conununication reaches its insurpassable high point 
through the hypostatic union and in the incarnation of God in 
the created, spiritual reality of Jesus for his own sake, 
and hence for the sake of alL of us. ( 142) 
~ shall turn our attention to Rahner's ~mdF"rstanding of Otrist as 
the climax of salvation history in the next chapter. Fbr the time 
being, it is enough to indicate that up to this point Rahner has 
focused his attention on salvation history as the official history of 
revelation in which God's transcendental self-conununication becomes 
self-reflexive without so far showing any concern to speak of the 
liberating activity of God in human history. If this is indicative of 
Rahner 's theology as a whole then it betrays a tendency to value 
epistenology and revelation over critical praxis (143). However, we 
may be doing Rahner a disservice. It is possible that Rahner 
understands the event of revelation to be not merely the statement of 
God's transcendental self-oommunication but the self-revealing 
ontological presence and activity of God in the historical realm. 
193 
When, in the next chapter, we discuss his understanding of Christ as 
the climax of salvation history, we shall have cause to question 
whether it is sufficient to interpret Christ's salvific significance 
merely in terms of his being the insurpassable objectification of 
general revelation. 
Before we proceed along these 1 ines of enquiry there are two other 
pressing questions which demand our attention. Firstly, how does 
Hahner seek to bridge the gap between his understanding of God as the 
transcendent ground of all reality, who cannot be thought of as an 
existent within the historical realm, and his understanding of 
uncreated grace as God's real self-communication to the human person? 
If Rahner cannot adequately overcome this apparent dichotomy then he 
fails to establish the possibility of God being truly active in the 
historical order which was one of the three criteria of adequacy that 
we have formulated in Chapter '!'\«). Secondly, how can Rahner claim that 
the human person is always graced, (that indeed human nature only finds 
its absolute fulfilment in grace), without thereby compromising the 
gratuity of grace and so leaving himself open to the charge of 
Pelagianism? This will lead us to further question whether Rahner 's 
attempted solution is a vacuous verbal definition by which he guards 
himself against the charge of noetic Pelagianism without adequately 
perceiving the threat of existential Pelagianism. 
5.7 How can the transcendent God be present in the historical order? 
We are concerned in this section with what Rahner terms "The 
tension between a transcendental starting point and historical 
religion." (144) On the one hand, Hahner insists that God is the 
transcendent ground of all reality ( 145) who cannot "be incorporated 
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along with what is grounded into a system which encompasses them both." 
(146) For Rahner, God, by definition, cannot be thought of as an 
individual existent in the world (147). Indeed, if God were to enter 
into the world, as one existent reality anongst many, then God would 
cease to be God ( 148). However, on the other hand, the human person 
can only know objects of spatia-temporal experience. Hence, if God is 
really to conununicate Godself in inunediacy to man, as Rahner maintains 
to be so, it would seem to suggest that God must be present within the 
historical order. The notion of an historical religion seems to 
require that: "God as it were appears within the world of our 
categorical experience at quite definite points as distinguished from 
other points." (149) These basic requirements of historical religion, 
(that God is active in the created order and reveals Godself in the 
historical order) stand in tension with Rahner 's starting point: "Our 
basic starting point seems to say that God is everyWhere in so far as 
he grounds everything, and he is nowhere in so far as everything that 
is grounded is created." (150) 
There are genuine difficulties here. Firstly as to whether the 
God who transcends all historica 1 reality can be present and active 
within the historical order: "The difficulty consists in the fact 
that by definition God does not seem to be able to be where by 
definition we are." (151) Secondly as to whether the notion of a 
transcendental self-conununication to all people at all times does not 
exhaust the possibility of a genuinely historical revelation: 
Wlat then can still take place in a history of salvation and 
redemption if always and everywhere and from the very 
beginning God with his absolute reality has already 
connnunicated himself as the innerrost centre of everything 
which can be history at all? (152) 
If revelation is transcendentally given, does that not reduce 
historical religion to the level of a mythological representation of 
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that which was already always known in its fullness? (153) These tv.o 
questions (as to God's activity in the historical order and as to the 
coherency of maintaining both a historical and a transcendental 
revelation) together focus on the coherency of Rahner's position that 
God who is transcendent, and who cormnunicates Godself transcendentally, 
is also present and active and cormnunicating Godself in the historical 
order. 
'Ib the question of God's presence in the historical order, Rahner 
gives a two stage answer: Firstly, he argues that God's presence can 
be thought of in terms of mediated inunediacy; Secondly, he argues that 
God can become God's other (154) and change in God's other. This 
latter argument ties in with Rahner's understanding of quasi-formal 
causality, and, as we mentioned earlier, Rahner locates his argument 
for God's quasi -formal causality in the special revealed case of the 
hypostatic union (155). Hence we must defer giving a full answer to 
Rahner's attempted solution to the question of God's activity in the 
historical order until we treat of Christology in the next chapter. Tb 
the question as to the possibility of maintaining both a transcendental 
and a historical revelation, Rahner attempts a reply in terms of the 
essentially historical nature of transcendentality. Firstly, let us 
focus our attention upon Rahner's understanding of God's presence 
within the historical order as being one of mediated immediacy. 
Rahner 's premise is that if God cannot be present in the 
historical realm in the manner of an individual existent, then God's 
presence must be mediated in some fashion (156). Hence, for Rahner the 
question as to whether God can be immediately present within the 
historical realm is identical to the question as to whether there can 
be such a thing as mediated inunediacy (157)? ve believe that the 
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concept of 'mediated inunediacy' is helpful when seeking to articulate 
the manner of God's presence in the historical order. We believe that 
the insights of process thought make it possible to articulate a 
coherent panentheism which overcomes the apparent dichotomy between the 
transcendence and immanence of God by thinking of the entire historical 
and created order as existing within God. Such an approach makes it 
possible to think of created, historical reality as being suffused by, 
and diaphanous to, God's presence in such a way that God is present in 
and through all things without being confined to, or exhausted by, any 
finite, created reality. In this way it is possible to speak of a 
'mediated immediacy' in relation to God's presence in the historical 
order. However, we find the way in which Rahner makes use of this 
concept to be inadequate. our basic concern is whether Rahner 
adequately explains how the nodel of 'mediated immediacy' coheres with 
his fundamental starting point of God as the distant, transcendent 
horizon of human knowing and willing. 
In seeking to argue a case for the concept of mediated immediacy 
Rahner recalls that the presence to God as the distant, transcendent 
horizon of all knowledge and freedom is always mediated by finite 
reality. He then proceeds to claim that this presence to God as the 
horizon of all finite reality is an immediacy to God: 
Fbr at least the presence of God as the transcendental 
ground and horizon of everything which exists and everything 
which knows (and this is a presence of God, an immediacy to 
him) takes place precisely in and through the presence of the 
finite existence. (158) 
From this premise Rahner then proceeds to claim that notions of 
mediation and immediacy are not incompatible when applied to God in 
general: "Mediation and irnmediacy are not simply contradictory. There 
is a genuine mediation of inunediacy with regard to God." (159) 
However, there are problems here. Earlier in the present chapter we 
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noted how Rahner contrasts the presence of God as the mysterious 
horizon of human knowledge and freedom with the presence of God in the 
absolute self-communication of grace. ~ may compare: 
And: 
In this kind of a natural, transcendental relationship to God 
the question is still unanswered whether God wants to be for 
us a silent and impenetrable mystery keeping us at a distance 
in our finiteness, or wants to be the radical closeness of 
self-communication. (160} 
According to Christian teaching, this one life finds its 
summit in the self-communication of God, God is not only the 
ground and innermost dynamism of this one history of nature 
and the spirit. He is also its goal, not merely as the 
asymptotic final point towards which this whole movement is 
orientated but also in the sense that he gives himself in his 
most personal, absolute reality and infinite fullness of 
life, to the life of man as .its innermost power (called 
grace} and as its innermost goal which communicates itself in 
its own proper reality. (161} 
Rahner contrasts the presence of God as the distant horizon of 
knowledge and freedom with the presence of God in the absolute self-
communication of grace in such a way that it only seems appropriate, in 
the terms of his own system, to refer to the latter as an immediate 
presence. Otherwise it would mean either that Rahner is equating the 
presence of God as distant horizon with the presence of God as self-
communi cat ion, which would make nonsense of his earlier comparison, or 
he is using the concept 'mediated immediacy' to mean two very different 
things in each case. If the latter, then whatever Rahner means by 
'mediated immediacy' as regards God as the distant horizon of human 
finitude cannot be taken to establish the possibility of the 'mediated 
immediacy' of the self-communication of God in grace as they are not 
logically equivalent uses of the concept. It would seem that, when 
judged by the terms of his own system, Rahner is trying to square the 
circle by seeking to argue from the possibility of God's transcendental 
presence to history as the transcendent horizon of human finitude to 
the possibility of the immanent presence of God within the created 
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order. Rahner's concept of God as the infinite horizon of human 
finitude does not require the involvement of God in the historical 
order, with classical theism it allows God to stand outside of the 
historical order. Hence, Rahner cannot state the presence of God as 
distant horizon as evidence for the possibility of God being present 
to, within and through created reality. 
'Ihe problem is that in the terms in which Rahner has set the 
question in his own system, transcendence is in tension with immanence. 
As we saw in Chapter Three, Ralmer builds his entire philosophical and 
theological system on a transcendental analysis of the ultimate 
conditions of human knowing and willing which discloses God as the 
distant horizon of human finitude. It is only after establishing this 
premise that Rahner turns to ask whether the transcendent horizon of 
Ibly Mystery is not only present as the absolutely distant one but also 
as the absolutely near one in loving self-conununication. '!hat is, the 
quest ion of inunanence in Rahner 's schema is consequent upon the prior 
establishment of transcendence. Rather than representing a creative 
reformulation of transcendence and immanence, Rahner's starting point 
seems to be laden with the dualistic assumptions of the classic 
tradition (162). Tracy states: 
Fbr the noment, it may be sufficient to state that this 
transcendental tradition - thus far at least - is unwilling 
to break with the classical theistic concepts of Aquinas. 
Hence, whatever its other merits as an authentic method of 
metaphysical inquiry, the transcendental methods of Rahner 
and I.Dnergan will not prove helpful to any theologian sharing 
the present revisionist conviction that classical Christian 
theism is neither internally coherent nor adequate as a full 
account of our C01111tDn experience and of the scriptural 
understanding of the Christian God. ( 163) 
Given the centrality in Rahner's system of God as the distant 
horizon of knowing and willing, it is inadequate for him to simply seek 
to graft a reworked understanding of transcendence and immanence into 
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his system at a late stage. Our dispute is not with this reworked 
approach per se but rather with Rahner's late and unargued adoption of 
it. Before he can legitimately and coherently adopt a reworked model 
such as this it is necessary for him to show how the inunanence of God 
coheres with the transcendence of God as he initially treats of it. As 
it is, Rahner does not overcome the dualism between transcendence 
and immanence. In fact, he threatens to collapse inunanence into 
transcendence in such a way that the immediate presence of God in grace 
is reduced to the level of the presence of God as the distant horizon 
of human finitude. We may compare: 
There can be a presence of God as the condition and the 
object of what we are accustomed to call religion in the 
usual sense only in so far as the representation of this 
presence of God... can essentially be nothing other than 
something categorial which points to the transcendental 
presence of God. (164) 
Thus far, we can claim that Rahner has failed to establish the presence 
of God in the historical realm, in a way that coheres with his own 
foundations, with all the disastrous implications which that holds for 
the notion of a redeeming activity of God in the historical order. 
However, we shall have to postpone final judgement unt i 1 we have 
discussed Rahner's Christology. 
Let us now turn our attention to the question as to how Rahner 
conceives of the relationship between transcendental and historical 
revelation. Rahner has argued that "man is spirit in world", that the 
human person's transcendental orientation is only given to him/her and 
lived out through the activity of forming finite judgements and free 
acts of self-realization. That is, he claims that the human person's 
transcendentality is essentially mediated historically (165). Hence, 
rather than posing history and transcendence as contradictory realms, 
Rahner claims that they are mutually related. Transcendence is only 
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possible in history and history is always the history of transcendence 
for without humanity's transcendental orientation there would be no 
history: "We are beginning with the proposition, therefore, that 
transcendence itself has a history, and that history itself is always 
the event of this transcendence." (166) Hence it is, he argues, that 
God's transcendental se l f-conununicat ion is not to be thought of as 
standing in contradiction to the notion of a genuinely historical 
religion. God's transcendental self-conununication is inevitably 
mediated historically. 
However, this cannot as yet be thought of as a sufficient solution 1 
to the problem. Rahner has merely stated that transcendence has a 
history without explaining how this is so in a manner which does not 
reduce the historical manifestation of God's transcendental revelation 
to the level of mythology. His justification for claiming that 1 
J 
transcendentali ty and history cannot be thought of as incompatible is 
that they are already found to be in a relationship in the exercise of 
human knowledge and freedom. '!hat Rahner uses this as grounds for 
claiming a general compatibility between transcendental revelation and 
historical revelation should alert our suspicions. In human knowledge 
and freedom, humanity's orientation to the transcendental horizon is 
prior to any reflection upon it or any freely chosen determination over 
against it. Any reflect ion or freely chosen determination represents I 
the process of bringing to explicit awareness that which was always 
already known at an implicit level, that is the person's orientation to 
the transcendent horizon of God. Is such an analogy adequate to 
support a genuinely historical religion of revelation? It would tend 
to suggest that the historical aspect of revelation is merely the 
manifestation of that which has always already been given. Indeed 
J 
Rahner states: 
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Consequently, every real intervention of God in his world, 
although it is free and cannot be deduced, is always only the 
becoming historical and becoming concrete of that 
intervention in which God as the transcendent ground of the 
world has from the outset embedded himself in the world as 
its self-communicating ground. (167) 
This could be taken to suggest that the historical aspect of revelation 
is reduced to the level of a cypher rather than being a genuine self-
revealing presence of God in the historical order. If this is so then 
the historical order of revelation would be seen to result not so much 
from God's free activity of self-disclosure, so much as from the 
varying degrees to which God's universal wiLl to disclose Godse 1 f is 
passively mediated by the varying potential of particular situations to 
do so. Historical revelation, ultimately becomes not so much an \ 
activity of God as rather a sUbjective apprehension of humanity. 
That the suggestion above represents a correct understanding of 
the status of the historical aspect of revelation in Rahner's thought 
may be suggested by Rahner 's understanding of God's causal activity. He 
maintains that God as the transcendent ground of the created order can 
be thought of as sustaining all things but cannot be thought of as 
acting causally in history: "God causes the world, but not really in 
the world." (168) God's causal activity in the historical order is due 
to a sUbjective interpretation, on behalf of man, through viewing a 
situation in terms of its ultimate significance (169). Whilst events 
in the world can be explained in terms of inner-worldly causality 
(170), the religious sUbject Who perceives a particular event in terms 
of its ultimate grounding in God's causation of the world can 
legitimately claim that it is caused by God: 
This role indeed really belongs to these phenomena in 
themselves, but only in so far as they really and truly exist 
within this sUbjective context, and therefore they can also 
be recognised in the special character which belongs to them 
only within this context. (171) 
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This position is inadequate to support a genuine presence and activity 
of God in the historical order. The most it can claim is that the 
universal, transcendental presence of God is mediated through the 
historical realm, some situations mediating it rrore effectively than 
others. It would tend to suggest that historical revelation is merely 
a showing forth, or a pointer towards, the transcendental truth about 
God. This would be a far rerrove from understanding God as the one who 
acts in history to secure one eventuality rather than another (172). 
If this were so, then Christ would be reduced to the level of a cypher 
and his salvific significance reduced to his being the fullest 
manifestation, the most adequate symbol, of the transcendental presence 
of God rather than his being the liberating activity of God. 
However, we believe that the above presentation does not do 7 
justice to Rahner's intentions when exploring the relationship between 
historical revelation and transcendental revelation. For Rahner, 
revelation is not a word about God, it is the ontological self-
communication of God transcendentally granted. Hence, historical 
J 
revelation is not merely a word about transcendental revelation, or a 
cypher pointing towards the transcendental presence of God. It is the 
''becoming historical and becoming concrete" in this situation "of that 
intervention in which God... has from the outset embedded himself in 
the world as its self-communicating ground." (173) Historical 
revelation is not a reduced expression of the totality, it is the 
absolute self-communication of God, which is transcendentally and 
unthematically present to all situations, categorically present in and 
to this particular situation (174). However, the adequacy of this 1 
position is in turn dependent upon the adequacy of Rahner's solution to 
the problem that we have earlier examined: Can the not ion of God's 
genuine presence and activity be reconciled with Rahner's starting 
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point? If Rahner fails to to do this, as so far he seems to do, then J 
the terms of Rahner 's own system would prevent us from thinking of 
historical revelation as the ontological self-conununication of God in 
the historical order. Historical revelation would be reduced to being 
a word about the transcendent God and Christ would be reduced to the 
level of a cypher. Before pursuing this quest ion further in the next 
chapter we must turn to ask whether the universality of God's sel £-
communication does not compromise the gratuity of grace. 
5.8 Can the universality and the gratuity of grace be reconciled? 
Is the human person naturally orientated to grace and the beatific 
vision, or is this due to a supernatural elevation? OVer against the 
nouvelle theology, official Catholic theology as outlined in the 
encyclical Humani Generis (175} maintained that the human orientation 
to grace and beatitude was due entirely to a supernatural elevation. 
'lbrough his not ion of the supernaturu.l e:!l'i stential, Rahner sought to 
bridge the gap between these two positi0~s whilst maintaining the 
primacy of grace. His argument is that it is the human person's 
natural state to be supernaturally elevated. However, there is a 
difficulty here. If the supernatural existential is always given to 
the human person in the concrete, does this not make the notion 
supernatural somewhat vacuous? Indeed, does not Rahner 's posit ion, 
(that the human person's absolute fulfilment is to be found in God's 
self-oommunication in grace}, mean that grace must be an essential 
constituent of the person due to him/her having an unfrustratable 
orientation to grace? If this were the case then Rahner could only 
claim that the human orientation to grace was gratuitous in as much as 
God could have refrained from creating humanity at all. In which case, 
his solution would reduce to that of the nouvelle theology, even though 
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he refers to grace as supernatural rather than natural. That is, it 
would seem that if human nature for Rahner cannot be anything other 
than supernature then the term supernatural is vacuous and leaves 
Rahner open to the charge of Pelagianism. 
fbwever, Rahner's position is nnre nuanced than this. He realises 
that an unconditional disposition (whether termed natural or 
supernatural) for grace can only be considered gratuitous in the sense 
that God could have refrained from creating the human person (176), 
and he clearly considers this to be an inadequate understanding of 
gratuity: 
as God • s real partner I must be able to receive his grace 
(otherwise than my existence) as an unexpected miracle of his 
love, not first of all think myself out of existence and 
then conceive of my own being as such as the miracle of his 
freedom. (177) 
He rejects the position of the nouvelle theology (178), arguing instead 
for a doUble gratuity whereby God could refuse to communicate Godself 
to the human person without frustrating the person's nature: 
Wlat is called supernatural grace in catholic doctrine is 
something uncalled for with regard to our present de facto 
permanent condition (our nature) even prior to sin. It is 
not merely free with regard to our non-necessa~ existence 
and God's free, uncalled for decision to create us. (179) 
Rahner argues that the person • s potentia oboedientialis is to be 
identified with the person's natural spiritual transcendence towards 
God as the infinite horizon of human knowledge and freedom (180). 
Whilst this spiritual dynamism only finds its absolute fulfilment in 
God's self-communication it already reaches a partial fulfilment in God 
as the woraufhin of human transcendence. Hence, whilst the person's 
spiritual nature as potentia oboedientialis has an openness for the 
supernatural existential, it does not demand it unconditionally. The 
person's spiritual nature is not frustrated if it does not receive 
God's self-communication (181) as the person's potentia oboedientialis 
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would still be the "indispensable transcendental condition of the 
possibility of a spiritual Life" ( 182). Rahner 's claim is that we 
cannot dismiss as meaningless even a spiritual Life which only 
approaches God asymptotically (183). 
Rahner understands God's activity in creation to be a derived and 
secondary nroe of his activity in self-communication. However, he 
maintains that God's self-communication is not simply an extension of 
God's act of creation. Whereas in creation God posits the creature 
over against Godself through efficient causality, he maintains that in 
self-communication God gives himself through quasi-formal causality to 
the previously posited creature. Nor does the act of creation 
necessitate the act of self-communication, "the secondary could be 
realized without the primal." (184) Pure nature really could have 
existed, nature is conceivable without the supernatural existential 
( 185). 
It is unclear in Rahner's theology Whether he wants to maintain 
doUble gratuity merely as a logical distinction between the acts of 
creation and self-communication, (i.e. to claim that whilst nature in 
the concrete always has been graced, it could have been created 
differently), or whether he wants to maintain double gratuity in terms 
of a teirp?ral distinction, (i.e. to claim that man was first created 
and later graced) • Certain netaphors that he uses to convey the not ion 
of doUble gratuity tend to suggest a temporal distinction: "He (God) 
was able to create the child of grace, in distinction to his only-
begotten son, only by creating the addressee without claim to sonship 
,, 
i.e. the servant (186). Shepherd maintains that Rahner did intend such 
a temporal distinction in his technical doctrine of nature and grace. 
He argues that this stands in a position of fundamental inconsistency 
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with Rahner • s wider theology which claims that creation was always 
given so that God could communicate Godself, implying only a logical 
distinction (187). Shepherd claims that the coherency of Rahner's 
position can only be won at the cost of dropping the notion of a 
temporal distinction and maintaining doUble gratuity through the notion 
of a logical distinction alone. Shepherd claims that such a position 
would still be adequate to guard against the intrinsicism of the 
nouvelle theology as it would be a real possibility that the human 
person could have been created differently (188). Whether or not 
Rahner's technical doctrine of nature and grace needs to be modified 
in the manner suggested by Shepherd depends upon whether Rahner really 
intends b¥ his metaphor to maintain a temporal distinction rather than 
a logical distinction. It is far from certain that Rahner does intend 
his metaphor to be pushed this far. However, in either case it 
represents only a slight modification to Rahner's solution. Through 
maintaining the genuine possibility of the human person being created 
without grace, Rahner is able both to maintain that all of human life 
as it is experienced in the concrete is graced and that this really is 
a supernatural elevation and not simply an outworking of human nature. 
In this manner, Rahner seeks to defend himself against the charge of 
Pelagianism. However, we must now ask whether Rahner 's solution 
adequately matches concretely experienced human life, or Whether his 
rebuttal of a Pelagian stance is merely verb:ll and vacuous after all. 
5.9 Rahner's understanding of the nature-grace relationship as 
condemning the human person to existential Pelagianism: 
Col'llliDn human experience would seem to tell us that the concept 
grace fundamentally refers to a more that humans, as they experience 
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themselves in the concrete, feel themselves to be in need of (189). It 
is difficult to see how Rahner's position, Which claims that grace is 
always given everywhere, can allow for such a IOC>re quality to grace. 
Augustine's dispute with Pelagius was not simply a verbal quibble as to 
whether Pelagius ascribed, intentionally or otherwise, the first step 
in salvation to the human person or to God. It was a deeply 
experiential dispute as to whether Pelagius had plumbed the depths of 
the human abyss and perceived our inability to liberate ourselves and 
our consequent need of God's redeeming grace. Pelagius' error was not 
that he gave a true account of concrete human experience yet failed to 
give due verbal acknowledgement to grace, his error was rather that he 
misrepresented human experience, we might say that he perceived it to 
be naturally graced. 
It would seem appropriate to question whether Rahner's attempt to 
Il'Odify the position of the nouvelle theology remains on 'a verbal level. 
In claiming that nature could have been created without grace, 
., 
Rahner 
d6es indeed secure a definitional acknowledgement of the gratuity of 
grace, but in claiming that nature as it is experienced in the concrete 
is always graced does he not present the human person with the same 
dreadful conclusion as the ascetic Pelagius: "since perfection is 
possible for man, it is obligatory" (190)? To the person who feels 
him/herself to be ensnared by evil, who knows the inadequacy of present 
resources, it is little comfort to be assured against the knowledge 
born from bitter experience that s/he really does have all the 
resources required for change. Indeed, this is to be told that the 
present inadequate resources are all that can be hoped for, that there 
is no IOC>re to be sought. Ultimately this is to condemn a person to 
their plight just as surely as does a government who tells a powerless 
underclass that they already have the means to change their situation 
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if only they would use them. As D:lly says: 
I believe that Pelagian optimism about the human condition is 
ultimately the most depressing of doctrines, as soon as one 
reckons with one's divided self, one's failed opportunities, 
and the ambivalent character of whatever good one may do. 
(191) 
we maintain that the need for a more to grace stems from the 
implications of Rahner's own dynamic understanding of human freedom. 
In Chapters Three and Fbur we characterised Rahner's understanding of 
human freedom as we become that which we do, an understanding that we 
wholeheartedly agreed with. We argued that such an understanding of 
human freedom had a consequent dark side. The sinful acts which all of 
us perform, to some extent, cannot be seen as superficial discrepancies 
which can be ignored, in contrast they actually form our personalities. 
Further, the human person always finds him/herself to be in a situation 
codetermined by other people's sin. Fbr these reasons the sinner 
cannot simply reject his/her sin and turn again to enjoy the fullness 
of grace. There is the need for a healing process which will arrest 
and reverse the dynamic of sin. That is, a dynamic understanding of 
freedom and sin seems to also require a dynamic understanding of grace. 
ColllllkJn human experience seems to suggest that grace must include a 
healing element which always opens to a ~· or to greater healing. 
Whatever we mean by the uni versa! i ty of grace, we cannot think of it as 
a static universal in a way that excludes this possibility of always 
opening to a more. 
There is a genuine problem here. Rahner has good reason for 
wanting to maintain that grace is present everywhere, at all times. In 
so doing he can maintain the universal salvific will of God and also 
close the door to any sacred/profane distinctions that would isolate 
the religious realm from the human realm. These are concerns that we 
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also share. The problem is whether 'Rahner has secured these concerns at 
the apparent cost of giving rise to a concept of grace that is vacuous. 
As we have already maintained, a formalistic statement of the 
universality of grace is of little use without an explanation of how 
grace transforms. 
Rahner could have sought to escape this impasse by attributing a 
dynamic aspect to the transcendental gracious presence of God, both in 
the sense that grace could be thought of as always seeking to establish 
that which God is, and also in the sense that we can think of a dynamic 
between God's offer and the free human response. This would mean that 
grace had a latent potency about it. It would be understood as being 
present in the manner of an offer or invitation which whenever it was 
responded to, (a response itself held in being by grace), enabled God 
to achieve Godself in that situation (192). In this manner, the 
dynamic presence of grace could be thought of as both preceding the 
human person • s responsive cooperation and also achieving the human 
person's responsive cooperation. Each such cooperative response could 
be thought of as opening the human subject rore and rore to the dynamic 
of grace. ~ could employ the image of an unstretched balloon on the 
end of a tap being filled with water. As the water fills the given 
capacity of the balloon at any one moment, so it creates a greater 
potential capacity. ~ may compare here Hardy and Fbrd's exploration 
of the dynamic of the • praise of God • : 
Perhaps the central effect of praise here is that of opening. 
Very simply seen, the effect of praise is to open • space • for 
the recipient to be himself, and thus to allow him to be 
himself without confinement or coercion; and this brings 
about an enlargement, both of him and of his sphere of 
relevance and relationships... Thus, the dynamic of this 
self-realization is like a circumference which continually 
expands, rather than an exclusive centre concerned with 
establishing and maintaining its own individuality and 
uniqueness ••• praise of God serves to recognize the expansion 
which is God's nature. Fbr with him, 'space' and 'time' and 
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'energy' are actually expanding, something like that 
expanding circumference which we saw before. It is not, of 
course, a matter of expanding to places which were there but 
he had not reached before, though human imagination seems 
always to operate in these terms~ in this case, God is 
expanding the very not ions of space, time and place, and even 
energy. So when, in what is perhaps the nost characteristic 
feature of Christian praise, God is in praise found to be 
ever more totally present, this is a profound intuition of 
the way he actually is. ( 193) 
Is Rahner concerned to establish any such dynamic aspect of grace? 
Gerard McCool claims that Rahner does indeed ascribe a senating (194) 
quality to grace which enables the human person to extend his/her 
control over the other dynamisms of nature, and so to overcome the 
effects of concupiscence. However, we find no evidence in Rahner 's 
essay on concupiscence (195) to support such a view. Even if Rahner 
does claim that grace overcomes the effects of concupiscence, this 
would st i 11 be insufficient for our purposes. ~ have claimed that 
there must be a dynamic quality to grace not only to overcome 
concupiscence, but to overcome the effects of a person's own freely 
chosen evil orientation and to lead him/her through sanctifying healing 
to a greater and greater openness to grace. In the entirety of our 
reading of Rahner we have found only two references to any such dynamic 
aspect of grace. The first is given in such an afterthought manner 
that we can only conclude that it is either a peripheral concern for 
Rahner or that he simply assumes a dynamic aspect of grace and so 
considers it to be adequate to make a formal statement of it. He 
states: 
The only distinction here that is binding on faith is this: 
Grace is habitual insofar as God's supernatural self-
communication is permanently offered to man (after baptism) 
and insofar as it is freely accepted (by one who is of age)~ 
this very same grace is called actual insofar as it actually 
sustains the act whereby it is accepted - an act which is 
intrinsical! aduated in existential de th and be 
renewed indefinitely - and thus actual1zes itself. 
The second comes in Fbundations when Rahner is introducing the 
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relationship between historical revelation and God's transcendental 
self-communication. He refers to this self-disclosure as having "a 
dynamism towards its own objectification" (197). 
Why is it that Rahner treats of the dynamic aspect of grace in 
such a peripheral way? Is it due to a different spiritual temperament 
which like that of the ascetical Pelagius cannot identify with the 
troubled Augustine's knowledge of his absolute need for a nore? This 
seems unlikely. As we saw in Chapter Fbur we cannot ascribe to Rahner 
a blindness to the extent and depth of human evil and the consequent 
need for an objectively given redemption. Indeed, in the present 
chapter we have observed how Rahner has sought to locate the 
objectivity of redemption in his understanding of human nature as 
graced nature. Given Rahner's awareness of the radical depth of sin 
Which requires a process of conversion, it would seem to be most likely 
that Rahner assumes throughout his theology of grace that it does 
indeed have a dynamic aspect to it, rather than that he overlooks this 
need entirely. However, the marginal way in Which he refers to this 
dynamic aspect of grace betrays a certain formalism. His theology of 
grace is not dominated by anguish over the possibility of healing and 
transformation in human life. His, nore theoretical, concern is to 
establish the universality of grace in a way that does not compromise 
the gratuity of grace. Whilst reams are written on this question, the 
actual working of grace, or effects of grace, are treated in a somewhat 
cursory fashion. Rahner states that human life is graced without 
exploring What difference this makes and without explaining how the 
activity of grace in human life liberates. we believe that it is 
insufficient to assert formally that human life is graced without 
establishing the how of the dynamic, liberating activity of grace. The 
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practical effect of such formalism, contrary to the desired intention, 
wi 11 be to appear to be condemning the person to his/her own inadequate 
resources. ~ could term this the despair of existential Pelagianism. 
~ feel bound to conclude that Ralmer 's approach to the 
nature/grace relationship, albeit unintentionally, reduces to a verbal 
solution which does not answer the hungering and doubt of the human 
heart. Rahner is concerned with the theoretical question of the 
relationship between the universality and the gratuity of grace. He 
does not show himself to be sufficiently immersed in the experienced 
dilemma of personal, social and structural evil in human life. Metz 
claims that this is due to Rahner's abstract, a priori starting point 
which treats the human subject in isolation from his/her historical and 
social struggles for identity (198). As we have already noted, we 
believe that this problem of a priori formalism runs throughout 
Rahner's theology. At that point, we also claimed that it stems from 
Rahner's transcendental starting point which shifts the attention onto 
universal, general, a priori statements rather than the particular 
details of human life and history. As we turn in our final chapter to 
explore Rahner's Christology and his understanding of Christ as the 
consummation of salvation history we wonder whether the same problem of 
formalism will show themselves. Will Rahner be able to establish that 
God was really present and active in the historical order in Christ or 
will Christ remain, against his intentions, at the level of a cypher of 
God's transcendental presence? Will Rahner be able to establish the 
salvific significance of Jesus' life, death and resurrection, or will 
it merely be stated that he is the Absolute Saviour? 
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ENDWI'ES: CHAPI'ER FIVE 
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definable objects within the horizon of his consciousness. Man 
always lives by the holy mystery, even where he is not conscious 
of it. The lucidity of his consciousness derives from the 
incomprehensibility of this mystery. The proximity of his 
environment is constituted by the distant aloofness of the 
mystery. The freedom of his mastery of things comes from his 
being mastered by the H::>ly which is itself unmastered." K. Rahner, 
"The Concept Of Mystery In catholic Theology" I T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 
53-54. 
2. cf., id., ~. pp. 84-86. 
3. ibid., pp. 85. cf. "Hence there is really only one question, 
whether this God wanted to be merely the eternally distant one, or 
whether beyond that he wanted to be the innerrrost centre of our 
existence in free grace and in self-oonnnunication." ibid., pp. 
50. cf. I id. I "The Concept Of Mystery In catholic Theology" I T.I. 
Vol. IV, pp. 61. --
4. cf. "The philosophy of religion, conceiving of God as essential 
and perpetually the holy mystery, can of course offer no grounds 
for a philosophical proof of the possibility of the beatific 
vision and hence of grace and the supernatural order in general." 
id. I "The Concept Of Mystery In catholic Theology" I T.I. Vol. IV, 
pp. 61. cf. "In this kind of a natural, transcendental 
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wants to be for us a silent and impenetrable mystery keeping us at 
a distance in our finiteness, or wants to be the radical closeness 
of self-oonnnunication: whether he wants to confront our sinful 
rejection of him in the depths of our conscience and in its 
categorical objectifications in history as judgements or as 
forgiveness." id., ~. pp. 170. 
5. cf., id., ~. pp. 171. 
6. cf. "It is dialogical, and in it God speaks to man, and makes 
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in the world to and in man • s transcendence." ibid. 
7. cf. "According to Olristian teaching, this one life finds its 
sunnnit in the self-oonnnunication of God, God is not only the 
ground and innerrrost dynamism of this one history of nature and 
the spirit. He is also its goal, not merely as the asymptotic 
final point towards which this whole rrovement is orientated but 
also in the sense that he gives himself in his rrost personal, 
absolute reality and infinite fullness of life, to the life of man 
as its innerrrost power (called grace) and as its innerrrost goal 
which conununicates itself in its own proper reality." id., "The 
Secret Of Life", T.I. Vol. VI, pp. 152. --
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pp. 67. -
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Christ that this absolute and abiding roystery can exist not only 
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to us, through the divine self conununication." ibid., pp. 72. cf. 
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fewer, and the three mysteries affirm the same thing that God has 
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God's self-communication is really a communication of God's self: 
cf. God "gives away himself", id., "On The Theology Of The 
Incarnation", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 114. cf. "God himself goes out 
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id., "Nature and Grace", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 177. cf. "God's self-
cooanunication means, therefore, that what is conununicated is 
rea11yGod inhisownbeing", id., FCF, pp. 117-118. cf. "It is 
decisive for an understanding of God's self-conununication to man 
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sovereign and incomprehensible, and which even as something 
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T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 96-97. cf. "If man has comprehended himself 
only when he has understood himself as the addressee of this 
divine self- conununication, then it can be said that the mystery 
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much with reference to the material presuppositions of man's 
freedom in which that freedom is accomplished... precisely this 
freedom of the corporeal, social and historical creature which in 
man is always and necessarily a freedom which is exercised through 
an encounter with the world-the community and environment i~ which 
man lives." ibid., pp. 98. 
61. ibid., pp. 98-99. 
62. id., "Grace", CI'D, pp. 193. 
63. cf., id., R!F, pp. 118, 128. 
64. id., "Grace", cro, pp. 193. cf., id., R!F, pp. 128-129. cf. 
"this acceptance-Is itself once roc>re an-act of that human freedom 
which in turn is a gift of God himself, granted to man by God's 
communication of himself." id., "History Of The W::>rld And 
Salvation History", T.I. Vol.V, pp. 102. cf. "And it follows 
still further that the concrete act of freedom precisely in its 
concrete goodness and moral rectitude must once again be 
understood as coming from and being empowered by the origin of all 
reality, and hence by God." id., R!F, pp. 119. cf. "indeed ••• in 
the movement towards this attainment it is already borne by the 
self-communication of the future towards which this process is 
noving as to its absolute fulfillment." id., R!F, pp. 126. cf. 
"the act of hearing, the acceptance of this self-disclosure and 
self-communication is borne by God himself through his 
divinization of man." id., R!F, pp. 171. cf. "In this elevation 
God gives not only something different from himself, but his very 
self, and the act of its acceptance is borne by him." id., R!F, 
pp. 172. - -
65. cf. "Even prior to justification by sanctifying grace, whether 
this is . conferred sacramentally or outside the sacraments, man 
already stands under the universal, infralapsarian salvific will 
of God which comprises within its scope original sin and personal 
sin." id., "Existence", Encyclopedia of Theology: A Concise 
Sacramentum Mundi, pp. 494. 
66. cf. "So it is revelation which throws light on the half or even 
completely concealed supernatural, theological factor in pre-
Christian and non-Christian religion and philosophy, which cannot 
be regarded as some sort of purely natura 1 religion or purely 
natural speculation, nor again as religion and philosophy which 
have become corrupted in some purely natural way." id., "Theos In 
The New Testament", T.I. Vol. I, pp. 81. --
67. id., R!F, pp. 172. cf. "Our whole spiritual life is lived in the 
realm of the salvific will of God, of his prevenient grace, of his 
call as it becomes efficacious... Even when he does not know it 
and does not believe it... man always lives consciously In the 
presence of the triune God of eternal life." id., "Nature And 
Grace", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 180-181. cf. "It (diVIilizing grace) is 
offered to everyone as light and as the promise of eternal 1i fe, 
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ll't'Orking freely and graciously in every man, welling up from the 
origin of his existence - even though perhaps not named as such." 
id., "'Ihe Need Fbr A Short Fbrmula Of Christian Faith", T.I. Vol. 
IX, pp. 123. 
68. id., "'lheos InTheNewTestament", T.I. Vol. I, pp. 81. 
69. ibid., cf. "What we call grace - innermost divinization of the 
creature from its very roots and its openness to the immediacy of 
God himself - does not merely begin at the same p:>int as does the 
explicit message of faith, church, sacrament, worship or the 
written word of God. All these explicitly sacral elements are 
rather the necessary, divinely disp:>sed, reflex realisation of 
that divinization of the world freely caused b¥ God's favour yet 
truly caused b¥ him, in which God has always already accepted and 
sanctified the Whole world in all its dimensions." id., "The M3.n 
Of Today And Religion", T.I. Vol. VI, pp. 18-19. --
70. id., "Nature And Grace", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 180. 
71. id., FCF, pp. 143. cf. "According to the Christian view of 
things-,-even though a person is co-conditioned b¥ original sin in 
his situation of salvation and sin, he always and everyWhere has 
the genuine p:>ssibility of encountering God and achieving 
salvation by the acceptance of God's supernatural se1f-
conununication in grace, a possibility Which is forfeited only 
through his own guilt. There is a serious, effective and universal 
salvific will of God in the sense of that salvation Which the 
Christian means b¥ his own salvation." ibid., pp. 146-147. cf. 
"Everyone is offered salvation, Which means that everyone, in so 
far as he does not close himself to this offer b¥ his own free and 
grave guilt, is offered divinizing grace - and is offered it again 
and again (even When he is guilty). Every man exists not only in 
an existential situation to Which belongs the obligation of 
striving towards a supernatural goal of direct union with the 
absolute God in a direct vision, but he exists also in a situation 
Which presents the genuine sUbjective possibility of reaching this 
goal by accepting God's self-communication in grace and in glory. 
Because of God's universal saving purpose, the offer and 
possibility of salvation extend as far as extends the history of 
human freedom." id., "The History Of '!he W:>rld And Salvation 
History", T.I. Vol. V, pp. 103. cf. "Acts inspired 
supernaturally by grace are not confined to the justified." id., 
"Nature And Grace", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 179. --
72. cf., 
Vol. 
pp. 
184. 
id., "'lhe Need Fbr A Short Fbrmula Of Christian Faith", T.I. 
IX, pp. 123. cf., id., "Christian Humanism", T.I. Vol. IX, 
189. cf., id., "Nature And Grace", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 183-
73. id., FCF, pp. 126. 
74. cf. "He (the theol?=Jian) is aware that he may only look at the 
salvation of an ind1vidual as one Which is oot achieved fully 
except within the absolute future of the Whole of mankind, as the 
ultimate result of the love of all the others in the absoluteness 
of God. In other words, the salvation of an individual soul does 
oot consist in escaping from the history of humanity but in 
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entering into the latter's absolute future, which we call the 
Kingdom of God." id., "Christ ian Humanism", T.I. Vol. IX, pp. 
189. cf. "Christianity understands itself as the religion of the 
future, as the religion of the new and eternal man." id., 
"Christianity And The New Man", T.I. Vol. V, pp. 135. cf. 
"Christianity is a religion of the future. It can indeed be 
understood only in the light of the future which it conceives as 
an absolute future gradually approaching the individual and 
humanity as a whole." id., "Marxist Utopia And The Christian 
Future Of Man", T.I. Vol. VI, pp. 60. 
75. id., "Marxist Utopia And The Christian Future Of Man", T.I. Vol. 
VI, pp. 6. cf. "God himself will be this consununation. And since 
God, the Infi.ni te, is the mystery which can be named and called 
upon only by a via negationis and by pointing silently beyond 
anything which can be put into words, we can speak of this 
consummation only negatively in images and likenesses and in 
speechless reference to absolute transcendence. our consununation, 
therefore, is not fitted to become the subject of party tirades, 
of glowing imagery, of plastic description of utopian 
conceptions." id., "Christianity And The New Man", T.I. Vol. V, 
pp. 148. -
76. cf. "The eschatology of Christianity is no intramundane utopia, it 
sets no intramundane tasks and goals." id., "Christianity And The 
New Man", T.I. Vol. V, pp. 138. cf. "By the fact that this 
coming of God himself is the true and the only infinite future of 
man, Christianity has always already infinitely surpassed all 
intramundane ideologies and utopias aoout the future. II ibid. 1 PP• 
148. cf. "Being the religion of the absolute future, Chrtstianity 
has no utopian ideas aoout a future in this world... Any future 
which is planned by man and is to be produced by the intramundane 
means at his disposal and which is posited as an absolute beyond 
which there is nothing to be expected, would be rejected by 
Christianity as an expectation for the future which only amounts 
to utopian ideology." id., "Marxist Utopia And The Christian 
Future Of Man", T.I. Vol. VI, pp. 64. cf. "Christianity renders 
every concrete humanism contingent, i.e. dispensable in favour of 
another, future humanism, by situating everyone within God's open 
future." id., "Christian Humanism", T.I. Vol. IX, pp. 195. 
77. id., "Christian Humanism", T.I. Vol. IX, pp. 201. 
78. id., "The Experiment With Man", T .I. Vol. IX, pp. 221. cf. 
Ibid., pp. 220. cf. "The mastering of the intramundane situation 
represents a task (in so far as this is possible for man) which is 
also really Christian - because eternal life must be effected in 
time - it is sadly perhaps possible to show that the Christians of 
this day and age occupy themselves far too little with the 
programming of man's future in this world, as if this did not 
present any problems or it could safely be left to the non-
Christians." id., "Christianity And The New Man", T.I. Vol. V, 
pp. 139. cf.,fuid., pp. 149. cf., id., "Marxist Utopia And The 
Christian Future Of Man", T.I. Vol. VI-,-pp. 64. 
79. id. 1 
VI, 
"Marxist Utopia And The Christian Future Of Man", 
pp. 60. 
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T.I. Vol. 
80. ibid. 
81. id., "The Position Of Christology In The Church Between Exegesis 
And D::>gmatics", T.I. Vol. XI, pp. 200. cf. "We say that 
Christianity is the religion of the absolute future to the extent 
in the first place that God is not only above us as the ground and 
horizon of history, but in front of us as our own future, our 
destination, sustaining history as its future. Fbr Christianity 
acknowledges the absolute, infinite God who is superior to the 
world, a radical and infinite mystery, as the God who in free 
grace communicates himself in his absolute mystery as its 
innermost principle and ultimate future, who sustains and drives 
history as his genuinely ItDst intimate concern, not only 
distinguishing himself from it as its creator." id., "The 
Experiment With Man", T.I. Vol. IX, pp. 219. 
82. cf., id., "Concerning The Relationship Between Nature And Grace", 
T.I. Vol. I, pp. 297-300. 
83. cf., id., "Nature And Grace", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 167. 
84. ibid. 
85. ibid. 
86. cf., id., "Concerning The Relationship Between Nature And Grace", 
T.I. Vol. I, pp. 299. 
87. cf., id., "Nature And Grace", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 168. 
88. cf., id., "Concerning The Relationship Between Nature And Grace", 
T.I. Vol. I, pp. 303. 
89. ibid., pp. 299. 
90. id., "Nature And Grace", T .I. Vol. IV, pp. 167. 
91. cf., ibid., pp. 166. 
92. cf., ibid. 
93. ibid. 
94. Unless, that is, we choose to be a spiritual pilgrim living in 
alienation from the human condition, an option akin to insanity. 
95. ibid., pp. 168. cf. "If man, just so far as he expresses himself 
existentially by himself, is really nothing but pure nature, he is 
always in danger of understanding himself merely as a nature and 
of behaving accordingly. And then he wiLl find God • s call to him 
out of this human plane merely a disturbance which is trying to 
force something upon him." id., "Concerning The Relationship 
Between Nature And Grace", T.I. Vol. I, pp. 300. 
96. ibid., pp. 303. 
97. Fbr Rahner's comment on Mar~hal's significance cf., id., "Nature 
And Grace", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 169. 
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98. id., "COncerning The Re.lat ionship Between Nature And Grace", T. I. 
Vol. I, pp. 297-318. 
99. id., "Nature And Grace", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 165-188. 
100. ibid., pp. 173. 
101. ibid. 
102. id., "COncerning The Relationship Between Nature And Grace", T.I. 
Vol. I, pp. 312. 
103. cf. "The real man as God's real partner should be able to receive 
this love as what it necessarily is: as free gift. But that means 
that this central abiding existential, consisting in the 
ordination to the threefold God of grace and eternal Life, is 
itself to be characterized as unexacted, as supernatural." ibid., 
pp. 312-313. 
104. id., "Nature And Grace", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 186. cf. "If God 
gives creation and man above all a supernatural end and this end 
is first in intentione, then man (and the world) is b¥ that very 
fact always and everywhere inwardly other in structure than he 
would be if he didn't have this end, and hence other as well 
before he has realised this end partially (the grace which 
justifies) or wholly (the beatific vision)." id., "Concerning The 
Relationship Between Nature And Grace", T.I. Vol. I, pp. 302-303. 
105. id. I FCF, pp. 123. 
106. id., "Concerning The Relationship Between Nature And Grace", T.I. 
Vol. I, pp. 315. cf. "All one must guard against is identifying 
this unlimited dynamism of the spiritual nature in a simply 
apodeictic way with that dynamism in which we experience (or 
believe we experience) in the adventure of our concrete spiritual 
existence, because here the supernatural existential may already 
be at work - as subsequently emerges in the light of revelation." 
ibid. 
107. id., "Nature And Grace", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 183. 
108. cf., id., "Concerning The Relationship Between Nature And Grace", 
T.I. Vol. I, pp. 313. 
109. cf. "A ~recise delimitation of nature from grace (supposing it 
were poss1ble at all) and so a really pure concept of pure nature 
could thus in every case only be pursued with the help of 
revelation, which tells us what in us is grace and so provides us 
with the means of abstracting this grace from the body of our 
existential experience of man and thus of acquiring pure nature 
(in its totality) as a remainder." ibid., pp. 302. 
110. cf. "This openness is not to be thought of merely as a non-
repugnance, but as an inner ordination." ibid., pp. 315. cf. "It 
is not necessary to take this potentia oboedientialis as more or 
less just a non-repugnance, which would be the extrinsicism of 
which we have spoken already." id., "Nature And Grace", T.I. Vol. 
IV, pp. 106. -
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111. id. , "The Theological Dimension Of The Quest ion About M:in" , T. I • 
Vol. XVII, pp. 66. cfQ "The nature of a spiritual being and its 
supernatural elevation are not opposed to each other like two 
things which lie side by side, so that they must be either kept 
separate or confused. The supernatural elevation of man is, 
though not due to him, the absolute fulfillment of his being, 
whose spiritual quality and transcendence towards being as such 
prevents its being defined, that is delimited in the same way that 
sub-human entities can." id., "Nature And Grace", T.I. Vol. IV, 
pp. 183. cf. Rahner's desmption of grace as "the real essence of 
what constitutes the ontological relationship between God and 
creatures." id., FCF, pp. 122. 
112. Although nature could be granted a natural fulfilment without 
grace in the dynamism towards God as infinite horizon which would 
not frustrate nature, hence preserving the gratuity of grace. 
113. id., FCF, pp. 123. 
114. id., "Philosophy And Theology", T.I. Vol. VI, pp. 75. cf. "God's 
creation through efficient causality takes place because God wants 
to give himself in love." id., FCF, pp. 123. cf. "Even what is 
earlier in time can be and can become precisely because it is the 
condition of the possibility of what comes later in tlme, for both 
come about because they are supported by the one God who simply 
wants one thing, viz. to communicate himself." id., "Philosophy 
And Theology", T.I. Vol. VI, pp. 76. cf. "The creature is 
endowed, by virtue of its innnst essence and constitution, with 
the pbssibility of being assumed, of becoming the material of a 
possible history of God. God's creative act always drafts the 
creature as the paradigm of a possible utterance of himself." id., 
"On The Theology Of The Incarnation", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 115. --
115. cf. "The concrete reality of grace includes nature as an inner 
l'IDment within itself. " id. , "Philosophy And Thea logy", T. I. Vol. 
VI, pp. 72. -
116. cf. "Such a creative, efficient causality of God must be 
understood only as a l'IDdality or as a deficient l'IDde of that 
absolute and enorl'IDUS possibility of God which consists in the 
fact that he who is agape in person, and who is by himself the 
absolutely blessed and fulfil Led subject, can precisely for this 
reason communicate himself to another." id., FCF, pp. 122. cf. 
''Wlat then is the power of being creator, h1s ability to keep 
himself aloof while constituting, bringing out of its nothingness, 
that which in itself is simply something else? It is only a 
derivative, restricted and secondary possibility, which is 
ultimately based on the other primal possibility." id., "On The 
Theology Of The Incarnation", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 115-.-
117. Rahner maintains a parallel relationship between creatureliness 
and dependence upon God, whereby radical dependence upon God and 
genuine autonomy vary in direct and not in inverse proportion. 
cf., id., FCF, pp. 77-79. 
118. cf. "Grace, being supernaturally divinizing, must rather be 
thought of as a change in the structure of human consciousness. " 
id., "History Of The w:>rld And Salvation History", T.I. Vol. V, 
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pp. 103. 
119. cf. "The formal object, the horizon within which the normal 
empirically experienced realities of consciousness are grasped, 
and the ultimate orientation of consciousness are changed by 
grace." ibid. 
120. cf. "It is the dynamism of the spirit's transcendence into the 
infinity of the silent mystery which we call God the dynamism 
which is really meant to arrive and to accept, and not merely to 
be the eternally approaching but never quite arriving movement 
towards the infinity of God, it is meant to reach the infinity of 
God, since God gives himself to it of his own accord and in such a 
way that he has already even now entered freely into this movement 
of infinite transcendence itself as its innermost moving force and 
raison d ·~tre. II ibid. 1 PP• 104. 
121. cf., id., R:F, pp. 149. 
122. ibid. cf. "as an element in our transcendentality which is 
constituted by God's self-communication, it is already revelation 
in the proper sense." ibid. cf. "this supernatural elevation of 
man which is granted by God • s universal saving purpose already has 
of itself the nature of a revelation ••• It is, therefore, 
absolutely legitimate to call it already a revelation, especially 
since it already communicates or offers in an ontologically real 
sense as grace something which also ultimately constitutes the 
whole content of divine revelation contained in proper 
propositions and human concept, viz. God and his eternal life 
itself which, as God's self-communication in grace and glory, is 
the salvation of man." id., "The History Of The W>rld And 
Salvation History", T.I. Vol. V, pp. 104. cf. "If there is 
indeed a universal, supernatural salvific will of God, then there 
is a revelation history which is co-existent with the history of 
mankind and hence with the whole history of religion. This 
general revelation doesnot occur directly by way of the 
objectivity and conceptuality constitutive of the thematic content 
of human words, but by a change in the unthematic horizon and in 
the basic condition of the mind of the person, a change which 
necessarily takes place on account of the accepted or rejected 
supernatural grace." id., "Philosophy And Theology", T.I. Vol. VI, 
pp. 78. cf., id., R:F, pp. 172. --
123. cf. "God's gift of himself, the gratuitously elevated, 
determination of man, the transcendental revelation is itself 
always mediated categorically in the world, because all of man's 
transcendentality has a history." id., R:F, pp. 173. cf. "In 
this sense the world is our mediation to God in his self-
communication in grace, and in this sense there is for 
Christianity no separate and sacred realm where alone God is to be 
found." ibid., pp. 152. 
124. ibid., pp. 154. cf. "'Ibis moment of God's self-communication, 
which seemingly is merely transcendent and trans-historical 
because it is permanent and always present, belongs to this 
history and takes place within it... this event of God's self-
communication is indeed transcendental, but precisely as 
transcendental it is a real history." ibid., pp. 143. cf. ibid., 
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pp. 138, 141. 
125. cf. "It is to be expected that it will try to objectify itself in 
explicit expressions of religion, such as in the liturgy, and in 
religious association, and in protests of a propnetic kind against 
any natural attempt by man to shut himself up in the world of his 
own categories and against any (ultimately polytheistic) 
misinterpretations of this basic graceful experience." id., 
"History Of The W::>rld And Salvation History", T. I. Vol. V, pp. 
105. 
126. cf., ibid. 
127. id., FCF, pp. 173. 
128. ibid., cf. "\'E are dealing with the self-interpretation of that 
reality which is oonstituted by the personal self-communication of 
God, and hence by God himself. If it interprets itself 
historically, then God interprets himself in history." ibid., pp. 
158. 
129. ibid., pp. 173. 
130. ibid. 
131. ibid. 
132. ibid., pp. 155. cf. "It is only partially successful, it always 
ex1sts within a still unfinished history, it is intermixed with 
error, sinful delusions and their objectifications, and these once 
again oo-determine the religious situation of other people." 
ibid., pp. 173. cf. "'lhe way in which it is directed or 
furthered by God, and guaranteed by prophets and miracles, may not 
be the same everywhere: it may often be mixed up with false 
interpretations, a fact which proclaims the helplessness and the 
guilt of unbelief or of any proud wanting-to-be-like-God by one's 
own powers." id., "Philosophy And Theology", T.I. Vol. VI, pp. 
75. -
133. id., FCF, pp. 153. 
134. cf. "God has interpreted a particular part of this profane and 
otherwise ambiguous history by his word... by giving it a saving 
or damning character... Thus he has distinguished this particular 
part of the one history from the rest of history and has made it 
the actual, official and explicit history of salvation." id., "'lhe 
History Of 'lhe W::>rld And Salvation History", T.I. Vol. V, pp. 
106. 
135. cf., id., ~. pp. 173-174. cf., id., "Philosophy And Theology", 
T.I. Vol. VI, pp. 77. 
136. cf. "'lherefore the history of revelation in the usual and 
especially the full sense of this term is found where this self-
interpretation of God's transcendental self-communication in 
history succeeds, and where with certainty it reaches its self-
awareness and its purity in such a way it correctly knows itself 
to be guided and directed by God, and, protected by him against 
227 
clinging tenaciously to what is provisional and 
depraved, it discovers its own true self." id., FCF, 
to what 
pp. 155. 
is 
137. cf. "\\hat we normally call revelation and revelation history is in 
reality the conceptually concrete, propositional and divinely 
controlled thematisation of the universal gratuitous revelation 
and its history achieved by God through his witnesses and 
miracles, and not the first rost original or slowly generalised 
revelation history." id., "Philosophy And Theology", T.I. Vol. VI, 
pp. 77. -
138. cf. "(It) doesnot take place everywhere in this official and, as 
it were-,-reflexively guaranteed purity." id., FCF, pp. 174. 
139. ibid. 
140. cf. "'lbe universal history of revelation, both transcendental and 
categorical, reaches its complete essence and its full historical 
objectification in the particular, regional, categorical history 
of revelation." ibid., pp. 161. 
141. cf. "'lhe history of the transcendental revelation of God wi 11 
necessarily show itself again and again to be a history which is 
taking place in an irreversible direction towards a highest and 
comprehensive self-interpretation of man." ibid., pp. 154. 
142. ibid., pp. 174. cf. "NOt until the full and unsurpassable event 
of the historical self-objectification of God's self-communication 
to the world in Jesus Christ do we have an event which as an 
eschatological event, fundamentally and absolutely precludes any 
historical corruption or any distorted interpretation in the 
further history of categorical revelation and of false religion." 
ibid., pp. 157. cf. Rahner's description of Christianity as the 
"process by which the history of revelation reaches a quite 
definite and successful level of historical reflection, and by 
which this history comes to self-awareness historically and 
reflexively, a history which itself is coextensive with the whole 
history of the world." ibid., pp. 146. 
143. cf. , De root A. Lane, Fbundat ions Fbr A Social Theol : Praxis, 
Process And Salvation, (Dublln: G1ll And Macmillan 1984 , pp. 67-
74. cf. "The understanding of knowledge and truth operative in 
the primacy of praxis is one of transformation in contrast to the 
mre traditional understanding of knowledge and truth as simply 
disclosure or correspondence or conformity or verification." 
ibid., pp. 67. cf. "The disclosure Ioodel of truth tends to leave 
th1ngs as they are, affirming the present in a way that neglects 
the future. The transformative model promotes change within our 
world. Wlat is nedded in Christian theology today is a creative 
unity of disclosure and transformation, directed towards a concern 
for change within continuity." ibid., pp. 74. 
144. ibid., pp. 81. 
145. ibid. 
146. ibid. 
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147. ibid. 
148. ibid. 
149. ibid.' pp. 82. 
150. ibid. 
151. ibid.' pp. 81-82. 
152. ibid., pp. 139. 
153. cf., ibid. 
154. He describes God 1 s self-communication to the creature as: 
11essentially the act whereby God goes out of himself into the 
other in such a way that he bestows himself upon the other by 
becoming the other. II id., 11'I'he Concept Of Mystery In catholic 
Theology .. , T.I. Vol. rv-;--pp. 68. 
155. cf. 11 lt is indubitably given for every catholic theologian at 
least is the special case of the hypostatic union. 11 id., 11Some 
Implications Of The Scholastic Concept Of Uncreated Grace." T.I. 
Vol. I, pp. 330. --
156. cf. 11 If there is any inunediacy to God at all, that is, if we 
really can have something to do with God in his own self, this 
inunediacy cannot depend on the fact that the non-divine absolutely 
disappears ... id., FCF, pp. 83. 
157. id., FCF, pp. 83. 
158. ibid. 
159. ibid. 
160. ibid., pp. 170. 
161. id., 11'llle Secret Of Life 11 , T.I. Vol. VI, pp. 152. 
162. Fbr the dualistic emphasis in the classic tradition cf., D. W. 
Hardy and D. F. Fbrd, Jubilate: Theology In Praise, {lDndon: DLT 
1984) 1 PP• 61. cf. 11With the rise of IOCXiern science, Christian 
cosrology on the whole went along with a dualism it had helped to 
form. The view of the world as a mechanism of linked causes with 
no room for God 1 s presence, dominated science. It led religion to 
see God either as a remote figure who merely set the system going, 
or as identified with history•s meaning, or as a presence in the 
subjectivity of people - the God of feeling, intuition, regulative 
ideas or nor ali ty. 11 ibid. 
163. D. Tracy, Blessed Ra e Fbr order: The New Pluralism In Theol 
{New York: The Seabury Press 1975 , pp. 172. 
164. ibid., pp. 85. 
165. cf., id., FCF, pp. 140. 
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166. ibid. cf., ibid., pp. 140. 
167. ibid., pp. 87. cf. "A special intervention of God, therefore, 
can only be understood as the historical concreteness of the 
transcendental self-conununication of God which is already 
intrinsic to the concrete world." ibid. 
168. ibid. 1 pp. 86. 
169. cf., ibid. 1 pp. 86-89. 
170. cf., id. 1 Fa', pp. 87. 
171. ibid. 1 pp. 88. 
172. cf. "According to the biblical witness God is active in human 
history, proclaiming and making real his righteousness in that 
history, 'mighty to save' (Isa. 63:1). God is engaged with his 
creation, and in this engagement he is not concerned to offer an 
interpretation of reality, as if salvation might be obtained by 
contemplation, but his purJ?Ose is the transformation and renewal 
of creation from within. The incarnation is the focal J?Oint of 
this engagement and activity of God." T. Gorringe, Atonement 
Through &lucation: Redeeming Time, (lDndon: DLT 1986), pp. 71. 
173. Rahner, Fa', pp. 87. 
174. cf. "God's self-revelation in the depths of the spiritual person 
is an a priori determination coming from grace and is in itself 
unreflexive... But none of this means that this a priori 
determination exists for itself, and that in this apriority 1t 
could only become the object of a subsequent reflect ion which 
would have nothing intrinsically to do with the apriority of grace 
as such." ibid., pp. 172. 
175. Pius XII, Humanae Generis, 1950. 
176. cf. "Wlere an unconditional disJ?Osition has preceded the gift, 
such a gift can at rost be a part of a partial end of nature, and 
hence can only be unexacted in the sense in which nature itself is 
(i.e. God need no rore have created it than the whole of nature)." 
Rahner, "Concerning The Relationship Between Nature And Grace", 
T.I. Vol. I, pp. 307. cf. "~re he simply this existential, and 
were this his nature, then it would be unconditional in its 
essence, i.e. once it has been given the love which is God would 
have to be offered by God." ibid., pp. 313. 
177. ibid., pp. 305. cf. "~ hold that with these presuppositions 
grace and beati~k v:sion can n~ longer be said to be unexacted." 
ibid., pp. 304. cf. "Wly cannot the reality called nature be 
conceived simply as an inner moment in the concrete relationship 
to God, which is known as the order of grace, in such a way that 
if it is not given grace, it must always be thought of as always 
and completely meaningless and hence simply sinful?. The answer 
is: because grace understood as the absolute self-communication of 
God himself, must always presuppose as a condition of its own 
J?OSsibility (in order to be itself) someone to whom it can address 
itself and someone to whom it is not owed; which therefore means 
230 
also someone who can be thought of without contradiction even 
apart from this communication." id., "Philosophy And Theology", 
T.I. Vol. VI, pp. 75. -
178. cf. "But is this inner reference of man to grace a constituent of 
his nature in such away that the latter cannot be conceived 
without 1t, i.e. as pure nature, and hence such that the concept 
of natura pura becomes incapable of complete definition. It is at 
this point that we are bound to declare our inability to accept 
the view Which has been attributed to the nouvelle tn(eo199ie and 
has met with so much opposition." id., "Concern1ng The 
Relationship Between Nature And Grace", T.I. Vol. I, pp. 303. 
179. id., "Controversial Theology On Justification", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 
213. cf. "Grace is absolutely gratuitous, that~ as unmerited 
and indeed with respect to every finite existent, and prior to any 
and every sinful rejection of QJd by a finite subject." id., FCF, 
pp. 123. cf. "The gratuitousness of creation, as a free act of 
<bd, and grace as a free gift to the creature, as something 
already existing, are not one and the same gift of God's free 
act." id., "Nature And Grace", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 185. He 
continues-on to describe grace as belng "not merely not due to man 
as a sinner, but not due to man even as a creature." ibid., pp. 
185. 
180. He describes the Potentia Oboedientialis as the "natural 
existential," the "unlim1ted dynam1sm of the spiritual nature," 
id., "Concerning The Relationship Between Nature And Grace", T.I. 
Vol. I, pp. 315. 
181. cf., ibid., pp. 315. 
182. ibid. 
183. cf. "Since this transcendence of man, making him capable of 
objective knowledge and personal freedom, would be intelligible 
even if the offer of this divine self-communication had not 
occurred, it is not, even in the concrete human nature that 
exists, the inevitable consequence of God's act in creating the 
intelligible being man, but a free grace, in no way due to man 
even if we abstract from the sin Whereby man made himself 
positively un\\Urthy of this divine gift." id., "Grace", Cl'D, pp. 
303-309. cf., id., "Concerning The Relationship Between Nature 
And Grace", T.I. Vol. I, pp. 316. 
184. id., "On The Theology Of The Incarnation", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 115. 
185. cf. "A reality must be postulated in man Which remains over When 
the supernatural existential as unexacted is subtracted, and must 
have a meaning and a possibility of existence even When the 
supernatural existential is thought of as lacking (for otherwise 
this existential would necessarily be demanded precisely by the 
postulated reality, and it could only be unexacted with respect to 
a purely possible man, as an element in creation in general)." 
id., "Concerning The Relationship Between Nature And Grace", T.I. 
Vol. I, pp. 314. 
186. id., "Philosophy And Theology", T.I. Vol. VI, pp. 75. 
231 
187. cf., Shepherd, Man's Condition: God And The i'brld Process, pp. 
240-251. cf. 11 It is one th1ng to say that there is a logica 1 
sense in which nature can be thought of apart from its 
inextricable conjunction with grace ••• But it is quite another to 
move from such an assertion, Which is necessary to maintain 
gratuity of grace, to the temporal implication of the assertion 
that God created man a servant in order to make him a child 
through grace. Recipient, addressee, language is specious in this 
context, for it implies a temporal distinction among ontologically 
different epochs. This sort of language and implication is 
expressly denied in Rahner • s reject ion of any historical state of 
pure nature prior to grace. 11 ibid., pp. 250. 
188. cf. "Obviously, it continues to be possible to envisage an 
entirely distinct world order, without grace and without 
ordination to glory. Other alternatives for God are sufficient to 
safeguard the gratuity of God's action toward this world order. As 
it happened, God acted gratuitously to create a nature graced by 
his presence. Rejecting the possibility of other options given to 
him, one perhaps to Which grace would not be given with creation 
but would perhaps core later, and one perhaps with no grace at 
all, appears to lack theological warrant." ibid., pp. 258. 
189. cf. "But 'grace' always involves a 'plus',an abounding, a going 
beyond - expressed by Paul through his use of the intensive (Rom. 
5:16-17) and by Jesus in a story like that of the Prodigal Son." 
Gorringe, op. cit., pp. 115. 
190. E. Portali~, A Guide 'lb The Thought Of St. AuguStine, (translated 
by Bastian), 1960, pp. 188. quoted in P. Brown, AuguStine of 
Hippo: A Biography, (I.Dndon: Faber & Faber 1967), pp. 342. 
191. Gabriel Daly, Creation and Red~tion, pp. 10. 
192. Hardy and Ford also point to • invitation • as a nodel of divine 
causality cf. "If we look for the highest forms of causality known 
to us, according to the standards of recognition and respect, then 
a simple answer is found: speech. If we wish to cause someone to 
do something while respecting their freedom and integrity, we may 
speak and ask them. This is the form of causality mst 
characteristic of human beings. Speech may of course be coercive 
or backed by the threat of force, but that is not necessarily so, 
and at its best it works by invitation and information rather than 
by manipulation." Hardy and Ford, op. cit., pp. 79. 
193. cf., ibid., pp. 159-161. 
194. cf • , r.t:: OJol , A Rahner Reader, pp. 185. 
195. Rahner, "The Theological Concept Of Concupiscentia", T.I. Vol. I, 
pp. 347-382. 
196. id., "Grace", CTD, pp. 195, (italics mine). 
197. cf., id., ~. pp. 173. 
198. cf., J. B. Metz, Faith In Histo & Societ : TOward A Practical 
Fundamental Theology, (I.Dndon: Burns & cates 1980 I pp. 62-65. 
232 
cf. "The concept of experience that has been elaborated in the 
transcendental theology of the sUbject does not have the structure 
of historical experience. The social contradictions and mutually 
antagonistic aspects which form the basis of suffering in 
historical experience and in which the historical subject is 
constituted in fact disappear," ibid., pp. 65. cf., D. Lane, 
Fbundations Fbr A Social Theel Praxis, Process And Salvation, 
Dublin: Gill & Macmillan 1984 , pp. 10-11. 
233 
CHAPTER SIX: CHRisr THE CONSUMMATION OF SALVATION HISTORY. 
6.1 Introduction. 
As we 
existential, 
noted in Chapter Five, 
Rahner holds that 
when discussing the supernatural 
God's self-conununicat ion which is 
transcendentally granted in and through the historical order seeks to 
attain to ever greater purity. Fbr this reasbn, he maintains that 
God's transcendental sel f-conununicat ion looks for an insurpassable, 
irrevocable, historical consununation whereby God is truly present in 
the historical order. Fbr Rahner, the irrevocable climax of God's 
transcendental self-conununication is to be found in ,Jesus, the God-man 
(1). Jesus is at once the radical fulfilment of God's offer of self to 
the human person and the radical fulfilment of the human person's 
acceptance of this offer (2). In as much as the person of Christ is 1 
the climax of God's transcendental self-communication in human history, 
Christ is the climax of salvation history (3). Hence, for Rahner 
Christology and soteriology are inextricably linked. Jesus is the 
absolute saviour in that he is the self-communication of God (4). The 
present chapter will be concerned with an extended analysis of Rahner 's 
understanding of Jesus as the God-man. Firstly we shall ask how it is 
that a human can be God and how can God become a human? We sha 11 
follow Rahner as he seeks to answer these questions through his 
"Transcendental Christology" (5). Then we shall explore why Rahner 
holds that the possibility of the God-man has occurred definitively in 
Jesus of Nazareth. We wi 11 seek to understand Rahner 's intentions in 
bringing soteriology and Christology together. What exactly does l 
Rahner intend by claiming that Christ's soteriological significance 
lies in the fact that Christ is the irrevocable climax of God's self-
communication? We will proceed to ask whether or not Rahner is 
..J 
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prevented from achieving his 
transcendental starting point. 
soteriological 
We will ask 
aims due 
whether 
to his 
Rahner's 
transcendental premise does not inevitably reduce Christ to the level 
of a sign 
importance 
Finally, we 
of God's presence anongst us and Christ's soteriological 
to the level of an assurc>'lce that God wills to forgive us? 
sha U explore the adequacy of the ways in which Rahner 
attempts to overcome these tensions in his thought through seeking to 
establish the principle that "He who is unchangeable in himself can 
himself become subject to change in something else" (6). First we will 
turn our attention to Rahner's transcendental Christology. 
6.2 Transcendental Christology. 
6.2.1 Background. 
Having decreed God to be the transcendent horizon of alL human 
knowledge and volition, Rahner must guard himself against two 
unacceptable possibilities if he is to maintain a genuinely revealing 
self-presence of God in the historical order. Firstly, he must avoid 
subsuming the historical order under the transcendental order of God's 
self-expression in the manner which Hegelian Idealism tends towards. 
This would reduce the historical order to being the self-expression of 
God. Secondly, Rahner must avoid inferring that there is an 
unbridgeable chasm between the absolute, eternal, unchanging realm on 
the one hand and the finite, temporal, changing realm on the other 
hand. 
The first of these options does not allow any genuine reality to 
the historical order. On this basis, revelation cannot be understood 
to be the presence of God in the historical order (indeed at its JOC>st 
extreme such an option would equate history and revelation), Jesus 
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cannot be thought of as genuinely human and historical, his humanity 
would merely be the visage through which God expressed Godself. The 
practical result would be the same as monophysitism. Rahner is well 
aware of the unacceptability of this position. Along with the 
tradition, Rahner affirms that the absolute saviour must be thought of 
as truly human if he is to be the self-communication of God to human 
history ( 7). 
The second opt ion poses an irreconcilable gulf between the 
transcendental order and the historical order. This would seem to rule 
out the possibility of God's presence in the historical order and hence 
the possibility of genuine revelation. Whilst this option, in contrast 
to the first, seeks to take the historical realm seriously, the 
historical realm still cannot be the locus of genuine revelation. At 
best the historical realm is a window onto the infinite. Whilst the 
historical order is not illusion, it is changing and temporal, and 
hence only a pointer to What is permanent, absolute and transcendental. 
This option allows Christ's true humanity to be affirmed, but it limits 
the significance of Christ to the level of a man Who points towards the 
eternal, the rost adequate cipher of God's presence. Again Rahner 
sides with tradition in finding such a position inadequate and holding 
to the belief that in Jesus God was truly present arongst us (8). 
Hence Rahner seeks to distance himself from each of these I 
positions. In contrast to being a mere visage, a moment in God's self-
expression, Rahner maintains that Jesus is truly human. In contrast to 
being a mere cipher of God's presence, Rahner maintains that Jesus is 
truly God. Indeed, Rahner assets that Jesus' humanity is truly the 
existence of God, this is What he takes to be the meaning of the 
hypostatic union (9). However, Whilst Rahner affirms the Chalcedonian J 
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formula of two natures in one person he is not content to simply re 
state it, he sees it both as an "end and as beginning" (10). Beyond 
the statement of the reality of God's presence in, and ontological 
union with, the human reality of Jesus, Rahner pursues such questions 
as: How is it possible for a human to be thought of as God? How is it 
possible for God to be really present as a human? What conditions must 
be met if this is to be thought of as having occurred? It is for this -, 
purpose that Rahner pursues his transcendental Christology, which "asks 
about the a priori possibilities in man which make the coming of 
message of Christ possible" (11). 
the 
Essentially Rahner 's approach is to claim that the idea of the ' 
God-man ,~~~~~=-~!~ both the radical fulfilment of humanity's 
transcendental openness to God and the radical fulfilment of God's 
transcendental self-communication to humanity. It \\OUld be recognised 
in one who's life and death accepted God's self-communication and which 
was 
to 
seen to be accepted as such by God. 
Rahner's transcendental Christology 
Before we turn our attention 
in greater detail it is 
important to note that whilst Rahner may intend to avoid the two 
unacceptable positions that we have mentioned, it is not at all certain 
that he in fact manages to escape the second option. Indeed our 
..J 
central criticism of Rahner 's Christology and soteriology will lie in 
the claim that he does not explain how God who is the transcendent ') 
horizon of all reality can also be thought of as genuinely present in 
the historical order. This is not to decry Rahner for not having 
presented an a priori proof of God's presence in the historical order -
something we would not ask of any theologian. Our claim will be that 
the foundations of Rahner's own system resist his desire to affirm the 
presence of God in the historical order and that he fails to adduce any 
sufficient arguments to reconcile this incoherency. 
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6.2.2 The God-man as the radical fulfilment of humanity's 
transcendental openness to God. 
We saw in Chapter Three that Rahner holds that every act of 
knowledge and freedom is orientated towards God (12). In this manner 
he understands the human person to be the place where the tendency of 
matter to transcend itself into spirit (13) becomes self-reflective 
(14): "By his very nature and by his very essence man is the 
fOSSibility of transcendence which has become conscious of itself." 
( 15) Further, the human person hopes that s/he is orientated to God not' 
only as the distant \\Oraufhin of human transcendence but rather 
immediately in grace (16). Indeed, Rahner claims that for this hope to 
be possible at all it must already be held in being by the gift of 
God's self-communication (17). Hence it is that Rahner believes that 
the human person cannot be eXhaustively defined but can only be defined 
in terms of his/her openness for the immediacy of God ( 18) : 
Man can be expressed only by talking about something else: 
about God, who he is not. It is impossible to engage in 
anthropology without having first engaged in theology, since 
man is pure reference to God. (19) 
...J 
In his/her very being the human person is open to the being of God,1 
indeed this is the very essence of the human person (20). The human 
person's being is dependent U(X>n, and constituted by, a sharing in the 
divine being. This leads to a unique relationship between God and the 
human person. W'lereas in nost situations dependence upon something and 
radical autonomy from it increase in inverse proportions, Rahner claims 
that in the case of the creaturely relationship with the creator, (and 
in particular in the human person's relationship with God) radical 
dependence and genuine autonomy increase in direct proportion: "There j 
lies the mystery of that active creation which is God's alone. Radical 
dependence upon him increases in direct, and not in inverse, 
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proportion with genuine self-coherence before him." (21) Hence, the -1 
oore radically dependent upon God a human subject is, the oore truly 
human that person wi 11 be. The fullest and oost radical expression of 
genuine human 1 ife will be found in that person who is oost radically 
united with God. We hear echoes here of Irenaeus: "Fbr the glory of 
God is a living man: and the Life of man is the vision of God." (22) _1 
Rahner 1 s understanding of the radical fulfilment of the human 1 
person 1 s potential as lying in an absolute openness to and dependence 
upon God presents him with a way of trying to understand how it is that 
a human person might be God. He believes the doctrine of the 
hypostatic union to be the radical statement that the human person is 
most genuinely autonomous from God precisely when the human person is 
most radically united with God (23). The possibility of the God-man 
asserts that the God-man is oost truly man because he is truly God and 
vice versa { 24) • Fbr Rahner, the idea of the God-man represents the 
c 1 imax of human openness to God: 
Seen from this perspective, the incarnation of God is the 
unique and highest instance of the actualization of the 
essence of human reality, which consists in this: That man 
is insofar as he abandons himself to the absolute mystery 
whom we call God. { 25) J 
In this manner, Rahner argues for an intrinsic unity between human 
transcendence in grace and the possibility of the incarnation. Grace 
does not simply stem from the incarnation on juridical grounds, rather 
the incarnation represents the climax of human transcendence in grace 
{26). Rahner claims that an intrinsic unity between the incarnation 
and human transcendence is suggested by the fact that the intrinsic 
effect of the incarnation, {i.e. the granting to Jesus of an immediate 
vision of God), is precisely what is taken to be the goal and 
fulfilment of all human transcendence {27). Fbr this reason, Rahner 
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believes that the tradition itself suggests that the hypostatic union 
brings human transcendence to its fulfilment. Fbr Rahner divinity and 
humanity are not irreconcilable. On the contrary, it is only through 
maintaining an inadequate understanding of human nature that one can 
rule out the possibility of the God-man: 
Only someone who forgets that the essence of man... is to be 
unbounded (thus in this sense, to be un-definable) can 
suppose that it is impossible for there to be a man, Who, 
precisely by being man in the fullest sense (which we never 
attain), is God's Existence into the world. (28) 
Ibwever, Rahner does not intend to reduce the incarnation to the 
level of the inevitably attained asymptote of human transcendence. 
There could be human life without it ever resulting in the incarnation 
(29). The incarnation is not the result of the upward evolution of 
graced human life into divine Life. Rather it consists in human Life 
being asswned by the word of God and brought to its radical fulfilment. 
Fbr Rahner it is not the incarnation that is dependent upon graced 
human life as its inevitable climax but rather graced human life Which 
is dependent upon God's intention to become man ( 30). For Rahner, all 
grace is orientated towards the incarnation without, however, making 
the incarnation inevitable. In other words: The potentia 
oboedientialis of the human person for the supernatural existential can 
be seen to be a potentia oboedientialis for the incarnation. Rahner 
identifies the human person's essence with this potentia oboedientialis 
for the incarnation (31). In answer then to the question as to how it 
is possible for a human person to be thought of as God, Rahner 's reply 
is that the human person is the potentia oboedientialis for the 
incarnation. Fbr this reason, he states: "Christology may be studied 
as self-transcending anthropology, and anthropology as deficient 
Christology." (32) We now turn our attention to the question as to how 
God might be thought of as becoming a human person. 
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6.2.3 The God-man as the radical fulfilment of God's transcendental 
self-communication to the human person. 
we have already seen that the ability of God to create something 
other than Godself is derived from the m::>re prim::>rdial ability of God 
to communicate God's self to God's other. Indeed, he refers to 
creatures as the "grammar of God's possible self-expression" (33). 
Rahner further claims that God's ability to communicate Godself to 
God's other derives from the necessity with which God expresses God to 
God through the Logos: 
It is because God must express himself inwardly that he can 
also utter himself outwardly; the finite, created utterance 
ad extra is a continuation of the immanent constitution of 
1mage and likeness a free continuation because its, object 
is finite - and takes place in fact through the Logos (Jn 
1:3) (34). 
Rahner develops his "Theology Of The Symbol" ( 35) in order to explicate 
how the LDgos expresses God to God inwardly and is thus capable of 
expressing God outwardly to God's other. He distinguishes between 
representational ~ls and real symbols (36). A representational 
symbol is where one existent acts as a sign or cipher for another quite 
independent existent. In this case there is no intrinsic connection 
between the reality and the concept that accidentally indicates it. In 
contrast, a real symbol is the "highest and m::>st prim::>rdial manner in 
which one reality can represent another" (37). In this case there is 
an intrinsic connection between the symbol and the reality, the symbol 
allows the reality to be there: "One reality renders another present 
J 
(primarily for itself and only secondarily for others)." ( 38) 
Rahner maintains that all beings are symbolic. He claims that 
this is primarily so that a being can be present to itself and only 
secondarily in order for the being to communicate itself to others 
(39). He further claims that a being and its symbol cannot be 
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separated and thought of as something other: "The symbol strictly 
speaking (symbolic reality) is the self- realization of a being in the 
other, which is constitutive of its essence." (40) Rahner identifies 
God's symbol with the I.Dgos, the word of God ( 41) • He refers to the 
theology of the Logos as the supreme form of the theology of the symbol 
(42). He understands the I.Dgos to be the "image and expression of the 
Father" (43) who communicates God to God in the immanent divine life. 
The Logos Who is the immanent divine self-expression is capable of 
expressing and communicating God to God's other. Ibwever, all such 
self-expressions in that they take place through the finite realm are 
surpassable by other finite mediations. Only if it was possible to I 
assert that in a given situation a finite reality was the reality of 
God present in the finite order would it be possible to claim an 
insurpassable and irrevocable self-communication on God's part. Rahner 
claims that this is precisely What is to be understood by the doctrine 
of the hypostatic union, that in the God-man the human reality is God's 
own reality (44). He utilises his understanding of the Logos as the 
real symbol of God in order to explicate how this is so. 
In contrast to the tradition stemming from Augustine onwards, 
Which maintained that any of the divine persons could have become man, 
Rahner claims that this only possible for the Logos Who is the divine 
self-expression (45). Rahner rules out the possibility of there being 
merely an external relation between the humanity of the God-man and the 
Logos. The humanity cannot be thought of as a visage through which God 
is revealed, rather it is the Logos expressing itself in this human 
reality: 
The humanity of Christ is not to be considered as something 
in Which God dresses up and masquerades - a mere signal of 
which he makes use, so that something audible can be uttered 
about the Logos by means of this signal. (46) 
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Hence the humanity of the God-man is not something which exists prior 
to its assumption by the I.Dgos, it is that which comes to be when the 
I.Dgos empties itself and expresses itself in human form (47): "The 
humanity is the self-disclosure of the Logos itself, so that when C<d, 
expressing himself, exteriorizes himself, that very thing appears which 
we call the humanity of the I.Dgos." (48) The humanity of the God-man, 
because it is the humanity of the Logos, is the most adequate symbol of 
God in the created order and the radical fulfilment of God's 
transcendental self-communication (49). The I.Dgos can become a human 
person because the I.Dgos seeks to conununicate God to God's other and 
assuming a human nature is the most adequate means of achieving this. 
Hence, for Rahner the ultimate definition of the hLLnan person is that 
s/he is: "that which comes to be when God's self-expression, his W:>rd 
is uttered into the emptiness of the Godless void in love." (SO) 
Having looked briefly at the notion of the God-man and at how it 
represents the fulfilment both of the human person's openness to God 
and of God's self-communication to the human· person, we shall now turn 
our attention to the conditions which Raf:.aer believes must be met if we 
are to ascribe the idea of the Q:rl.-man to any person. 
6.2.4 The conditions that the absolute saviour must fulfil. 
When discussing the supernatural existential in Olapter Five we 
noted Rahner 's belief that God's transcendenta 1 self-conununication in 
grace must be mediated historically. So also he claims that it is not 
sufficient to just have the idea of the absolute saviour, rather we 
must look for the historical establishment of this (51). Indeed, 
ultimately our idea of the absolute saviour is dependent upon its 
historical realization and not vice-versa (52). Rahner distinguishes 
two ways in which the coming of the absolute saviour could proclaim the 
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irreversible, final and eschatological self-communication of God. It 
could either be an absolute fulfilment which announces the end of 
history or it could be an event within an ongoing history which makes 
the promise irrevocable without bringing history to its end in a final 
fulfilment (53). Rahner maintains that for God's transcendent, 
salvific, self-communication to be established in an eschatologically 
irrevocable manner then it must have the character both of offer and 
acceptance. That is, it must be both the definitive offer of God's 
self-communication to the human person and the definitive acceptance of 
this offer by the human person (54) • Hence, for Rahner, the absolute 
saviour will have to be one who is conscious of being God's self-
communication in an absolute sense such that this offer is inseparable 
from his/her very person. FUrther, the absolute saviour must show by 
his/her life and death that this offer has been accepted in an equally 
irrevocable manner. Finally, the life and death of the Absolute 
Saviour must be seen to be vindicated by God in a manner which confirms 
that God accepts this person as the eschatological event of God's self-
communication: 
The categoriality of God's irreversible offer of himself to 
the ~rld as a whole... can only be a man who on the one 
hand surrenders every inner~rldly future in death, and who 
on the other hand in this acceptance of death is shown to 
have been accepted by God finally and definitively. (55) 
Before we turn to consider Jesus Christ as the historical 
actualisation of the absolute saviour, it will profit us to consider 
further the significance which Rahner ascribes to death. l'e noted in 
Chapter Three that human freedom for Rahner is not geared towards an 
endless series of disparate choices but rather towards a final self-
realization (56). Hence, if one is to think in terms of life after 
death then it cannot be understood simply to be a continuance of the 
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temporal sequence that went before. Death marks an end, a cessation of 
being able to cl1ange: 
In this respect death marks an end for the Whole person. 
Anyone Who simply allows time to "continue" for man's soul 
beyond his death so that new time arises gets into 
insuperable difficulties both in the understanding and in 
the existentiell actualization of the true finality of ~n 
Which takes place in death. (57) 
Thus, the finality Which we aim at through our free choices of self, in 
Which we create ourselves (58), is achieved in death (59). Life after 
death can only be understood as the radical establishment and eternal 
validity of the person that one has chosen to be (60). Death does not 
simply mark the end of an otherwise continuing life and capture it in 
this state for eternity rather like a "freeze-frame photograph" might 
do. There is a far more intrinsic relationship between human freedom 
and death than this would allow. Human freedom is essentially freedom 
to choose or reject God, that is the freedom as to Whether one will 
submit to another will than one's own. It is precisely this choice 
that confronts us most profoundly in the anticipation and actualisation 
of our death. There we are confronted in an ultimate way with our own 
finitude and powerlessness (61). The choice is ours as to Whether we 
will rebel against our death in a last despairing ~ to God or whether 
we will accept the condition of being given over entirely to other 
things and so hand ourselves over to God (62). When viewed in this 
manner we see that there is an intrinsic connect ion between freedom and 
death. Our individual acts of freedom through Which we make of 
ourselves a ~or no to God already anticipate the moment of death 
when we will be confronted in the starkest way with our own 
p:JWerlessness before God. Our death can thus be seen to be something 
that extends throughout our life in as much as we hand ourselves over 
to God (63). Fbw we have died to self during our life will affect how 
we die at the end of our .lives. Hence, our death does not merely freeze 
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our otherwise continuing life. In the final powerlessness of death our 
entire Life is gathered up and the response that we have been making to 
God throughout our lives is realized in a radical manner : 
The dying man, who of his freedom possesses his own Life, 
nevertheless inescapably confronts death with a demand that 
it must canst i tute the sum total of his life as an act of 
freedom in whiCh the whole of life is gathered up. (64) 
Hence it is that Rahner lays so much emphasise upon the death of the 
absolute saviour. The absolute saviour will be recognised as the 
irrevocable offer of God's self-communication which has been accepted 
through abandonment to God only if his/her death can be seen to fulfil 
the abandonment to God which has characterised his/her Life. Further 
it must seen to be vindicated by God as such: 
This free and definitive acceptance of God's offer of 
himself, which makes God's word to the world eschatological 
and predestines world history to salvation, can come about 
only by the death of the person who freely accepts that 
offer: a death of course which must be seen as 
redeemed. (65) 
6.3 Jesus, the absolute saviour, the God-man, the irrevocable self-
communication of God and the eschatological consummation of 
salvation history. 
Along with the Christian tradition, Rahner proclaims that the 
transcendental idea of the God-man, the irrevocable self-communication 
of God, has found its historical establishment in Jesus of Nazareth 
(66). He claims that were we to search the entire history of the human 
race, none other would stand out as capable of bearing this title in 
the manner which Jesus does (67). Rahner identifies God's self-
communication with salvation. Hence, the God-man, Jesus, who is the 
irrevocable self-communication of God is the absolute saviour, the 
eschatological consummation of salvation history on Whom the salvation 
of each one of us depends ( 68) • 
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~ will discuss Hahner's ontological soteriology in greater detail 
in {6.4) and {6.5). It is sufficient at this stage to note Rahner's 
identification of Christology and soteriology. Christ's acts are not 
just thought to be redemptive in virtue of the dignity of his person. 
Nor is Christ's person thought to be divine in virtue of What he has 
accomplished. Rather Christ is in his very being the establishment of 
salvation in that he is the God-man, the irrevocable self-conununication 
of God to the human race. It is inadequate to describe Christology and 
soteriology as being related in Rahner's theology. Christology does 
not merely suffuse soteriology, nor does soteriology merely give rise 
to Christology. Christology and soteriology are identified. Christ's 
work is his person manifested through his life and death. 
Hahner does not simply seek to impose a post-Easter understanding 
of Jesus as the God-M:ln upon the historical Jesus. He is well aware 
that such an approach would reduce Christian faith to the level of 
mythology. fbwever, al9ng with the New Testament, Rahner holds there 
to be a continuity between the Christ of faith and the Christ of 
history. He maintains that Christian faith is sol idly founded upon the 
historical Jesus (70). He accepts that we have to constantly inquire 
as to What we can know about the Jesus of history, but maintains that 
we can know about him is beyond dispute {71). In this manner, he 
maintains that scriptural study provides us both with objects of faith 
(Jesus of faith) for dogmatic theology and with grounds of faith (Jesus 
of history) for fundamental theology (72). It is the task of historical 
study of the New Testament to lay such grounds of faith bare ( 73) • 
Hahner claims that there are only two absolutely necessary grounds for 
us to be able to claim continuity between the Jesus of history and the 
Christ of faith. Firstly, that Jesus saw himself not just as one 
anongst many prophets but rather as "the eschatological prophet, as the 
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absolute and definitive saviour" (74). Secondly, his self-
understanding can be seen to have been vindicated by God in a manner 
that is credible from the perspective of our transcendental experience. 
Rahner finds the first ground in Jesus' proclamation of the immanent 
arrival of the Kingdom of God and the second ground in the resurrection 
of Jesus. We turn now to examine his treatment of each of these grounds 
in greater detail. 
Rahner considers it to be firmly established from contemporary 
exegesis that the pre-Easter Jesus saw himself as the "absolute 
eschatological event of salvation and the eschatological bringer of 
salvation" {75). The grounds for this claim are to be found in the 
radical nature of Jesus' message of the immanent arrival of the Kingdom 
of God with his person. Unlike the prophets who called people to renew 
a relationship that already existed between them and God and who's 
message could always be surpassed, Jesus stands as one who presents a 
new and insurpassable SUIDIOOns of God. "Jesus, then, proclaimed the 
immanence of God's Kingdom as the~ present situation of an absolute 
decision for or against salvation." (76) Further, it is significant 
that this message of the new and irrevocable presence of God is given 
precisely by this person Jesus. His message is inextricably tied to 
his person and makes at very least an implicit claim for his person: 
According to his own self-understanding he is already before 
the resurrection the one sent, the one who inaugurates the 
Kingdom of God through what he says and what he does in a 
way that it did not exist before, but now does exist through 
him and in him. At least in this sense the pre-resurrection 
Jesus already knew himself to be the absolute and 
insurpassable saviour. {77) 
The connect ion between Jesus' person and his message is evidenced by 
the way in which he makes the decision at the Last Judgement dependent 
upon a decision vis~-vis his own person. Fbr Rahner, the radical 
nature of the identity between the message and person of Jesus is shown 
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by Jesus' death. He dies because of his message and for his message 
believing that through his death God will vindicate him ( 78). As we 
mentioned earlier, Rahner believes that it is only in and through our 
death that we can dispose of ourselves in our entirety ( 79). Hence it 
is in his death that Jesus disposes of himself rost fully as the one 
who in his person is the inbreaking Kingdom of God (80). 
Turning to what Rahner takes to be the second ground for affirming 
a continuity between the Jesus of history and the Jesus of faith we see 
that Rahner holds, with the New Testament, that the resurrection is not 
merely an object of faith but rather a ground of faith. He holds there 
to be an intrinsic unity between the death and resurrection of Jesus 
(81) such that the resurrection is: "The permanent, redeemed, final 
and definitive validity of the single and unique life of Jesus who 
achieved the permanent and final validity of his life precisely 
through his death in freedom and obedience." (82) The resurrection can 
be seen as God's seal upon Jesus' life (83) and his claim that "there 
is present with him a new and insurpassable closeness of God which on 
its part will prevai 1 victoriously and is inseparable from him" (84). 
Rather than faith in Jesus' resurrection, and hence faith in the risen 
Jesus, being projected back onto the pre-resurrection Jesus, Rahner 
believes the resurrection to be the validation and explicit 
manifestation of what was already true of Jesus' life. The 
resurrection does not make Jesus the absolute saviour rather it 
vindicates his claim to be the final and insurpassable historical 
presence of God's word of self-disclosure. In this sense the 
resurrection Shows Jesus to be absolute saviour (85). 
Should it be objected that Rahner can hardly appeal to the 
resurrection of Jesus as a ground of faith as so many people find the 
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reality of the resurrection difficult to accept, Rahner would only 
reply that far from being difficult to believe in, the hope in personal 
resurrection is a transcendental of human life. He has claimed that 
human freedom is the creation and disposition of self in a manner that 
seeks for a unified, final self-expression that can only be achieved in 
death. Rahner maintains that such an understanding of freedom includes 
within it the implicit hope that an individual's personal history will 
be successful and conclusive. Rahner identifies this hope with the 
hope for a personal resurrection (86). It is the hope for the abiding 
validity of a person's single and entire existence (87). Hence, Rahner 
argues 
faith 
that the resurrection of Jesus can be thought of as a ground of 
(and not just believed in as an object of faith) in that it 
resonates with and fulfils a hope that all men and women share. 
Before we seek to establish the precise significance which Rahner 
seeks to accord to Jesus as the climax of God's transcendent self-
conununication it is necessary to make some observations on his 
identification of Jesus as the absolute saviour. Rahner perceives the 
need to root the Christ of faith in the Jesus of history. However, it 
is questionable as to what degree he has actually achieved this. He 
states that the Jesus of history can be thought of as the climax of 
God's self-conununicat ion, but he does not necessarily establish how or 
~that this is so. The grounds that Rahner adduces can be reduced to 
the fact that Jesus claimed to be the definitive presence of God 
amongst us and that this claim was vindicated by his resurrection. 
However, he shows no concern to develop this in terms of what it meant 
in Jesus' life, how it was that people experienced the presence of God 
amongst them in this man Jesus. Historical study of the New Testament 
reveals that Jesus' self-consciousness of being the eschatological 
agent of the Kingdom of God was not a static, formal knowledge of his 
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essence. It was a consciousness of being the one in and through whom 
the liberating, redeeming presence of God was at work in an 
eschatologically final and irrevocable manner. So also, the witness of 
the earliest disciples is that people did not simply meet Jesus as one 
who declared with authority that he was the definitive presence of God 
amongst them. They met him as one in whom the 1 iberating and redeeming 
presence of God was at work in a definitive manner. Again, the 
resurrect ion was not rationally experienced as a formal validation of a 
claim made by Jesus. It was experienced as a participation in the 
redeemed life that had been experienced in and through the ministry of 
Jesus. However, Rahner shows no interest in developing the 
experiential implications of What it means that Jesus was the presence 
of God a.nongst men and women. He rests content with the statement that 
Jesus can be thought to be such because that is how he considered 
himself to be and that this claim was vindicated by his resurrection. 
Rahner 1 s formal statement on this point reminds us of his earlier 
formalism (Chapter Five) When he rests content with stating that we are 
redeemed by God 1 s se 1 f-conununicat ion in grace without exploring how 
this is so. ~ feel compelled to agree with I:aly: 
~ have to ask searching questions about the historical Jesus 
of Nazareth; Who he was, what he preached, and Why the 
religious and civil authorities decreed his destruction ••• 
~stical and cosmic theories can come later, but their 
credibility will ultimately depend upon their being rooted 
in certain historically specifiable events which took 
place in first-century Palestine. (88) 
~ will return to these points in section 6.5 when we have to consider 
Rahner 's understanding of the soteriological implications of Christ as 
the irrevocable self-conununication of God. First let us clarify our 
understanding of the status of Christ in Rahner 1 s theology. 
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6.4 Christ as ground and goaL of God's transcendental self-
conununica t ion: 
Approving wholeheartedly of the Scotist emphasis upon the 
incarnation as the crown of creation (89) Rahner understands the 
significance of Christ in a way that complements his understanding of 
God's transcendental sel f-conununicat ion to all men and \'K>men in grace. 
He considers creation, (with its orientation to God's transcendental 
self-conununication in grace) and the incarnation to be t\'K> noments of 
the one process of God's self-giving ( 90) • As we saw in Chapter Five, 
the transcendental revelation of God seeks objectification. This gives 
rise to a history of revelation which in turns seeks an irrevocable 
historical climax. Fbr Rahner and Scotus alike this climax is to be 
found irt the God-man, Jesus, the point to which all creation has been 
moving (91). The incarnation marks that stage of the world's evolution 
when the divinisation of humanity has started: 
we give the title of saviour simply to that historical person 
who, coming in space and time, signifies that beginning of 
God's absolute conununication of himself which inaugurates 
this self-communication for all men as something happening 
irrevocably and which shows this to be happening. (92) 
However, there are two potential difficulties with such an 
understanding of Christ's significance. Firstly, in claiming a 
continuity between Christ and God's transcendental self-communication, 
do we not inevitably reduce Christ to the level of other 
objectifications of God's transcendental se 1 £-communication? D::>es not 
Christ become reduced to the level of a cipher of God's presence, 
albeit the most adequate cipher, but a cipher nevertheless? Secondly, 
if the incarnation is understood as the climax of creation, the highest 
point in the evolution of matter, does the incarnation not inevitably 
become subswned under the creative process? D::>es not the God-man 
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become reduced to an inevitably reached stage in the evolutionary 
process, rather than being a free self-communication of the free God? 
(93) 
Rahner seeks to close the door to the first objection, (that 
Christ is reduced to the level of a cipher), by claiming that there is 
an absolute (although not essential) difference between God's self-
communication in Christ and God's transcendental self-communication in 
grace. Whether in fact Rahner's position is adequately maintained is a 
question that we wi 11 turn to in section 6.6. Rahner does not simply 
hold Christ to be a heightened JOOde of God's transcendental self-
communication. Such a heightened JOOde would still be surpassable. He 
holds Christ to be the absolute climax of God's self-communication. 
Fbr Rahner, Christ is the place where God's self-communication really 
becomes self-communication in an absolute manner. Hence Christ can be 
thought of as the absolute beginning of God's self-communication (94). 
Whereas in any other event of self-communication God communicates 
Godse!£ to, in and through, what is other than Godself, the human 
reality of Jesus is really and truly the human reality of the I.Dgos. 
'Iherefore in Quist, God communicates Godse!£ to, in and through, God's 
own reality. 'Ihe incarnation is the event of God's self-communication 
(95). 
'lb the second objection, (that a continuity between graced 
creation and the incarnation compromises the gratuity of the Christ 
event through reducing it to an inevitable outworking of the 
evolutionary process), Rahner seeks to cover himself in two ways. 
Firstly, he argues that whilst the created order as it is given is 
orientated towards the incarnation as its fulfilled climax, it could 
have been otherwise. 'Ihe incarnation was not inevitable, the created 
253 
order could have been orientated in a different way without being 
frustrated (96). The argument here reflects his earlier argument that 
although concretely experienced human nature is orientated towards 
grace and is fulfi Ued in grace, things could have been different. 
Secondly, Rahner argues that far from the incarnation being subsumed 
under creation and being reduced to the level of the inevitable climax 
of the creative process, in contrast the incarnation is both the ground 
and the goal of the creative process. Rahner develops this argument in 
various articles and it is worthy of lengthier treatment. 
In Chapter Five we noted that the priroc>rdial possibility of God 
is to conununicate Godself in grace. It is from this primary 
possibility that the possibility of God creating finite things other 
than Godself is derived. Fbr Rahner, the priroc>rdial possibility of 
God's self-communication reaches its climax in the incarnation. Hence, 
it is the possibility of the incarnation that grounds the possibility 
of creation and not vice versa. Creation, for Rahner, is held to be a 
reduced roc>de of what God achieves fully in the incarnation (97). It is 
for this reason that Rahner views the incarnation as the climax of 
creation, and not because the incarnation is an inevitable evolutionary 
development. 
In keeping with his principle that the lesser is grounded in the 
possibility of the greater and not vice-versa, Rahner further maintains 
that the possibility of the incarnation is not only what God's 
transcendental self-conununication is geared towards but is what makes 
this transcendental self-communication possible (98). As we have 
already noted, Rahner refers to the incarnation as the absolute 
beginning of God's self-communication (99). Rahner argues that the 
dynamism behind a historical roc>vement is provided by the goal towards 
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which it m:>ves. Hence he maintains that the incarnation can be 
understood to be the "Fina 1 Cause" ( 100) of God's universal self-
communi cat ion and not just its effect: 
In so far as a historical nnvement lives by virtue of its end 
even in its beginnings, because the real essence of its 
dynamism is the desire for the goal, it is completely 
legitimate to understand the whole movement of God's self-
communication to the human race as borne by this saviour 
even when it is taking place temporally prior to the event 
of its irrevocable coming to be in the saviour. (101) 
In as much as all grace can be thought of as being given on 
account of its final and irrevocable manifestation in Christ, then all 
grace is to be thought of as being the grace of Christ. Rahner holds 
that this is true even of the supralapsarian grace of the "original 
state" (102). Further, the Spirit is to be thought of as being the 
Spirit of Christ (103). In this manner Bahner is able to formulate his 
fannus and influentiul theory of "Anonynnus Christianity" (104). If 
grace is everywhere and is always Christ's grace, then all people are 
always in relationship with Christ whether they realise it or not 
(lOS). Rahner claims that his theory of anonynnus Christianity finds 
scriptural backing when Jesus claims that anyone who loves his/her 
neighOOur loves himself (106). We may compare here Bahner's 
identification of love of God and love of neighbour that we discussed 
in Chapter Three. 
The results of our investigation into the status of Christ in 
Rahner' s theology reveals the following: He wishes to understand 
Christ's significance in continuity with the created order and God's 
transcendental self-communication. He does not intend to either reduce 
Christ to the level of a cipher of God • s presence or to subsume the 
Christ-event under the graced created order such that it becomes the 
inevitable outgrowth of evolution. In contrast, Rahner maintains that 
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Christ is the presence of God as a human, the ultimate cause of God's 
transcendental self-communication. However, we must restate that if 
Rahner wants to avoid reducing Christ to the level of a cipher by 
maintaining that he is the presence of God, then he must do more than 
simply state this in a formalistic manner due to the tendencies of his 
own theological foundations. 
As we have seen in Chapters Three and Five, Rahner builds his 
philosophical and theological system on a transcendental analysis of 
the ultimate conditions of human knowing and willing which discloses 
God as the transcendent, distant horizon of human finitude. It is only 
after establishing this premise that Rahner turns to ask whether the 
transcendent horizon of Holy MYstery is not only present as the 
absolutely distant one but also as the absolutely near one in loving 
self-communication. That is, the question of God's involvement in the 
historical order, in Rahner's system, is consequent upon the prior 
establishment of God as the transcendent horizon of human finitude. 
Further, Rahner 's concept of God as the distant horizon of human 
finitude does not require the involvement of God in the historical 
order, with classical theism it allows God to stand outside the 
historical order. Rather than representing a creative reformulation of 
transcendence and immanence, Rahner's staring point seems laden with 
the dualistic assumptions of the classic tradition (107). The problem 
is that, in the terms in which Rahner develops his system, 
transcendence and immanence are in tension and it is a transcendental 
perspective on the transcendent, distant God that has precedence. 
Hence, there is a real question as to how the God who is the distant 
horizon of human finitude can be genuinely present-and active in the 
historical order. It is not sufficient for Rahner to simply state that 
this is so, it is necessary for him to explain how this is so in a way 
256 
that coheres with the foundations of his own theology. If Rahner 
settles for a formal statement that God is present in the historical 
order in Christ then, despite his intentions, the terms of his own 
theology will inevitably tend to reduce Christ to the level of a 
cipher. ~shall return to this point later in the present chapter. 
\matever we may be forced to conclude about the actual status of 
Christ within Rahner's theology when viewed as a Whole, it is vital for 
us to realise that he genuinely intends to avoid reducing Christ to the 
level of a cipher. Only if we appreciate this point will we be 
equipped to understand the soteriological import Which Rahner wants to 
accord to Christ as the irrevocable self-conununication of GXI. It is 
the difference as to Whether Rahner intends Christ to be understood as 
an expression and reassurance of GXI's will to forgive humanity or 
whether he can be understood as the cause of human redemption. 'lb this 
question we now turn our attention. 
6:5 Rahner's Ontological Soteriology 
In the previous section we observed that Hahner follows Scotus in 
viewing the incarnation as the crown of creation. He further follows 
Scotus in locating Christ's soteriological significance in terms of his 
being the crown of creation, the irrevocable self-communication of God. 
In Ola.pter Five we noted that for Rahner the fulfilment of the 
individual was to be foWld in the self-oommunicat ion of God and that 
consequently salvation was to be identified with this self-
conununicat ion ( 108) • So also Rahner has argued that the entire 
creation is orientated towards the irrevocable self-conununication of 
God such that the incarnation is to be thought the fulfilment of 
salvation history. Indeed, Rahner refers to Christ as the absolute 
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saviour on account of his being the irrevocable self-communication of 
God (109). Fbllowing Scotus, Rahner maintains that the incarnation was 
not only given on account of sin and evil in order to restore a fallen 
creation. Rather, he understands the incarnation as being the 
consummation of the created order and hence as the fulfilment of 
salvation history even had there been no sin: 
In the Catholic Church it is freely permitted to see the 
incarnation first of all, in God's primary intention, as the 
summit and height of the divine plan of creation, and not 
primarily and in the first place as the act of a mere 
restoration of a divine world-order destroyed ~ the sins of 
mankind, an order which God had conceived in itself without 
any incarnation. (110) 
Hence the primary soteriological significance of the incarnation for 
Hahner consists not in any deeds performed ~ the incarnate one but 
rather in the fact of God's self-communication to humanity. Indeed, 
the restorative and redemptive aspect of the Christ-event is not to be 
distinguished from the fact of God's self-conununication in the Christ-
event. Christ's soteriological significance is thought to consist in 
the fact that Christ is the irrevocable self-conununication of God to a 
sinful, fallen creation, accepting it in a forgiving embrace. We will 
quote at length to illustrate this: 
Jesus' being (as the union of God's life and human existence) 
and activity. • • taken together are the historically real, 
eschatologically victorious bestowal on the world of God's 
self-communication despite, and in, the world's 
sinfulness... Thus the presence of God's redemptive 
forgiveness, efficacious throughout history, has found its 
all- sustaining sense and centre, its definitive culmination, 
in Jesus Christ; and it remains inabrogably such because in 
Jesus God has definitively accepted the one world and 
humanity, as a whole, in spite of sin and precisely in their 
culpable destiny. (111) 
However, in identifying the soteriological importance of Christ with 
his designation as the irrevocable self-communication of God to 
humanity, Rahner does not intend to reduce atonement to being God's 
word of forgiveness to sinful humanity as manifested in Christ. As we 
258 
have already mentioned, for Rahner God's self-communication is not 
simply a finite word about God but is rather God's own logos and hence 
a genuine self-communication (112). Revelation is understood by Rahner 
to have an ontological character, it is God's presence in history. In 
this manner, Rahner understands the history of salvation and revelation 
to be God's "progressive taking possession of the world." (113) Hence 
God's irrevocable self-connnunicat ion in Cltrist is not simply the final 
word about God's will to forgive but is rather on ontological self-
communication of God (114) which assumes and redeems human nature: 
"The fact that he pronounces as his reality precisely that which we 
are, also constitutes and redeems our very being and history." (115) 
Hence, along with the catholic tradition in general, Rahner maintains 
that: 
The redemption and destruction of sin must not be understood 
as a merely moral or legal transaction, or as a mere 
acquittal from guilt, or as a mere non-reckoning of guilt. 
It is the communication of divine grace and takes place in 
the ontological reality of God's self- communication. (116) 
FUrther, Rahner draws upon the emphasis in Greek patristic soteriology 
in maintaining that the entire human race shares in and is affected b¥ 
the ontological self-communication of God in Christ. Against what 
Rahner perceives, rightly we believe, to be an excessive emphasis upon 
individualism in western thought (117) he maintains that there is an 
underlying unity to humanity (118). Hence, he claims that the 
objective redemption of God's ontological self-communication to 
humanity in the incarnation is something that affects the entire human 
race. The incarnation heralds the divinisation of humanity as a whole 
( 119) and as such is to be seen as the event of salvation history 
( 120). Hence, the incarnate one is not so much the one who performs 
redemptive acts as rather the one who is "in his very being salvation, 
redeemer and satisfaction." (121) This constitutes Rahner's 
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ontological soteriology to which we referred in the title of this 
section. 
Ebwever, we have to ask how this ontological soteriology conceives 
of the crucifixion. The tradition has normally maintained the 
scriptural emphasis upon the cross as being in some sense the cause of 
our salvation, Whether through the notion of paying a debt or bearing a 
punishment, or as representing the definitive victory over evil. In 
such theologies of the atonement, salvation all too easily becomes 
identified with averting the anger of God and securing a favourable 
judgement on account of Jesus' propitiatory death. In contrast, Rahner 
maintains that salvation consists in God's ontological assumption and 
divinisation of human nature through his ontological self-communication 
in the incarnation. Indeed Rahner specifically distances himself from 
any propitiatory ideas, maintaining instead that the incarnation and 
crucifixion occurred precisely because God already willed to save 
humanity: 
God is not transformed from a God of anger and justice into a 
God of mercy and love by the cross~ rather God brings the 
event of the cross to pass since he is possessed from the 
beginning of gratuitous mercy and, despite the world's sin, 
shares himself with the world, so overcoming its sin. (122) 
But such an understanding seems to negate any notion of a casual 
efficacy for the cross. Far from the cross being the cause of our 
salvation it is Gods prior salvific will Which is seen to be the cause 
of the cross: 
According to COitiiiOn 11nderstanding, cause means a physical or 
nDral operati0n w~1ich bring3 soiOC:thing about. By contrast we 
must say: because God wills salvation, therefore Jesus died 
and rose again, and not: because the crucifixion occurred, 
therefore God wills our salvation. (123) 
Further, What salvific import Rahner attaches to the incarnation 
is understood to consist not so much in the acts of the incarnate one 
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as rather in his being. Hence, not only are the incarnation and 
crucifixion apparently caused by God • s salvific wi 11 (and not vice 
versa) but 
understood 
incarnation. 
their primary soteriological significance is to be 
is terms of God's ontological self-communication in the 
Tying this in with Rahner's understanding of death as the 
unique event in which we can dispose of ourselves fully, it would seem 
that the only soteriological significance which we can ascribe to the 
cross in Rahner • s theology is that it is the rost integrated expression 
of Jesus • life as the self-communication of God. That is, the 
significance of the cross is derived from the incarnation and the 
incarnation, in turn, is caused by God's universal salvific will. 
However, it would be a gross misunderstanding to charge Rahner with 
actually holding the view Which we have just outlined. He vigorously 
denies that the cross can be reduced to the level of an "attestation 
(directed to us) of God's forgiving love, Which roves us to believe in 
this love" (124). He insists with the tradition (125) that we must 
ascribe a causal efficacy to the crucifixion ( 126). Hence, it is not 
all forms of causality that Rahner denies to the cross, only the sort 
which understands it to be the cause of God being changed from wrath to 
love. In effect, it is not the notion of causality that Rahner 
disagrees with but rather an understanding of salvation as being the 
securement of divine favour. Instead he maintains that salvation is 
the ontological redemption of human Life which God has always willed to 
effect. AU this being so, how then does he seek to secure a causal 
efficacy for the crucifixion? 
Tb achieve this Rahner employs the scholastic notion of Final 
cause. He maintains that Whilst God's universal sal vific wi 11 and 
transcendental self-communication may be the efficient cause of the 
incarnation, the incarnation and, in particular, the crucifixion are 
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the final cause of God's ontological, divinising self-conununication t.o 
the world. fbw is this? As we have mentioned God's transcendental 
self-conununication seeks an irrevocable historical climax, 
establishment and manifestation. For Rahner this climax is to be found 
in Christ. We also noted that for this to be the case then it must be 
accepted victoriously by the entire unified life of Christ (127). 
However, such a unified disposal can only be achieved in death: "Death 
is the one act which pervades the whole of Life, and in which man, as 
<i being of freeQom, has disposal of himself in his entirety." (128) 
Hence it is that the crucifixion of Jesus as the fulfilment of his life 
can be seen to be the climax of God's transcendental self-
communication. In as much as it is the irrevocable climax to which 
God's transcendental self-communication has always been moving and on 
account of which it has always been given, then the crucifixion of 
Jesus is to be understood to be the final cause of God's sal vi fie will 
( 129): 
In as much as the history of God's transcendent self-
communication... is based in all its phases on its 
irreversible goal and culminating point (as causa finalis), 
and unfolds by moving towards this eschaton, Christ and his 
destiny (the complete accomplishment of which appears in the 
resurrection) are the cause of salvation as historically 
constituting the historically irreversible saving situation 
for all. ( 130) 
~er likens his understariding of the causality of the cross to 
sacramental causality (131). -He conceives a sacrament to be a real 
Symbol of grace in which "grace achieves its own fullness of being and 
forms an irreversible gift (opus operatum)" ( 132). Hence "to this 
extent the sign is a cause of grace, although the sign is caused by 
this grace" (133). So also, the crucifixion is the primary sacrament -J 
for the salvation of humanity (134) in that it is the irrevocable 
manifestation of God's salvific will for the entire human race (135). 
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In the present section we have examined Rahner's conflation of 
Christology and soteriology, or Christ's being and Christ's work, in 
what we have termed his ontological soteriology. In the last section 
we observed that Rahner was concerned to maintain Christ's status as 
the ontological self-communication of God to humanity rather than 
reduce him to the level of a cipher. So also in the present section 
Rahner seeks to maintain the identity of the Christ event with the 
climax of salvation history without reducing its soteriological 
significance to the level of an expression of God's will to forgive. 
FUrther he seeks to achieve this in the same manner that he seeks to 
avoid reducing Christ to the level of a cipher. That is he maintains 
that the Christ event is the irrevocable establishment of God's 
ontological 
humanity. 
giving of self in a divinizing self-communication to 
In this manner he views the crucifixion as the final cause 
or primary sacrament of salvation. we welcome such a closer 
identification between the being and work of Christ. 
However, before we turn our attention to the question that we 
raised at the end of the last section (i.e. as to whether the 
foundations of Rahner 's theology do not undermine his attempt to avoid 
reducing Christ to the level of a cipher and the atonement to the level 
of an expression of.God's will to forgive) it is necessary for us to 
make some observations as to the deficiencies in Rahner 's approach as 
it stands. These deficiencies do not annul the attempt to formulate an 
ontological soteriology, however we do consider that they raise points 
that would have to be included in any such attempt. we have three 
difficulties with Rahner's presentation and they all cohere in being 
expressions of the formalistic tendency that we have found in Rahner: 
Firstly, Rahner states that all of humanity forms a unity and so shares 
in Christ without saying how this is so. Secondly, he states that 
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Christ as the irrevocable self-communication of God is redemption and 
salvation without really showing any concern to show how this can be 
seen to be so in the life of Jesus. Thirdly, he states that God's 
self-communication redeems human Life without explicating how this is 
so. WE! shall treat briefly of each of these in turn. 
Firstly, regarding Rahner's statement that humanity forms a unity. 
we are not disputing Rahner's plea for a redressing of the excessive 
emphasis up::>n individualism in western thought, indeed such a plea 
forms a central thrust of the present \\Qrk. fbwever, given the degree 
to which absolute individualism has become ingrained in western thought 
it is insufficient to simply state that there is really a unity. 
Indeed, Rahner seems blind to his own individualist/existentialist 
perspective which dominates his soteriological concern concentrating as 
he does upon a soteriology of personal authenticity. The latter formed 
the basis for one of our criticisms of Rahner's overall approach in 
Chapter Three. 
Secondly, regarding Rahner 's statement that the being of Christ as 
the irrevocable self-communication of God is salvation, without showing 
any real concern to relate this to the life of Jesus. As we noted in 
section 6.3, Rahner show very little concern to relate his 
understanding of Jesus as the ontological self-communication of God to 
the events of Jesus' life. Whilst he seeks to establish that Jesus 
thought of himself as the irrevocable presence of God and that his 
claim was vindicated by his resurrection, he displays little or no 
concern to explore how Jesus was experienced as the presence of God in 
his acts. Rahner seems to feel it sufficient for him to establish that 
Jesus considered himself to be the presence of God without exploring 
the implications of this. He does not explore how the redemptive acts 
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of healing, teaching, forgiving and restoring in Jesus' ministry can be 
thought of as the redemptive aspect of the ontological self-
communication of God. It seems that Rahner 's fascination with the 
redemptive significance of the fact of the incarnation is not matched 
by a concern with the soteriological significance of the life, death 
and resurrection of the incarnate one. The effect of this is that, 
despite Rahner's protestations about Christology being rooted in the 
historical Jesus, it seems that his identification of Jesus as the 
self-communication of God sits loosely on the shoulders of the 
historical Jesus. We would expect an ontological soteriology to 
develop the connections between ontological statements of Christ's 
dignity and the record of his ministry, death and resurrection as the 
liberating activity of God. 
OUr third concern, (that Rahner states that God's self-
communication to Christ redeems human Life without going on to explain 
how), is related to our second. Rahner's equation of salvation with 
Christ as God's self-communication seems to be a static, formal 
definition which does not develop the redeeming, liberating, dynamic 
aspect of God's presence to which scripture gives attestation. we are 
told by Rahner that we are redeemed/divinised without any of the 
dynamics being laid bare as to how humanity is divinised in the 
particularity of human life. we have here the same problem that we 
have already encountered in Chapter Five as regards Rahner's failure to 
explicate the healing dynamic of grace. Again, we would expect an 
ontological soteriology to seek to give an account of such a dynamic in 
a way that is applicable to the particularity of lived human life. 
The above points are criticisms of Rahner's attempt at formulating 
an ontological soteriology. However, they do not in themselves 
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invalidate any such attempt at formulating an ontological soteriology. 
They show the need for a development of Rahner 's posit ion rather than 
its final inadequacy or inconsistency. However, there is a nore 
serious tension in Ralmer's theology which if it cannot be resolved 
renders his soteriology incoherent and inadequate. Ralmer identifies 
the climax of salvation history with the irrevocable self-communication 
of God in Christ. For Ralmer, God's self-communication is not a finite 
~rd about God but is rather the ontological presence of God. Hence, 
for Ralmer, Jesus is not a cipher of God but God's presence, and 
redemption is not a sign of God's forgiveness but God's redeeming, 
divinising, self-communication in Christ. However, as we have claimed 
earlier in the present chapter and in Chapter Five, unless the 
possibility of the genuine presence of God in the historical order can 
be coherently reconciled with the central thrust of Ralmer's own 
theological foundations, (God as the distant, transcendent horizon of 
human finitude), then against his own intentions the notion of Christ 
of as the self-communication of God inevitably reduces Christ to the 
level of a cipher pointing towards the distant God and reduces the 
soteriological significance of the life, death and resurrection of 
Christ to the level of a statement of God's will to forgive. We have 
claimed that so far Rahner has not established the possibility of God's 
genuine presence in the historical order in a way that coheres with his 
own foundations. 
In the present chapter, we have followed Ralmer as he explained 
how a human person could be thought of as God due to the human person's 
openness and potentia olxledientialis for God. We have seen how Rahner 
uses the concept of the symbol in order to explain how the IDgos is 
capable of expressing God exteriorly in such a manner that the humanity 
of Jesus is to be thought of as the humanity of the IDgos. However 
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Ra."lner has gone no way towards establishing how it is that God can be 
present in the historical order given his own designation of God as the 
distant horizon of human finitude. In the next section we will turn 
our attention to a detailed analysis of Rahner's attempt to establish 
this through his claim that "God who cannot change in himself can 
change i:l :1 i ·-; · JiJl~(" ( 1.3o). Should this attempt prove to be incoherent 
or reduce to a mere empty formalism then it would seem that Rahner 
cannot s,'tV•· Jd1aself from ultimately reducing Christ to the level of a 
cipher of God's transcendental self-conununication, albeit the nnst 
adequate one, and from reducing the soteriological significance of 
Christ's life and crucifixion to the level of a sign of God's 
forgiveness. 
6.6 Rahner's last stand -God who cannot change in Godself can change 
in God's other. 
Rahner expresses his awareness of the tension between his claim 
that God is the absolute, transcendent ground of all reality and his 
claim that in Jesus, God is "part of the history of the cosnns itself" 
(137) through the notion of God's immutability (138). Christians 
maintain that "God is the inunutable One who is in an absolute sense" 
( 139). Rahner asks how this claim is to be reconciled with the claim 
that the word became flesh: 
It is the question of how to understand the truth that the 
immutability of God ma.y not distort our view of the fact that 
what happened to Jesus on earth is precisely the history of 
the word of God himself, and a process which he underwent. 
- (140) 
Rahner rejects the scholastic solution which claimed that in the 
incarnation change only occurred on the side of the human reality of 
Jesus and not on the side of the I.Dgos ( 141) • fbwever this would seem 
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to lead to incoherency. If Rahner wants to maintain that change does 
not only occur on the side of the created reality but also on the side 
of God and yet to continue to maintain the immutability of God, does 
this not inevitably mean that Rahner seeks to maintain both that God 
does change and that he does not change. Rahner seeks to overcome this 
incoherency by claiming that whilst God really does become in the 
incarnation this is not to be thought of as a change of God in Godself 
so much as a change of God in the hl.Uilan reality of Jesus. Hence Rahner 
proclaims his principle: "God can become something. He who is not 
subject to change in himself can himself be subject to change in 
something else." (142) 
Rahner claims that this formula must not be reduced to either 
contradicting God's immutability or to positing any change as occurring 
only on the side of the created reality (143). However this statement 
does not of itself go any way towards resolving the tension between 
God's immutability and God's becoming in the incarnation. Indeed, 
Rahner recognises that the statement is not an explanation of how the 
transcendent, immutable God can be present in the particular and 
changing realm of history but is rather a dialectical juxtaposition of 
the two claims that he is concerned to maintain (144). Ultimately, 
Rahner does not seek to explain how the incarnation is possible, given 
the immutability of God, so much as to state what must be adhered to if 
we are to remain loyal to the fact of the incarnation (145). His final 
appeal is to the mysteriousness of God's reality, which cannot be 
probed: "Here ontology has to be adapted to the message of faith and 
not be schoolmaster to this message. " ( 146) 
However, we feel bound to claim that this is quite inadequate to 
overcome the avowedly transcendental, ahistorical perspective in 
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Rahner's theology. He has not as yet explained how, within the 
transcendental premises of his own theology, God can be thought of as 
genuinely present in the historical order. He simply states that this 
is so. But this is what is so very difficult to explain let alone 
state given his transcendental perspective. Indeed, we have claimed 
that the transcendental orientation of Rahner • s theology is so 
overwhelming that a simple statement of God • s presence in the 
historical order inevitably reduces to an empty verbalism in which the 
historical aspect of God's presence is reduced to the level of a cipher 
of God • s transcendental presence. 
lbwever, Rahner does make some attempt to explicate his thought 
further at this point b¥ developing his notion of God's other as the 
real symbol of God. He has claimed that in the light of the 
incarr1at ion, God is seen to be the one who in God • s infinite fullness 
gives Godself away (147). He further claims that in so far as God 
gives Godself from infinite fullness, then the other whiCh comes to be, 
comes to be as God's own reality: 
By the fact that he remains in his infinite fullness while he 
empties himself - because, being love, that is, the wi 11 to 
fill the void, he has that wherewith to fill all- the 
ensuing other is his own proper reality. (148) 
Hence, Rahner wishes to maintain that God has the possibility of 
becoming God • s other in such a way that God • s other is both distinct 
from God and yet identical with God (149). As we have seen, Rahner 
maintained a similar notion of unity in difference when developing his 
theology of the symbol. A real symbol is both genuinely other than 
that which it symbolises and also a genuine expression of, and hence 
not wholly other than, that which is symbolised: 
~ may say that each being forms, in its own way, I'IDre or 
less perfectly according to its degree of being, something 
distinct from itself and yet one with itself, for its own 
fulfilment. (Here unity and distinction are correlatives 
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Which increase in like proportions, not in inverse 
proportions which would reduce each to be contradictory and 
exclusive of the other). (150) 
Insofar as God's other or symbol is genuinely God then God can be 
thought to really change in God's other. Insofar as God's other is 
distinct from God in God's self then God does not change in God's self. 
However, Rahner's understanding of God's other as being both 
distinct from God and identical with God has not overcome Rahner's 
dialectical juxtaposition of the statements that God cannot change in 
Godself yet can change in God's other. Indeed, he has merely succeeded 
in shifting the dialogical juxtaposition onto the notion of God's 
other. Rahner vacillates between seeing God's other as identical with 
God, (and hence claiming that God changes) on the one hand and seeing 
God's other as different from God (and hence claiming that God does not 
change) on the other hand. Hence, Rahner still has not explained how 
God can change in God's other without changing in Godself. For God to 
be thought of as changing in God's other it seems that God's other must 
be identified with God's self, but God's inunutability in Godself can 
only be maintained if God's other is to be thought of as different from 
God in Godself. We have the same problem as before. Either God does 
not really change and hence the statement reduces to an empty verbalism 
or God really does change, in Which case the statement is inconsistent. 
We must note with Taylor that Rahner's appeal to mystery at this 
point, whilst being clothed in language of the intractable mystery of 
God's being, sounds ominously like an appeal to the notion of mystery 
as a limitation of human reason Which Rahner earlier dismissed as 
inadequate. Indeed, his appeal to mystery could be seen as an attempt 
at "excusing real conceptual incoherence" (151). Incoherence, that is, 
in maintaining God's historical presence given Rahner's transcendental 
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perspective. ~ have to conclude with Taylor that Rahner has not 
established the coherence of his statement that God who cannot change 
in Godse l f can change in God's other. As we mentioned in the last 
section, this failure to secure God's presence and activity in the 
historical order l:xxies i U for Rahner 's Christology and ontological 
soteriology. 
6.7 The inadequacy of Rahner's ontological soteriology due to his 
transcendental perspective: 
The inadequacy of Rahner 's formula "God changeless in self but 
changes in his other" as a means of establishing God's presence in the 
historical order means that our earlier suspicions were correct. 
Rahner is unable to overcome the overriding and thorough going 
transcendental perspective in his theology. Despite his intent ions to 
maintain the reality of God's ontological redeeming presence in Christ, 
the terms of his own theology inevitably reduce Christ to the level of 
a cipher of God's transcendental presence and soteriology to the level 
of a sign of God's will to forgive. 
Further we would maintain that this tendency does not only become 
apparent upon close scrutiny of Rahner's theology. Due to the 
overarching transcendental perspective of his thought even an initial 
and superficial encounter with a work such as Fbundations of Christian 
Faith creates the impression that the crucified Christ can be thought 
of as no mre than a cipher of God's transcendental will to forgive. 
Indeed, it is only upon a second and mre diligent examination that we 
perceive that Rahner does indeed intend to hold that grace is 
redeeming, that Christ is the ontological self-conununication of God and 
that God's atoning work consists in the divinising redemption of 
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humanity. His statements in defence of these positions can very easily 
be swamped by the IOC>mentum of his own theology. Further analysis 
reveals that our first impressions are correct, that Rahner is not able 
to establish God's presence within the realm of historical 
particularity given his transcendental perspective. Hence, his claims 
that grace entails a healing dynamic, that Christ is God's presence in 
history and that in Christ hwnanity is divinised reduce to an empty and 
formal verbalism that cannot secure what they maintain. Rahner's 
theological inability to posit God as active in the historical order 
serves to reinforce his philosophical inability to take the 
particularity of human life seriously. 
\'e have consistently raised this quest ion of Rahner 's tendency 
towards generalising abstractions. That is, Rahner makes statements 
about the redeeming dynamic of grace and our divinisation in Christ 
that do not seem to be rooted in experienced human life. These 
statements have the character of a priori, universal generalisations 
Which are imposed onto the particular situations of human life without 
being able to genuinely speak to them. In Chapter Three we claimed 
that Rahner's transcendental starting point inevitably tends towards 
generalised abstractions. \'e have now found that the philosophical 
inadequacies of Rahner's starting point are compounded by the 
theological implications of his transcendental starting point (i.e that 
God Who is the distant horizon of all reality cannot be thought of as 
present in the historical order). Rahner does not simply neglect to 
treat of the process of redemption in particular situations (a 
fundamental requirement of the present critique) due to an over concern 
for the uni versa!, 
particular realm. 
transcendental realm over against the historical, 
Ultimately he is unable to treat of the process of 
God's redeeming activity in the genuinely historical sphere. 
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Given this inability, we should not be at all surprised to find 
that Rahner presents us with an abstract soteriological schema that is 
imposed on Christ and imposed on humanity. This is indeed what we have 
seen to occur. Christ's redemptive significance is reduced to the fact 
that he claimed to be the absolute self-communication of God without 
developing the significance of Jesus' ministry as the redeeming 
presence of God. Likewise the interpretation of the cross as the most 
unified expression of Jesus' life is drawn more from an existentialist 
theology of death than it is based upon the historical context of 
Jesus' death. we have observed a similar lack of concern to relate the 
redemptive self-communication of God in Christ to the particular 
situations of human life. Hence Rahner's soteriology appears to be an 
inadequate Idealism that is imposed upon scripture and lived human 
reality alike. In contrast, we maintain the need for theology to speak 
to and from the context of particular human situations and to be 
faithful to the contexts of scripture. 
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6.8 <DNCLUSION 
In our Introduction we maintained that Rahner's theological 
endeavour represents one of the most influential attempts within 
twentieth century Roman catholic theology at mediating between 
traditional scholasticism and the concerns of modernity. Having 
engaged with the grandeur of his system it is not difficult to see why 
it has been so influential. He is not content to assume that theology 
is univocal with human life, rather he seeks to establish that this is 
so. tbr does he simply repeat the inherited tradition, he seeks to 
reformulate and re-express the tradition in a way that is consonant 
with the concerns of modernity. In dialogue with Kant, Rahner employs 
a transcendental method not only to establish the possibility of 
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metaphysics but rather to present a creative reformulation of 
traditional scholasticism, one that maintains a distinctively 
anthropological bias. He seeks to counter the charge of the 
meaninglessness of soteriological discourse through grounding salvation 
language in the human person's fundamental and inescapable openness to 
God. He respects the role of human freedom by thinking of salvation as 
the human person's acceptance of God's transcendental self-
communication through the person s/he makes of him/herself. Again, we 
have observed how he seeks to reconcile the Christian salvation schema 
with a concern for this world through his understanding of the love of 
neighbour Which must extend to the socio-political sphere. • -1 However, 1n 
Chapter One we raised the question Whether Rahner simply seeks to 
justify, and thereby re-establish, the pre-modern assumption of the 
theocentric nature of human life, and so justify the philosophical 
basis of Thomistic metaphysics, or whether he genuinely reformulates a 
theocentric vision in dialogue with modern and post-modern assumptions 
and experience. In Chapter TWo we articulated three perspectives and 
-J 
concerns, drawn from the modern and post-modern experience of human 
life, with which we chose to engage in dialogue with Rahner. These 
concerns broadly pertain to the area of fundamental soteriology: 
1) Soteriology must be rooted in the human realm, it must flow from 
and address the particularity of human life and hence God must be 
thought of as genuinely present within the particularity of human 
life. 
2) A soteriology will be found to be inadequate if it is centred upon 
the salvation of the individual without a true appreciation of the 
need for a corporate redemption of the human community. 
3) An adequate soteriology will be one that is formulated in dialogue 
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with an appreciation of the radical nature of sin and evil in 
hllJ'Oan life and which allows for the possibility of God • s 
transforming, liberating presence to evil. 
we hoped that Rahner•s adequacy when measured against these 
concerns would throw light on the adequacy of his method as a whol~. 
In the body of our work we turned to explicate Rahner•s soteriology, 
mindful of the above criteria. In Chapter 'Ibree we found that his 
a priori, transcendental method prevented him from truly addressing 
human life in its particularity. Ra."'&ner•s soteriology is focused upon-, 
an understanding of salvation as the fulfilment of the person's 
transcendental openness to God. He then seeks to relate this 
understanding of salvation to the lived experience of hllJ'Oan life, to 
the way in which the person lives out his/her response to God in 
his/her daily life. 'Ibis is a long way short of starting with 
particular human situations which cry out for a liberating redemption 
and then seeking to locate the mea.'1ing nf salvation language in such 
contexts. we claimed that this inadequacy is rooted in his theological 
method which has the form of an a priori analysis of the universally 
given structures of the human sUbject. we also claimed that Rahner•s 
soteriological schema displays an excessive concern with the 
individual sUbject's relationship with God in isolation from the 
corporate salvation of the social and political realities in which s/he 
finds him/herself. For Rahner, social and political realities are only 
important in as much as the hl.ll'lan sUbject accepts or rejects salvation 
through the personal response that s/he makes in these contexts. Again 
we claimed that this deficiency in Rahner•s soteriology is due to his 
philosophical starting point which is a metaphysics of the autononnus 
subject. In Chapter Five we observed that whilst Rahner has a profound 
understanding of human freedom and evil and whilst he recognises the 
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need for a genuine dynamic of redemption in human Life, he only treats 
of such a dynamic, healing aspect of grace in a peripheral manner. We 
claimed that this betrayed a recurrent formalism in Rahner 's theology 
Which led him to be more concerned with a priori, theoretical questions 
about the universality of grace than with questions born from the 
anguished human heart as to the sufficiency of grace. Again we claimed 
that this is due to his transcendental starting point Which shifts 
attention away from the particular details of human life and history 
and towards universal, general, a priori concerns. 
Finally, we observed that there is a tension in Rahner 's theology 
between his identification of the distant horizon of human finitude 
with God and his concern to speak of the self-conununicating presence of 
God in the historical order. Rahner's entire philosophical and 
theological edifice is built upon the foundation stone of God as the 
distant horizon of human finitude. Hence, we claimed that unless 
Rahner coherently reconciles this starting point with the genuine 
immanence of God then immanence becomes swallowed up in transcendence. 
It is insufficient for Rahner to simply state that God can be present 
in the historical order. Given the terms of his own theology, Rahner 
has to explain how this can be so. We repeat again that we are not 
arguing for an extreme rationalism that claims that God must be proven 
to be present in the historical order before one can believe in, or 
experience, this reality. Rather, we are claiming that Rahner must 
reconcile this claim with the terms of his own system if he is to avoid 
falling into incoherency. Mter having explored the various ways in 
Which Rahner has wrestled with this problem we have claimed that Rahner 
does not secure the genuine presence and activity of God in the 
historical order in a way that coheres with his philosophical and 
theological starting point. Rahner 's transcendental method, Which 
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rises at the very dawn of his theology, proves to be his stumbling 
block. We echo the w:>rds of Tracy: "On no single question does the 
choice of a basic theological method so determine one's response as on 
the question of God." (152) We were forced to conclude that, despite 
his intent ions, Rahner 's overall theology reduces Christ to the level 
of a cipher of God's transcendental self-conununication and Christ's 
soteriological significance to his being the sign of God's will to 
forgive. 
In short we believe that, against his own intentions, Rahner's 
soteriology is inadequate both to the demands of C011110C)n human 
experience, in that it is general, lacks redemption and is overly 
concerned with the individual's spiritual destiny, and to the(dernands 
of the Christian tradition, in that it reduces Christ to the level of a 
cipher and the Cross to a statement of God's will to forgive. We 
further believe that each of these deficiencies can be traced back to 
Rahner's starting point, 
individual human subject. 
Rahner simply seeks to 
an a priori transcendental analysis of the 
In answer to our earlier question Whether 
justify, and thereby re-establish, the 
traditional assumptions and starting point of scholastic metaphysics or 
Whether he genuinely seeks to reformulate a theocentric vision in 
dialogue with modern and post-modern assumptions and experience, we can 
now state nore clearly that Rahner's attempt to reformulate a 
theological staring point does not go far enough. He succeeds in 
locating theological discourse far nore intrinsically in human life 
than was possible with scholastic extrincisism. However, the very 
method Which enables him to do this also causes him to perpetrate some 
of the least helpful elements that have crept into Christian 
soteriology. We believe that a transcendental 
represented by such as Rahner, presents us with 
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metaphysics, as is 
the nost creative 
attempt possible within neo-orthodoxy at dialogue with secular self-
understanding. 
methodology, 
Hence, in seeing the inadequacies of Rahner 1 s 
we believe that we are led to see the need for the 
formulation of a revisionist soteriology and an adequate philosophical 
and hermeneutical basis for contextual theology. We must be prepared 
to nnve beyond the attempt to reconcile the inherited tradition and 
contemporary self-understanding and allow each to criticise and re-
interpret the other. 
Should it be thought premature and arrogant for a comparative 
whelp to have maintained a fundamental inadequacy in Rahner 1 s theology 
we would wish to put on record our enormous gratitude and respect for 
his work. 
emphasised. 
of fortress 
Rahner 1 s stature and influence quite simply cannot be over 
His energies helped the church leave behind the dark ages 
isolationism and to give her the confidence to proclaim 
again her mission to be the sacrament of the redemption of the world. 
In turning to study Rahner we did not proceed with an iconoclastic 
zeal, eager to sneer at a pillar of authority. Rather we proceeded as a 
student eager to learn from the Professor, or if I may be allowed the 
analogy, as a disciple docile to the master. It was the very event of 
engagement with Rahner that provoked the articulation of our 
presuppositions and concerns which in turn we believe to have revealed 
the final inadequacy of Rahner 1 s approach. 
We acknowledge a symbiosis between the present critique and 
Rahner 1 s achievement. Our call for theology to be rooted in the 
particularity of htnnan life would be impossible without the 
anthropological turn in theology which Rahner was largely responsible 
for initiating. our criticism of Rahner 1 s transcendental method is not 
to be viewed as a criticism of his anthropological grounding of 
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theology. It is rather the criticism that in starting with a 
transcendental analysis of the a priori structures of human knowledge 
and freedom Rahner has remained captive within the universal 
perspective of the metaphysical tradition in general, resulting as it 
does in abstract generalisations. In place of an a priori theological 
anthropology we seek an a posteriori theological anthropology. Finally 
we would wish to claim that in criticising Rahner in order to move 
forward we are responding to him as he would wish. He consistently 
maintained that the anthropological shift in theology was of far 
greater importance than his particular methodology. we draw our 
conclusion to a close with the same words of Kerr about Rahner with 
Which we closed our introduction: 
Even if one were to reject his own theological 'system' root 
and branch, doing so with quest ions and arguments one would 
be benefiting from the renewal of theological controversy and 
exploration in the catholic Church for Which he more than 
anyone is responsible. Even if nothing else of his work 
endures (an unlikely supposition), he would be content to 
have renewed interest in, and to have excited courage to deal 
with, the central questions of theology. (153) 
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E:NI:N:Yl'ES: CHAP1'ER SIX 
1. cf. "This history of revelation has its absolute climax when God's 
self-communication reaches its insurpassable high point 
the hypostatic union and in the incarnation of God in the 
spiritual reality of Jesus for his own sake and hence for 
of all of us." Rahner, R::F, pp. 174. 
through 
created, 
the sake 
2. cf. "This m:>ment in which the irreversibility of God's historical 
self-communication becomes manifest refers both to the 
communication itself and to its acceptance." id., R::F, pp. 194. 
cf. "'!be unique and final culmination of this history of 
revelation has already occurred and has revealed the absolute and 
irrevocable unity of God's transcendental self-communication to 
mankind and of its historical mediation in the one God-man Jesus 
Christ, who is at once God himself as communicated, the human 
acceptance of this communication and the final historical 
manifestation of this offer and acceptance." id., "Revelation", 
E.T., pp. 1462. 
3. cf. "In Jesus Christ, the God who communicates himself and the man 
who accepts God's self-communication become irrevocably one, and 
the history of revelation and the salvation of the whole human 
race reaches its goal." id., R::F, pp. 169. 
4. cf. "~ are applying this title (Absolute Saviour) to that 
historical person who appears in time and space and signifies the 
beginning of the absolute self-communication of God which is 
noving towards its goal, that beginning which indicates that this 
self-communication for everyone has taken place irrevocably and 
has been victoriously inaugurated." ibid., pp. 193. 
5. cf., ibid., pp. 206-227. 
6. id., "On The Theology Of The Incarnation", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 113. 
7. cf., ibid., pp. 118. 
Christology", T.I. Vol. I, 
cf., 
pp. 158. 
id.' "CUrrent Problems In 
8. cf. "As long as this finite mediation of the divine self-
expression does not represent a reality of God himself in the 
strict and real sense, it is still basically provisional and 
surpassable because it is finite. And in this finiteness it is 
not simply the reality of God himself, and so it can be surpassed 
by God by establishing something else finite. If, therefore, the 
reality of Jesus, in whom as offer and as acceptance God's 
absolute self-communication to the whole human race is present for 
us, is really to be the insurpassable and definitive offer and 
acceptance, then we have to say. it is not only established by God 
but is God himself." id., R::F, pp. 202. cf., ibid., pp. 176. 
9. cf. "The union between the one offering and the offer cannot be 
understood only as a moral unity, as for example between a human 
word or a mere sign on the one hand and God on the other. It must 
rather be understood only as an irrevocable kind of union between 
this human reality and God, as a union which eliminates the 
possibility of separation between the proclamation and the 
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proclaimer, and hence a union which makes the really human 
proclamation and the offer to us a reality of God himself. And it 
is just this that the hypostatic union means, this and really 
nothing else: In this human potentiality of Jesus the absolute 
salvific will of God, the absolute event of God 1 s self-
communication to us along with its acceptance as something 
effected by God himself, is a reality of God himself unmixed, but 
also inseparable and therefore irrevocable." id., FCF, pp. 202. 
cf. "This human reality as human (not as something abstract, of 
course) in its bare humanity can only be of theological importance 
if it is as such (as just this) the manifestation of God in the 
world, not just as something joined on in a logically subsequent 
way: if, that is to say, it is one with the Logos in virtue of 
being the reality of the Logos itself, and not the reality of the 
Logos in virtue of being one (how?) with The Logos... we must 
learn to see that what is human in Jesus is not something human 
(and as such uninteresting for us in the world) and in addition 
God 1 s as well (and in this respect alone important, th1s spec1al 
character however always merely hovering above the human and 
forming its exterior setting, as it were). On the contrary, in 
this view the everyday human rea.li ty of this life is God 1 s 
existence, in the sense cautiously determined above it is human 
reality and so God 1 s, and vice versa." id., "CUrrent Problems In 
Christology11 , T.I. Vol. I, pp. 191. --
10. id., "CUrrent Problems In Christology", T.I. Vol. I, pp. 150. 
11. id., ~. pp. 207. 
12. cf. "Man is understood as the existent of transcendental 
necessity who in every categorical act of knowledge and of freedom 
always transcends himself and the categorical object towards the 
incomprehensible mystery by which the act and the object are 
opened and borne, the mystery which we call God." ibid., pp. 209. 
13. cf., id., "The Unity Of Spirit And Matter In The Christian 
Understanding Of Faith", T.I. Vol. VI, pp. 153-177. 
14. cf. Rahner 1 s description of the human person as "the being in whom 
this basic tendency of matter to find itself in the spirit by 
self-transcendence arrives at the point where it definitely breaks 
through." id., "Christology Within An Evolutionary View Of The 
'ihrld", T.LVol. V, pp. 160. cf. The human person is "the 
existent --rn-whom the basic tendency of matter to discover itself 
in spirit through self-transcendence reaches its definitive 
breakthrough." id., FCF, pp. 181. 
15. id., FCF, pp. 198. 
16. cf., ibid., pp. 209. 
17. cf., ibid., pp. 210. 
18. cf. "When we have said everything which can be expressed about 
ourselves which is definable and calculable, we have not yet said 
anything about ourselves unless in all that is said we have also 
included that we are beings who are orientated towards the God who 
is incomprehensible." ibid., pp. 216. 
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19. id., "Thoughts On The Theology Of Christmas", T.I. Vol. III, pp. 
31. 
20. cf. "Thus he himself is a mystery, always referred beyond himself 
into the mystery of God. This is his being: he is defined by the 
indefinable which he is not, but without which he is not even (nor 
realizes) what he is." ibid. 
21. id., "CUrrent Problems In Christology", T.I. Vol. I, pp. 162. 
cf., id., Ft:F, pp. 78-79. 
22. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, 
The Early Christian Fathers, 
1984), pp. 75-76. 
IV, XX.6, 
(Oxford: 
quoted in H. Bettenson, 
Oxford University Press 
23. cf. ''We must conceive of the relation between the logos person and 
his human nature in just this sense, that here both independence 
and radical proximity equally reach a unique and qualitatively 
inconunensurable perfection, which nevertheless remains once and 
for all the perfection of a relation between creator and 
creature." id., "Current Problems In Christology", T.I. Vol. I, 
pp. 162-163-.-
24. cf. "If this indefinable nature, whose limit, that is, its 
definition, is this unlimited orientation towards the infinite 
mystery of fullness, is assumed by God as his own reality, then it 
has reached the very point towards which it is always RDving by 
virtue of its essence. It is its very meaning, and not just an 
accidental side activity which it could also do without, to be 
given away and to be handed over, to be that being who realizes 
himself and finds himself by losing himself once and for all in 
the incomprehensible." id., Ft:F, pp. 217. cf., id., "On The 
Theology Of The Incarnation", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 109. --
25. id. 1 :ft:F, PP• 218. 
26. cf. "The point of the thesis that we are trying to establish is 
this: although the hypostatic union is a unique event in its own 
essence, and viewed in itself it is the highest conceivable event, 
it is nevertheless an intrinsic moment within the whole process by 
which grace is bestowed upon all spiritual creatures." ibid., pp. 
201. cf. "We have constantly to remind ourselves that human being 
is not some absolutely terminated quality, which, while persisting 
as a quite self-contained whole indifferent to all else, is 
combined with some other thing (in this case the logos) by a 
wholly external miracle. Human being is rather a reality 
absolutely open upwards: a reality which reaches its highest 
{though indeed unexacted) perfection, the realization of the 
highest possibility of man's being, when in it the logos himself 
becomes existent in the world." id., "CUrrent Problems In 
Christology'', T.I. Vol. I, pp. 183. 
27. cf. , id. , FCF, pp. 200. 
28. id., "CUrrent Problems In Christology", T.I. Vol. I, pp. 184. 
29. cf., id., FCF, pp. 223. 
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30. cf. "The Incarnation cannot be understood as the end and goal of 
the world's reality without having recourse to the theory that the 
Incarnation itself is already an intrinsic moment and a condition 
for the universal bestowal of grace to spiritual creatures." 
ibid. 1 PP• 199. 
31. cf., ibid., pp. 218. cf., id., "On The Theology Of The 
Incarnat1on", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 110. 
32. id., "CUrrent Problems In Christology", T.I. Vol. I, pp. 164. 
33. id. I FCF, pp. 218. 
34. id., "The Theology Of The Symbol", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 236-237. 
35. ibid., pp. 221-252. 
36. cf., ibid., pp. 225. 
37. ibid. 
38. ibid. 
39. cf. "All beings are by their 
necessarily express themselves 
nature." ibid., pp. 224. 
40. ibid., pp. 234. 
nature symbolic, because they 
in order to attain their own 
41. cf. "The I.ngos is the word of the Father, his perfect image his 
imprint, his radiance, h1s self-expression." ibid., pp. 236. 
42. cf., ibid., pp. 235. 
43. ibid., pp. 236. cf. "The Logos is the symbol of the Father, in 
the very sense which we have given the word: the inward symbol 
which remains distinct from what is symbolized, which is 
constituted by what is symbolized, where what is symbolized 
expresses itself and possesses itself." ibid., pp. 236. 
44. cf., id., FCF, pp. 202. 
45. cf., ibid., 
T.I. Vol. IV, 
pp. 215. cf. "On The Theology Of The Incarnation", 
pp. 115. 
46. id., "The Theology Of The Symbol", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 239. cf., 
id., "ThoughtsOnTheTheologyOfChnstmas", T.I. Vol. III, pp. 
29. cf., id., FCF, pp. 226. 
47. cf. "If, therefore, the I.ngos becomes man, then this humanity of 
his is not something which exists antecedently, but rather is that 
which comes to be and is canst i tuted in its essence and existence 
if and insofar as the Logos empties himself." id., FCF, pp. 224. 
cf. , id. , "On The Theology Of The Incarnation ":--T". I • Vol. IV, pp. 
116.-
48. id., 
"The 
"The Theology Of The Symbol", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 239. cf. 
divine Logos himself both really creates and accepts this 
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corporeality - which is a part of the world - as his own reality: 
he brings it into existence as something other than himself in 
such a way, therefore, that this very materiality expresses him, 
the l.Dgos himself, and lets him be present in his world." id., 
"Christology Within An Evolutionary View Of The ~rld", T.I. Vol. 
V, pp. 177. cf. "Because the human itself, affirmed by the fact 
that he pledges himself to us, is realty and truly affirmed of him 
himself (although differently from the divinity), this huiiian 
nature is thus his very own reality in which he himself and not 
merely a human nature different from him comes out to meet us, 80 
that, when one grasps this humanity, one has in very truth 
understood and grasped something of God himself." id., "Thoughts 
On The Theology Of Christmas", T.I. Vol. III, pp. 29-30. 
49. cf. "The l.Dgos, as Son of the Father, is truly, in his hLUnanity as 
such, the revelatory symbol in which the Father enunciates 
himself, in this Son, to the world-revelatory, because the symbol 
renders present what is revealed." id., "The Theology Of The 
Syml:x>l" , T. I • Vol. IV, pp. 239. 
50. id., FCF, pp. 224. cf. ''W'len God wants to be what is not God, 
man comes to be... ~ know this by the fact that we recognise the 
incarnate Logos in our history and say: here the question which we 
are is answered historically and tangibly with God himself." 
ibid., pp. 225. cf. "When God lets himself go outside of 
himself, then there appears man - Who for this very reason is pure 
openness for God - out of the very fringe of nothingness (i.e of 
the material) • " id. , " Thoughts On The Theology Of Christmas", 
T.I. Vol. III, _pp:--32. cf. ''VE could now define man, within the 
framework of his supreme and darkest mystery, as that which ensues 
when God's self-utterance, his WOrd, is given out lovingly into 
the void of god-less nothing. • • If 530d wills to become non-<;od. 
man comes to be, that and nothing els\:, we might say." id., "On 
The Theology Of The Incarnation", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 116.--
51. cf. "Since man can experience and actualize his ultimate, 
essential being only in history, this orientation must come to 
appearance in history. r-t>reover, since God's offer can be 
actualized only in and through a free act of God, if it is to find 
its irreversible actualization and validity, man must expect and 
look for this offer within this historical dimension." id., FCF, 
pp. 298. -
52. cf., id., FCF, pp. 177. cf., id., FCF, pp. 207. 
53. cf., ibid., pp. 211. 
54. cf. "This Saviour, who represents the climax of this self-
conununication, must therefore be at the same time God's absolute 
pledge by self-conununication to the spiritual creature as a whole 
and the acceptance of this self-conununication by this Saviour: 
only then is there an irrevocable self-conununication on both 
sides, and only thus is it present in the world in a historically 
conununicative manner." id., "Christology Within An Evolutionary 
View Of The WOrld", T.I. Vol. V, pp. 176. 
55. id., FCF, pp. 211. 
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56. cf., id., "On Christian Dying", T.I. Vol. VII, pp. 287. 
57. id., FCF, pp. 271. cf. "It is obvious that death is in this 
sense the absolute end of the temporal dimension of a being of the 
kind to which man belongs." id., "Ideas Fbr A Theology Of Death", 
T.I. Vol. XIII, pp. 174. -
58. cf. "Life is one and single, and is brought to its fullness in a 
single and definitive historical development." ibid. 
59. cf. "Death, then, is the consummation of a man • s history as a free 
person, that in which this history breaks through into the 
absolute future which is its goal, and in which God as the 
ultimate, original, and infinite all, by whom all reality is 
upheld, is encountered either as judgement or as man's blessed 
consummation. Now if this is true then death is that towards 
which the will of the free person tends at its deepest and 100st 
ultimate, because this free person must seek the end of that which 
merely prolongs itself in time in order to achieve his 
consummation." id., "Theological Consideration On The M:>ment Of 
Death", T.I. Vol. XI, pp. 319. cf., id., "Ideas Fbr A Theology 
Of Death", T.I. Vol. XIII, pp. 170. --
60. cf. "In reality eternity comes to be in time as its own mature 
fruit. Eternity does not really come beyond the experienced time 
of our biological life in time and space and continue this time, 
but rather it subst.nnes time by being released from the time which 
came to be temporarily, and came to be so that the final and 
definitive could be done in freedom." id., FCF, pp. 271. 
61. cf. "Death (which is something that goes on throughout the whole 
of life to its very end) understood in wholly human and 
theological terms, is not a merely biological occurrence at the 
end, a medical exitus, but a self-realization of creaturely-human 
freedom in which man faces God and disposes of himself completely 
and finally for or against God: this he does in that final state 
of creaturely powerlessness that reaches its uttermost realization 
and manifestation in what we conuoonly experience as death." id., 
"The Death Of Jesus And The Closure Of Revelation", T.I. Vol. 
XVIII, pp. 139. cf., id., "On Christian Dying", T.I. Vol. VII, 
pp. 290-291. -
62. cf., id., "On Christian Dying", T.I. Vol. VII, pp. 288-289. 
63. cf. "In the temporal duration of life which is to end completely, 
eternity is actualizing itself towards its fulfillment." id., FCF, 
pp. 272. - -
64. id., "Ideas F-::r l'. rheology Of Death", T.I. Vol. XIII, pp. 179-
180. 
65. id., "The 
Vol. XVIII, 
Death Of Jesus And The Closure Of 
pp. 139. 
Revelation", T.I. 
66. cf. "Fbr the real point of the Christian message lies precisely in 
the assertion that this Jesus, who died under Pontius Pilate, is 
none other than the Christ, the Son of God, the absolute saviour." 
id., FCF, pp. 232. 
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67 o cf o "If one seeks him, to whom one can bring the eternal mystery 
of the pure fullness of one's own being for fulfilment, one can 
see very simply, if one seeks quietly, that is, in meekness and 
with the eyes of innocence that it is only in Jesus of Nazareth 
that one can dare to believe such a thing has happened and happens 
eternally." id., "On The Theology Of The Incarnation", T.I. Vol. 
IV, pp. 111-.-cf. "But when the longing for the absolute nearness 
of God, the longing, incomprehensible in itself, which alone makes 
anything bearable, looks for where this nearness came - not in 
the postulates of the spirit, but in the flesh and in the housings 
of the earth: then no resting place can be found except in Jesus 
of Nazareth, over whom the star of God stands, before whom alone 
one has the courage to bend the knee and weeping happily to pray: 
'And the Vbrd was made flesh and dwelt anongst us' • " ibid. , pp. 
120. 
68. cf. "The salvation of all times depends on this historical event, 
indeed the salvation of each one of us" id., Fcr, pp. 232. 
69. cf., ibid., pp. 235-236. 
70. cf. "The genuine Christianity of the New Testament understood 
itself differently than this approach does. It knew itself to be a 
faith which was related to a definite historical event, and which 
did not itself simply posit this event or create it in faith, but 
rather it receives its justification and foundation from this 
event." ibid., pp. 238. 
71. cf., ibid., pp. 236. 
72. cf., ibid., pp. 245. 
73. cf. "In a historical inquiry what can be established with 
sufficient certainty about those events which are not only objects 
of faith but also grounds of faith?" ibid., pp. 244. 
74. ibid., pp. 245-246. 
75. id., "The Position Of Christology In The Church In Between 
Exegesis And D:Jgmatics", T.I. Vol. XI, pp. 201-202. 
76. id., Fcr, pp. 250. cf. "Jesus understood himself as something 
roc>re than merely some kind of preacher with a mission to arouse 
men to a sense of religion such that his message merely pointed to 
a relationship between God and man, a relationship itself already 
existing independently of the message pointing to it. He 
understood himself, rather, as one in whose message (precisely as 
his), and in whose person that which he preached was actually made 
present in a new and irrevocable form as a new and insurpassable 
sllllll10ns of God." id., "The Position Of Christology In The Church 
In Between Exegesis And ll:Jgmatics", T.I. Vol. XI, pp. 202. 
77. id. , Fcr, pp. 254. cf. "The closeness of God's Kingdom, which 
did not always exist but does now and in a new presence as the 
victorious situation of man's salvation, a situation of radical 
conversion or metanoia, is for the pre-resurrection Jesus already 
inseparably connected with his person." ibid., pp. 251-252. cf. 
"He is the final call of God, and after him no other follows or 
286 
can follow because of the radical nature in which God, no longer 
represented by something else, promises himself." ibid., pp. 253. 
78. cf. "Jesus maintains in death his unique claim of an identity 
between his message and his person in the hope that in this death 
he will be vindicated by God with regard to his claim." ibid., 
pp. 255. 
79. cf., ibid., pp. 297. 
80. ~ will treat of Rahner 's full understanding of the crucifixion 
when we turn to discuss Rahner's understanding of the 
soteriological implications of God's self-communication in section 
6.5. 
81. cf. "The death and resurrection of Jesus is such that by its very 
nature it is subsumed into the resurrection. It is a death into 
the resurrection. And the resurrection does not mean the 
beginning of a new period in the life of Jesus, a further 
extension of time filled with new and different things." ibid., 
pp. 266. 
82. ibid. cf., ibid., pp. 277. 
83. cf. , id. , "Remarks On The Importance Of The History Of Jesus For 
catholic [k)gmatics", T.I. Vol. XIII, pp. 210. cf. "This Jesus 
with his concrete claim and his history is experienced in the 
resurrect ion experience as of permanent validity and as accepted 
byGod." id., ~. pp. 279. cf. "By the resurrection, then, 
Jesus is vindicated as the absolute saviour. ~ can also say nnre 
cautiously at first as the final 'prophet •." ibid., pp. 279. 
84. ibid. 
85. cf., ibid., pp. 280. 
86. cf. "The hope that a person's history of freedom will be 
conclusive in nature (a hope which is given in the act of 
responsible freedom and which is transcendentally necessary} 
already includes what we mean by the hope of resurrection." id., 
"Jesus' Resurrection", T.I. Vol. XVII, pp. 16. --
87. cf., id., ~. pp. 268. 
88. Gabriel Daly, Creation and Redemption, pp. 88. 
89. cf., id., "Christology Within An Evolutionary View Of The \tbrld", 
T.I. Vol. V, pp. 185. 
90. cf. "~ are entirely justified in understanding creation and 
Incarnation not as two disparate and juxtaposed acts of God 
outwards Which have their origins in two separate initiatives of 
God. Rather in the world as it actually is we can understand 
creation and Incarnation as two ITOil\ents and two phases of the one 
process of God's self-giving and self-expression, although it is 
an intrinsically differentiated process." id., ~. pp. 197. 
91. cf. "The Incarnation of the I.Dgos (however much we insist on the 
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fact that it is itself an historical, unique event in an 
essentially historical world) appears as the ontologically (not 
merely norally, an afterthought) unambiguous goal of the novement 
of creation as a Whole, in relation to which everything prior is 
merely a preparation of the scene." id., "CUrrent Problems In 
Christology", T.I. Vol. I, pp. 165. cf. "His laying hold of this 
part of the s1ngle material and spiritual reality of the reality 
of the world can rightly be understood as the climax of that 
dynamism in Which the self-transcendence of the world as a Whole 
is borne by the W:>rd of God." id., Fcr, pp. 197. 
92. cf. , id. , "Chris to logy Within An Evolutionary View Of The W:>r ld", 
T.I. Vol. V, pp. 174-175. cf. "The God-Man is the initial 
beginning and the definitive triumph of the movement of the 
world's self-transcendence into absolute closeness to the mystery 
of God." id., Fcr, pp. 181. cf. "The first step and definitive 
beginning-, -andthe absolute guarantee that this ultimate and 
basically unsurpassable self-transcendence will succeed and indeed 
has already begun, is to be found in what we call the Hypostatic 
Union. At a first approximation, this must not be seen so much as 
something which distinguishes ,Jesus Our Lord from us, but rather 
as something Which must happen once, and once only, at the point 
Where the world begins to enter into its final phase in Which it 
is to realize its final concentration, its final climax and its 
radical nearness to the absolute mystery call God. Seen from this 
viewpoint, the Incarnation appears as the necessary and permanent 
beginning of the divinization of the world as a Whole." id., 
"Christology Within An Evolutionary View Of The W:>rld", T.I. Vol. 
v, pp. 160-161. 
93. cf., ibid. 
94. cf. "God's self-communication must have a permanent beginning and 
in this beginning a guarantee that it has taken place, a guarantee 
by Which it can rightly demand a free decision t.o accept this 
divine self-communication." id., Fcr, pp. 193. 
95. cf. "In the absolute event of salvation God must live out its 
history as his own history and retain it permanently as something 
done in freedom, for otherwise it would remain something 
inconsequential and provisional for him. Only if this event is his 
own history, a history Which, as lived out in divine and of course 
also in created freedom, determines him once and for all and hence 
becomes irrevocable, only then can we speak of an absolute and 
eschatological event of salvation." ibid., pp. 301. 
96. cf. "Such an understanding in no way denies that God could also 
have created a world without an Incarnation, that is, that he 
could have denied to the self-transcendence of matter that 
ultimate culmination Which takes place in grace and Incarnation. 
For although every such essential transcendence of self is the 
goal of the movement, it is always related to the lower stage as 
grace, as the unexpected and the unnecessary." ibid. , pp. 197. 
97. cf. "For there is no problem in understanding What is called 
creation as a partial llDil\ent in the process in Which God becomes 
world, and in Which God in fact freely expresses himself in his 
I.Dgos Which has become world and matter." id., Fcr, pp. 197. 
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98. cf. "We are presupposing, then, that the goal of the world is 
God's self-communication to it, and that the entire dynamism which 
God has implanted in the process by which the world comes to be in 
self-transcendence (and this as intrinsic to it but not, however, 
as a constitutive element of its own essence) is already directed 
towards this self-communication and its acceptance by the world ... 
id. I FCF, pp. 192. 
99. cf., ibid., pp. 193. 
100. cf., ibid., pp. 316-318. 
101. ibid., pp. 194. cf., id., "Olristology Within An Evolutionary 
View Of The \'hrld", T.I. Vol. V, pp. 175-176. 
102. cf. "This creation in view of grace ••• may have been conceived of 
by God (in the Scotist sense) all along from the very beginning in 
view of Christ as the supreme point in history and the point of 
eschatological irreversibility of this world as endowed with 
divine grace, and if this interpretation is correct, then even the 
supralapsarian grace of the original state was a grace of Christ." 
id., "The Sin Of Adam", T.I. Vol. XI, pp. 256. 
103. cf. "In so far as the universal efficiency of the spirit is always 
oriented towards the high point of its historical mediation, in 
other words, in so far as the event of Christ is the final cause 
of the communication of the Spirit to the world, it can truly be 
said that this spirit is everywhere and from the outset the spirit 
of Jesus Christ, the l.Dgos of God who became man." id., FCF, pp. 
318. cf., id., "Jesus Christ In The Non-christian Religions", 
T.I. Vol. xvir:- pp. 46. 
104. cf. "Since the transcendental self-communication of God as an 
offer to man's freedom is an existential of every person, and 
since it is a moment in the self-communication of God to the world 
which reaches its goal and its climax in Jesus Christ, we can 
speak of anonyt!Dus Christianity." id., FCF, pp. 176. cf., ibid., 
pp. 306. For the full statement of Rahner's theory of anonYJ!DUS 
Christianity see the article: id., "Anonyt!DUs Christians", in T.I. 
Vol. VI, pp. 390-398. 
105. cf. "Consequently, anyone who, though still far from any 
revelation explicitly formulated in words, accepts his existence 
in patient silence (or, better, in faith, hope and love), accepts 
it as the mystery which 1 ies hidden in the mystery of eternal love 
and which bears life in the womb of death, is saying ~ to Christ 
even if he does not know it." id., FCF, pp. 228. 
106. cf. "If we do not turn the saying of .Jesus that he himself is 
truly loved in every neighbour into an 'as if' or merely 1nto a 
theory of juridical imputation, then, when this saying is read 
from out of the experience of love itself, it says that an 
absolute love which gives itself radically and unconditionally to 
another person affirms Christ implicitly in faith and love." id., 
FCF I pp. 295-296. -
107. cf., D. Tracy, Blessed Rage For Order: The New Pluralism In 
Theology, (New York: The Seabury Press 1975), pp. 172. 
289 
108. Rahner states that salvation "implies the absolute self-
communication of God in himself as the innenrost power of our 
existence and as our goal." ibid., pp. 205. 
109. cf. "W:! are calling saviour here that historical subjectivity in 
which, first, this process of God's absolute self-communication to 
the spiritual world as a whole exists irrevocably; secondly, that 
process in which this divine self-communication can be recognized 
unambiguously as irrevocable; and thirdly, that process in which 
God's self-communication reaches its climax in so far as this 
climax must be understood as a IIDment within the total history of 
the human race, and as such must not simply be identified with the 
totality of the spiritual world under God's self-communication." 
ibid. 1 PP• 194. 
110. id., "Christology Within An Evolutionary View Of The W:>rld", T.I. 
Vol. V, pp. 185. 
111. id., "Redemption", Concise Theological Dictionary, pp. 396. cf. 
"In a history which, through the free grace of God has its goal in 
an absolute and irrevocable self-communication of God to the 
spiritual creature in a self-communication which is finally 
established through its goal and climax, i.e. through the 
Incarnation - the redeeming power which overcomes sin is 
necessarily found precisely in this climax of the Incarnation and 
in the realization of this divine human reality." id., 
"Christology Within An Evolutionary View Of The Wlrld", T.I. Vol. 
V, pp. 186. cf. "It has also been revealed in this experience of 
freedom that man • s no to God, as far as the whole history of human 
fr~om is concerned, was permitted by God in this yes to His own 
self-communication to created freedom and that it remains embraced 
by this yes of God which remains victorious in the history of 
sal vat ion as a whole. " id. , "Theology Of Freedom", T. I. Vol. VI, 
pp. 196. -
112. cf. "'Ibis act (of revelation) is never merely of the nature of a 
thing, but rather it always has an ontological character." id., 
~. pp. 300. 
113. id., "Current Problems In Christology", T.I. Vol. I, pp. 167. 
114. cf. "God's central and definitive saving act... is the single 
inner unity of Incarnation, Cross and Resurrection, in which he 
definitively and radically communicated himself to the world and 
in which he really came to us." id., "Theos In The New Testament", 
T.I. Vol. I, pp. 88. -
115. id., "On The Theology Of The Incarnation", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 116. 
116. id., "Christology Within An Evolutionary View Of The W:>rld", T.I. 
Vol. v, pp. 187. cf. "From this perspective we can come to the 
idea of an 'absolute event of salvation' and of an 'absolute 
saviour', which are two aspects of one and the same event: it is 
the historical and personal event, and not merely a word which is 
added to the reality or merely a verbal promise, in which man 
experiences his essential being in the above sense as really 
affirmed by God in and through his absolute, irreversible and 
'eschatological' offer of himself. This touches all his 
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dimensions because it is only then that 
fulfilment of the whole person." id., FCF, PP~ 
117. cf., ibid., pp. 293. 
salvation is 
298. 
the 
118. cf. "Hum.:mity and history form a genuine unity and do not merely 
consist in a sum of individual human beings and isolated 
biographies put together by our thought processes." id., "The One 
Christ And The Universality Of Salvation" I T.I. vor:- XVI, pp. 
210. 
119. cf. "The Incarnation appears as the necessary and permanent being 
of the divinization of the world as a whole." id., "Christology 
Within An Evolutionary View Of The W:>rld", T.I. Vol. V, pp. 161. 
cf. Rahner • s claim that in Christ, "the mystery of our 
participation in the divine nature is promised to us in a 
definitive and historically tangible way." id., FCF, pp. 213. 
cf., id., FCF, pp. 81. -- --
120. cf. "Thus, this event of becoming man is an 'eschatological' 
event: the definitive salvation of the world, irrevocable and 
unsurpassable, by God • s grace in the W:>rd of the Father become 
flesh, is already definitely in the world in virtue of what took 
place in and through Mary, and had to and still has to merely work 
itself out in what we call the Cross of the Son, his Resurrection 
and the history of the world post Christum natum. 11 id., 11The 
Interpretation Of The D:lgma Of The Assumption", T.I. vor:-I, pp. 
216-217. 
121. id., FCF, pp. 293. 
122. id., "The One Christ And The Universality Of Salvation", T.I. 
Vol. XVI, pp. 207. cf., ibid., pp. 211. 
123. ibid., pp. 207. cf., id., FCF, pp. 317. 
124. id., "Salvation III", E.T.,. pp. 1525. 
125. cf., id., FCF, pp. 282. 
126. id., "Salvation III", E.T., pp. 1525. 
127. cf., id., FCF, pp. 284. 
128. ibid., pp. 297. 
129. cf. "The life and death of Jesus taken together, then, are the 
'cause' of God's salvific will (to the extent that these two 
things are regarded as different) insofar as this sa1vific will 
establishes itself really and irrevocably in this Life and death. 
In other words, insofar as the life and death of Jesus, or the 
death which recapitulates and culminates his 1 ife, possess a 
causality of a quasi-sacramental and real-symbolic nature... id., 
FCF, pp. 284. 
130. id., 11Salvation III", E.T., pp. 1526. 
131. cf., id., FCF, pp. 284. 
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132. id., "The One Christ And The Universality Of salvation", T.I. 
Vol. XVI, pp. 213. cf., id., "The Theology Of The Symlx>l", T. I. 
Vol. IV, pp. 221-252. -
133. cf., id., "The One Christ And The Universality Of salvation", T.I. 
Vol. XVI, pp. 216. 
134. cf. "'\'e may assert the following: the cross {together with the 
resurrection of Jesus) has a primary sacramental causality for the 
salvation of all men, in so far as it mediates salvation to man b¥ 
means of salvific grace Which is universally operative in the 
world. It is the sign of this grace and of its victorious and 
irreversible activity in the world. The effectiveness of the cross 
is based on the fact that it is the primary sacramental sign of 
grace." ibid., pp. 212. 
135. cf. "Given the unity and solidarity of mankind, we have here 
before us the sign of an irreversible positive outcome of the one 
historical process. Before this event took place the positive 
ending of salvation history was not assured with tangible 
historical certainty, but was obscured b¥ the ambiguity of human 
and divine freedom. Thus we may predicate of this sign of the 
salvation of the whole world the type of sacramental causality 
which was mentioned earlier. Because Jesus died and rose again, 
therefore salvation is offered and given to the Whole of mankind; 
taken together cross and resurrect ion are the • cause • of the 
salvation of all men. To avoid the problems alluded to above, 
this • causality • must be thought of in terms of • sacramenta 1 sign 
causality', Which is brought about b¥ the prior divine will to 
save mankind and is not itself the cause of this divine will." 
ibid., pp. 214. 
136. cf., id.' 
pp. 113.""""" 
137. id., FCF, 
138. cf., ibid., 
139. ibid. 
"On The Theology Of The Incarnation", T.I., Vol. IV, 
pp. 195. 
pp. 219. 
140. id. , "On The Theology Of The Incarnation", T. I. Vol. IV, pp. 113. 
141. cf., id., FCF, pp. 219-220. 
142. ibid., pp. 220. cf., id., "On The Theology Of The Incarnation", 
T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 113. 
143. cf. ''Vi! may not regard this process b¥ which one changes in 
something else as a contradict ion to God • s inunutabi li ty, nor allow 
this changing in something else to be reduced to asserting a 
change of something else." id., FCF, pp. 221. cf., id., "On The 
TheologyOf The Incarnation-n-;-T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 113 footnote 3. 
144. cf. "N:>w this gives us a formulation which is not intended to 
offer a positive insight into the compatibility of the dogma of 
God • s inunutabil i ty and the possibility of becoming in the eternal 
Logos, nor a positive solution to the duality of this fundamental 
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Christian assertion. It is a formulation which clearly and 
seriously maintains ooth sides of it." id., FCF, pp. 220. 
145. cf. "~ must maintain methodologically the immutability of God and 
yet it would be basically a denial of the incarnation if we used 
it alone to determine what this mystery could be ••• we learn from 
the Incarnation that immutability (which is not eliminated) is not 
simply and uniquely a characteristic of God, but that in spite of 
his immutability he can truly become something." id., "On The 
Theology Of The Incarnation", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 113-114 footnote 
3. 
146. id., FCF, pp. 221. cf., id., "On The Theology Of The 
Incarnation", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 113-114 footnote 3. 
147. cf. "God goes out of himself, he himself, he as the self-giving 
fullness. Because he can do this, because this is his free and 
primary possibility, for this reason he is defined in scripture as 
love." id., FCF, pp. 222. cf. "The primary phenomenon given by 
faith 1spreclSely the self-emptying of God, his becoming, the 
kenosis and genesisofGodhimself." ibid. cf., id., "On The 
Theology Of The Incarnation", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 114-.-
148. id., "OnTheTheologyOfThe Incarnation", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 114-
115. cf. "Insofar as in his abiding and 1nfinite fullness he 
empties himself, the other comes to be as God's very own reality. " 
id., FCF, pp. 222. cf. "This brings ustoan ontological 
ultimate, which a purely rational ontology might perhaps never 
suspect and find it difficult to take cognizance of and insert as 
a primordial truth into its most basic and seminal utterances: the 
absolute, or more correctly, he who is the Absolute, has, in the 
pure freedom of his infinite and abiding unrelatedness, the 
possibility of himself becoming that other thing, the finite; God, 
in and by the fact that he empties himself gives away himself, 
poses the other as his own reality." id., "On The Theology Of The 
Incarnation", T.I. Vol. IV, pp. 113-114. 
149. cf. "'lhe absolute, or, more correctly, the absolute one in the 
pure freedom of his infinite unrelatedness, which he always 
preserves, possesses the possibility of himself becoming the 
other, the finite. He possesses the possibility of establishing 
the other as his own reality by dispossessing himself, by giving 
himself away. " id. , FCF, pp. 222. 
150. id. , "'lhe Theology Of The Symbol" , T. I • Vol. IV, pp. 228. 
151. M. Taylor, God Is Love: Of Karl Rahner, 
(Atlanta Georgia: Scholars 
152. Tracy, gp. cit., pp. 175. 
153. F. Kerr, "Rahner Retrospective 
lvbnolithismus", New Blackfriars, 
pp. 232-233. 
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